Archive for the ‘Civil Procedure and Evidence’ Category

“The proof of the pudding is in the eating” that litigation is not the best way to quantify interim costs.

Wednesday, January 11th, 2012

PDF version: “The proof of the pudding is in the eating” that litigation is not the best way to quantify interim costs.

Case considered: R v Caron, 2011 ABCA 385

Gilles Caron has been a very present figure before the Alberta courts since ABlawg began posting comments in late 2007 (see here). Caron is challenging the constitutionality of Alberta’s legislation on the basis that the province’s laws are not enacted in both English and French. That issue is now before the Court of Appeal (see 2010 ABCA 343 and here). Caron’s litigation has also involved an access to justice component in that he has pursued interim costs awards to fund his litigation. That issue went to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled that the Alberta government was required to fund Caron’s language rights challenge (see 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 SCR 78 and here). The lingering question was, to what extent was such funding required? That issue was recently considered by the Alberta Court of Appeal. In a decision written by Justice Jean Côté, Caron was awarded far less funding than he sought for the Court of Appeal litigation, and in the form of a loan rather than a grant (see 2011 ABCA 385).

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Cost Decision from Canadian Human Rights Commission Case: Implications for Albertans

Tuesday, November 29th, 2011

PDF version: Cost Decision from Canadian Human Rights Commission Case: Implications for Albertans 

Decision considered: Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 53 (”Mowat“)

The Supreme Court of Canada’s (”SCC”) decision about costs in the Mowat case was released in October, and this will have significant ramifications in cases under the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 (CHRA). (See my blog on the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal for a discussion of the facts of the case here). The issue of costs in the context of human rights cases is significant, as it may become an access to justice issue, especially in cases with public interest issues.

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How persistent does a vexatious litigant have to be?

Wednesday, July 27th, 2011

PDF version:  How persistent does a vexatious litigant have to be?

Case considered: Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 206

Are the 2007 vexatious litigant provisions in the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, being overused? Is it too easy to have a person declared a “vexatious litigant and barred from bringing or continuing court actions without leave of a court? I am sure that every person who has had a vexatious litigant order made against them would answer “yes” to both questions, but what might a more detached assessment reveal? These questions demand empirical answers that I cannot give. However, the recent decision of Justice Frans Slatter in Wong v Giannacopoulos suggests that vexatious litigant orders are only being granted in rather extreme cases. It seems to take a lot of improper behaviour against a variety of long-suffering defendants before a person is denied unmediated access to a court.

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“Amended Amended Redacted Document” Ordered Released to the Press and Public Fifteen Days after Judgment

Wednesday, July 20th, 2011

 PDF version: “Amended Amended Redacted Document” Ordered Released to the Press and Public Fifteen Days after Judgment

Case considered: Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (”Globe and Mail“)

When the police want to obtain a search warrant, they file a document with a justice of the peace or judge called an “Information to Obtain a Search Warrant” or “ITO”. In this case, Judge J.D. Bascom had sealed the contents of an ITO filed on a case with respect to an “Unnamed Company”. The Globe and Mail applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench for access to the ITO (subject to some redactions).

Justice William Tilleman dealt with the application for access to the ITO, and noted that he had to “face the difficult task of balancing the sometimes competing rights to freedom of expression and the press, with the administration of justice, the protection of innocent persons, and the right to a fair trial” (Globe and Mail at para 2).

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Supreme Court of Canada hears appeal in Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society

Thursday, January 27th, 2011

Case commented on: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society et al., 2009 ABCA 403, appeal heard January 27, 2011

On January 27, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada heard arguments in the case of Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society et al. The case arose after the provincial Health Minister issued a directive in August 1991 indicating that the operators of long term care facilities in Alberta were to charge and collect the maximum accommodation charge permitted by s. 3(1) of the Nursing Homes Operation Regulation, A.R. 258/85. The plaintiffs sought to certify class action proceedings under the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-16.5, on behalf of approximately 14,000 long term care facility residents. The plaintiffs argued that the residents had been overcharged because the Crown and Regional Health Authorities did not ensure that the monies paid by them for the “accommodation charge” were used solely for accommodation and meals. The class proceedings were certified by Justice Sheila Greckol of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (see 2008 ABQB 490) and this decision was upheld by the Alberta Court of Appeal (2009 ABCA 403, per Justices Conrad, Berger and Rowbotham). The overall issue in the case is whether class proceedings were properly certified, which in turn raises issues related to the underlying cause of action. The Supreme Court described those issues as follows: What is the test for imposing a fiduciary duty upon the Crown outside the Aboriginal context? Does the province owe a private law duty to “exercise all reasonable care, skill and diligence with respect to the administration, monitoring and auditing of the public funding provided to operators and the accommodation charges paid to operators by residents”? If the province does not owe a fiduciary duty or duty of care with respect to setting the maximum accommodation charge, can dismissal of the common law claims against the province be avoided by pleading unjust enrichment? Do the pleadings support a Charter damages claim? Should a class action be certified based on any surviving cause of action? The Supreme Court reserved its decision in the case.

