Lucy is a 34 year old elephant who lives in the Edmonton Valley Zoo. In recent years Lucy has attracted significant media and celebrity attention, as animal welfare activists have campaigned for her transfer to a warmer climate (details on the campaign and Lucy herself are documented here). Activists insist that Lucy is in distress because of her living conditions in the Edmonton zoo. Media celebrities including William Shatner and Bob Barker have called upon the City of Edmonton to allow Lucy to move south. Lucy’s plight has attracted the attention of the local media as well (see “Free Lucy the elephant: protesters“, CBC News). The Valley Zoo insists Lucy is fine and cannot be safely moved.

In the Fall of 2009, ZooCheck Canada and the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) retained Ontario lawyer Clayton Ruby to advise them on possible legal remedies for Lucy. In February 2010 ZooCheck, PETA, and a local Alberta resident (Tove Reece) filed an Originating Notice in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench seeking a judicial declaration that the City of Edmonton (as operator of the Valley Zoo) was contravening section 2 of the Animal Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, in its treatment of Lucy at the Valley Zoo. Associate Chief Justice John Rooke heard the ZooCheck application along with the City’s motion to strike the proceeding under Rule 129 of the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/1968. In Reece v. Edmonton (City), 2010 ABQB 538 Justice Rooke grants the City’s motion to strike on the basis that the ZooCheck/PETA application is an abuse of process for two reasons: (1) the application does not conform with the legislative path for bringing this issue to the Court; (2) no individual can bring a civil action to enforce criminal law. Justice Rooke also makes some obiter statements on standing which I comment on below.

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Public participation is a key feature of energy and natural resources development in Alberta. The provincial government often expresses its desire for participation by Albertans in its policy making and planning processes. At the project approval stage, project proponents regularly conduct public consultation programs and regulatory boards hold public hearings and award costs to interveners.

Yet there are signs that public participation is not all that it seems in the Alberta energy and resources development context. Albertans seem frustrated and dissatisfied with the current level or type of public participation available: see, for example, Dan Woynillowicz & Steve Kennett, “Passage of Bill 46 Perpetuates EUB Shortcomings” (2007). Applications for leave to appeal decisions of energy tribunals on issues of public participation and procedural fairness seem to be on the rise: see, for example, Prince v. Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board), 2010 ABCA 214, Cheyne v. Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2009 ABCA 94, and Kelly v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2008 ABCA 52.

The Canadian Institute of Resources Law (CIRL) at the University of Calgary is currently engaged in a research project, funded by the Alberta Law Foundation, which is focusing on legal and policy questions in relation to public participation in the Alberta energy and natural resources development context. To obtain input on the issues and challenges facing public participation in this context, CIRL held a Round Table discussion at the University of Calgary on April 16, 2010. There were 20 participants in attendance, all of whom have experience with public participation issues in the energy and natural resources development context. There was representation from landowners, regulators, industry, the regulatory bar, environmental and natural resources organizations, multi-stakeholder consultation groups, policy and energy consultants, and academia.

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Report commented on: Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage, August 2010

I don’t often sing the praises of government reports. Often written in turgid prose, they seem more concerned to find the lowest common denominator that all can live with rather than to identify and evaluate the policy problem and policy options to address that problem. This is even more likely to be the case where you have an “inter-agency” report; a report cobbled together by multiple cooks and authors, where the LCD really is the way to go. But I like this report of the United States federal Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage, which came out earlier this month. It should be compulsory reading, not just for CCS wonks, but also for anybody engaged in formulating public regulatory policy in response to any new technology.

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Case considered: Zhang v. Lin, 2010 ABQB 420

Zhang v. Lin raised the question of whether a divorce granted in Texas should be recognized in Alberta. Interestingly, the court determined that it should refuse recognition of the Texas decree because it violated Canadian public policy. In the past, such a defence has been seen as more of a theoretical than a real possibility. In Zhang, however, the court came to that conclusion very readily. What concerned the Alberta court was not so much the divorce itself but the apparent lack of corollary relief by way of child and spousal support available to the respondent in Texas.

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Case considered: Fuhr Estate v. Husky Oil Marketing Company, 2010 ABQB 495

This decision by Mr. Justice Don J. Manderscheid answers a novel question: whether section 49(7) of the Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43 allows an applicant to appeal the remedy awarded by an arbitrator without raising a question of law or seeking leave to appeal under section 44? Section 49(7) provides, in part, that “[i]f the award gives a remedy that the court . . . would not grant in a proceeding based on similar circumstances, the court may . . . grant a different remedy requested by the applicant. . .”. In Fuhr Estate v. Husky Oil Marketing Company, the applicant, Mrs. Fuhr, did not want the damages awarded her; she wanted specific performance. She argued she could by-pass the appeal provisions of the Arbitration Act and rely on section 49(7) alone for the remedy she wanted. It seems that section 49(7) has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny, even though an identical provision appears in the domestic arbitration legislation of Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario and Saskatchewan. Neither does the section appear to have been considered in the literature; the standard texts usually merely repeat what section 49(7) states. While the decision is also noteworthy because Justice Manderscheid adopts a rather unorthodox interpretation of section 44, this comment will focus on the section 49(7) issues.

