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	<title>Comments on: The Doctrine of Part Performance: Still Strict After All These Years</title>
	<link>http://ablawg.ca/2008/03/04/the-doctrine-of-part-performance-still-strict-after-all-these-years/</link>
	<description></description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2012 17:35:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: ABlawg.ca &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Caveator Beware: Damages for Wrongfully Filing a Caveat Can Be Substantial</title>
		<link>http://ablawg.ca/2008/03/04/the-doctrine-of-part-performance-still-strict-after-all-these-years/#comment-72821</link>
		<dc:creator>ABlawg.ca &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Caveator Beware: Damages for Wrongfully Filing a Caveat Can Be Substantial</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2009 13:22:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ablawg.ca/2008/03/04/the-doctrine-of-part-performance-still-strict-after-all-these-years/#comment-72821</guid>
		<description>[...] One issue not addressed by the trial judge was whether section 4 of the SOF really had any application to the facts in this case at all. Frisgo raised the issue of its relevance, but Madam Justice Bensler ignored it. According to Frisgo, this was not, as the language of section 4 contemplates, an action brought to enforce an agreement. Rather, it was a claim by Frisgo respecting Brower&#8217;s caveat. In an earlier post, my colleague Jonnette Watson Hamilton argues convincingly that in order for a caveator to &#8220;show cause why the caveat should not be discharged&#8221; in response to an application to discharge a caveat brought under section 141 of the LTA, the caveator will be trying to prove the existence of an enforceable agreement evidencing the interest in land being protected. This could, in effect, be viewed as an &#8220;action&#8221; caught by section 4 of the SOF: see Jonnette Watson Hamilton, The Doctrine of Part Performance: Still Strict After All These Years. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] One issue not addressed by the trial judge was whether section 4 of the SOF really had any application to the facts in this case at all. Frisgo raised the issue of its relevance, but Madam Justice Bensler ignored it. According to Frisgo, this was not, as the language of section 4 contemplates, an action brought to enforce an agreement. Rather, it was a claim by Frisgo respecting Brower&#8217;s caveat. In an earlier post, my colleague Jonnette Watson Hamilton argues convincingly that in order for a caveator to &#8220;show cause why the caveat should not be discharged&#8221; in response to an application to discharge a caveat brought under section 141 of the LTA, the caveator will be trying to prove the existence of an enforceable agreement evidencing the interest in land being protected. This could, in effect, be viewed as an &#8220;action&#8221; caught by section 4 of the SOF: see Jonnette Watson Hamilton, The Doctrine of Part Performance: Still Strict After All These Years. [&#8230;]</p>
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