When is Delay “Undue” under Section 7(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act?

Saturday, October 23rd, 2010

PDF version: When is Delay “Undue” under Section 7(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act 

Case considered: Eiffel Developments Ltd. v. Paskuski, 2010 ABQB 619

In June of 2007, Eiffel Developments Ltd. sued Geoffrey and Lisa Paskuski for $46,667, alleging non-payment under a contract for the construction of the Paskuskis’ home. Three years later, Eiffel asked Jodi L. Mason, Master in Chambers, to deem service of Eiffel’s Statement of Claim on the Paskuskis to be good and sufficient. The Paskuskis made three arguments opposing this simple application: (1) that there was no evidence of service of the Statement of Claim and an absence of service cannot be cured; (2) that even if an absence of service could be cured, there was no evidence to support the relief sought by Eiffel, and (3) that Eiffels’ claim should be stayed on the basis of an arbitration clause in the home construction agreement. The Paskuskis lost all three arguments. This comment will focus on the third argument seeking enforcement of an arbitration agreement.

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Estoppel arguments fail once again in an oil and gas lease case

Monday, July 26th, 2010

PDF version: Estoppel arguments fail once again in an oil and gas lease case 

Case considered: Desoto Resources Limited v. Encana Corporation, 2010 ABQB 448

In this case Justice William Tilleman dismissed an appeal from Master Jodi Mason’s decision in chambers in which she had granted summary judgement in favour of the defendant in the action, Encana. Desoto had been seeking a declaration that it had a number of valid leases notwithstanding that the primary term of the leases had expired in the 1970s and that there had been no production on the leases for a period beginning in the late 1990s. This was apparently, at least at the outset, as a result of the properties being shut-in by order of the Energy Resources Conservation Board because of the failure of the then lessee to pay well abandonment deposits.

I blogged on Master Mason’s decision - see Successful application for summary dismissal in an oil and gas lease validity case.

On appeal, Desoto focused on estoppel arguments urging that the leases should survive on the basis of promissory estoppel, estoppel by acquiescence, or estoppel by deed.

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A custodian of a lawyer’s practice is not a “mere warehouseman”

Wednesday, March 3rd, 2010

Case considered: Polis v. Edwards, 2010 ABCA 59

PDF version: A custodian of a lawyer’s practice is not a “mere warehouseman”

There are few written decisions on the rights, liberties, powers and immunities of custodians appointed by the court to wind up or manage another lawyer’s practice pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L 8, section 95. Polis v. Edwards, 2010 ABCA 59 adds to that small body of law, although its ability to do so was limited by the fact the appellants were self-represented - and apparently not very well self-represented at that. The Court of Appeal notes (at para. 4) that there were at least 23 different issues or grounds of appeal set out in the appellants’ joint factum and, although there might have been more, they were incomprehensible in law. Nevertheless, one legal question of interest to more than the parties was squarely before the Court of Appeal and that was the question of whether a custodian is entitled to tax the accounts of the member of the Law Society of Alberta (LSA) whose legal business they were appointed to manage or wind up. That question was, not surprisingly, answered in the affirmative.

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The Animal Keepers Act: Perennial Problems of Priority

Wednesday, January 20th, 2010

Case considered: Rachar v. Litvak, 2009 ABQB 441

PDF version: The Animal Keepers Act: Perennial Problems of Priority

This is the first case to consider the Animal Keepers Act, S.A. 2005, c. A-40.5, a piece of legislation which came into force in November of 2005. It replaced a 101-year-old statute, the Livery Stable Keepers Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.L-14, which was originally enacted in 1884 as an ordinance of the North-West Territories and applied to the area that would become Alberta. According to the Alberta Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Animal Keepers Act “provides a person who boards or cares for an animal a means of collecting outstanding bills owed by the owner of such animals with priority over all other liens, bills of sales, etc. without the use of costly, complicated legal processes.” The new Act seems to live up to this description. While extensively used by the cattle industry and other keepers of livestock, neither this Act nor its predecessor have been the subject of much judicial consideration. Those rare disputes that have been taken to court tend to involve issues of priority among creditors, as does this case.

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The role of a limitations defence in a judicial review application involving the Crown’s duty to consult

Monday, October 26th, 2009

Case considered: Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v Alberta (Minister of Energy), 2009 ABQB 576

PDF version: The role of a limitations defence in a judicial review application involving the Crown’s duty to consult

Oil sands developments in Alberta are taking place in the traditional territories of First Nations in areas of the province that are subject to Treaty 8. As with the other numbered treaties, Treaty 8 contains a hunting clause with a “lands taken up” proviso which reads as follows:

And Her Majesty the Queen HEREBY AGREES with the said Indians that they shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as before described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the Government of the country, acting under the authority of Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.

The Supreme Court examined the implications of this clause for Crown disposition policies in Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 (Mikisew Cree). I commented on that decision in a short note in Resources: “Mikisew Cree and the Lands Taken Up Clause of the Numbered Treaties” (2006), 92/93 Resources 1 - 8.

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