This all makes sense. for what it’s worth, however, I don’t think that Resurfice is turning out to be the potentially useful case for plaintiffs that some (including me) originally thought it might turn out to be. Taking McLachlin CJ’s phrasing of the “material contribution” test seriously, it seems on its face to be importing the augmented risk threshold that was stated by Wilberforce in McGhee, adopted (with restrictions) in Fairchild, but rejected in various Canadian decisions, including Snell v. Farrell. Yet, that threshold is repeatedly rejected by courts, noting that it is to be reserved for the rarest of circumstances (whatever those might be). (One notable exception is the decision of Ross J., sitting ad hoc at the ABCA in Bowes v. Edmonton, but I rather doubt that was the result of a conscious decision to adopt Resurfice as opposed, say, to the but-for test). As a result, I seriously doubt that Resurfice would be of much assistance to a Taser victim.

Of course, as your post demonstrates, Taser plaintiffs wouldn’t need to resort to the Resurfice test anyways: the but-for test, and the thin skull rule to temper any remoteness problems, would suffice.

Russ