Yet, as the concurring judge, Mr. Justice Martin convincingly says, “finding that Dr. Wanglin falsely accused two colleagues of serious, even criminal, misconduct, combined with her evidence that she had not said those things, gives rise to only one reasonable conclusion: she made the impugned comments dishonestly and maliciously.

However, Mr. Justice Martin is unable to find that the complaint was “in the public interest,” when the majority, as convincingly, says, “…false and unsubstantiated allegations can have an adverse effect on the public interest and amount to professional misconduct…”

The majority’s reconciliation which was that the intervening Health Disciplines Board found that the complaints were not made out in fact, (”..the basis of the Board’s decision, however, was that the facts as found by the Committee did not support the charges,”) seems difficult to accept in light of Mr. Justice Peter’s forceful presentation that the facts warranted a negative finding on the public interest aspect of the complaint.

This being said, with its clear introduction of the requirement of malice into the assessment of discipline for an unfounded professional on professional complaint — something which the author points out as wise and appropriate for the policy context — the panel can be perhaps forgiven.