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Cases considered: R. v. D.J.D., 2010 ABCA 207; R. v. D.J.D., 2009 ABPC 216

Until 1983, the definition of rape in Canada excluded offences committed by a husband against his wife. In that year, reforms to the Criminal Code did away with the offence of rape altogether, and implemented a new scheme of sexual offences that were gender neutral and could, explicitly, be committed by one spouse against another (see Bill C-127, Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980 81 82 83, c. 125, s. 246.8). The issue of spousal sexual violence has received little specific attention in Canada since the reforms of 1983. However, the African and Canadian Women’s Human Rights Project (ACWHRP) - a project involving lawyers, activists and academics in Canada, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi - is presently studying the lessons learned from the criminalization of marital rape in Canada in the context of efforts to criminalize this form of violence in the 3 African countries. I am completing a review of case law in Canada - some 275 decisions over the past 27 years - which shows that cases of spousal sexual violence still continue to be treated differently from other sexual assault cases when it comes to issues of consent, mistaken belief in consent, evidentiary matters, and sentencing. On the latter issue, a recent case of the Alberta Court of Appeal, R. v. D.J.D., brings to light some of the considerations faced by judges when sentencing offenders for spousal sexual violence.

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Case considered: R. v. Asiala, 2010 ABQB 450

Earlier this year I wrote an ABlawg post discussing s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in relation to three Alberta cases decided in late 2009 (see A policy of delay? The cost of s.11 (b) Charter violations in Alberta). Section 11(b) of the Charter guarantees the right to be tried within a reasonable time. In my post, I noted that trial delays appeared to be a growing trend that should be closely monitored by the citizenry, particularly as they relate to government policy in allocating budgetary resources for judicial services. What I neglected to say is that sometimes delay has nothing to do with government policy, lack of judicial resources or even the tactical advantage gained by one or both sides in a case. On rare occasions delay is caused by the human element of the judicial system.

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Case considered: Star Energy Weald Basin Limited v Bocardo SA, [2010] UKSC 35

It is not every day, or even every year, that the highest court in the United Kingdom passes judgement in an oil and gas case. But the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom did so at the end of July and while much of the Court’s reasoning turns on the details of the UK’s petroleum legislation, and in particular on the terms of the Crown vesting legislation in that jurisdiction, the Court also had something to say about the common law ownership rights of the surface owner. These comments merit carefully scrutiny in the context of the ongoing debate in Alberta and elsewhere about ownership rights in relation to pore space, an important issue in the context of carbon capture and storage (CCS).

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Case considered: Burgess v. Stephen W. Huk Professional Corporation, 2010 ABQB 424

In the past few years, it has become increasingly difficult to ascertain in human rights cases what exactly the complainant must prove in order to make out a claim of discrimination. The usual legal analysis for discrimination cases under the Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. c. A-25.5 (”AHRA”) was established in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (”O’Malley“) and is as follows:

1. Has the complainant made out a prima facie (sufficient to establish a case unless disproved) case of discrimination on a ground covered under the AHRA?

2. If yes, can the respondent nevertheless demonstrate that the contravention of the AHRA did not occur, was a bona fide occupational requirement, or was reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances?

3. If yes, there is no discrimination under the AHRA. If no, what is the appropriate remedy?

For many years, human rights commissions used the test for “discrimination” under s.15(1) of the Charter set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143:

I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.

Thus, the complainant has the burden of making out a prima facie case that he or she had experienced discrimination (as set out above) on the basis of a ground listed under an area (e.g., employment) covered under the legislation.

This procedure seemed to serve human rights commissions well, but in 1999 uncertainty was introduced when some commissions adopted the new and complex legal test for s.15(1) devised by the Supreme Court of Canada in Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (”Law“). The next several years of human rights cases often dealt with whether the test developed in Law was the proper test to be used in human rights cases. (See the discussion of this issue in my previous ABlawg post Human Rights Panel Faced with Mandatory Retirement (Again)). To further complicate matters, many legal experts believe the test for discrimination set out in Law has been modified by the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41. In Burgess v. Stephen W. Huk Professional Corporation, Madam Justice M.T. Moreau does not mention the Kapp decision in her reasons, but she does set out a requirement that a complainant demonstrate the respondents’ knowledge of the grounds for discrimination. Arguably, this adds more complexity to this area of law.

Ms. Burgess was employed as a dental assistant starting in May 2005 in a clinic owned and operated by Dr. Huk (who was retired from dental practice). She was assigned to work primarily with Dr. Jacob, an associate dentist. Ms. Burgess was supervised by the office manager, Ms. Netter, and the head dental assistant, Ms. Brayer. Her duties included providing chair-side assistance to dentists (Dr. Jacob) during dental procedures, keeping operations sanitized, sterilizing equipment and managing patient flow (para. 5).

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The litigation saga of Omar Khadr continues. On July 22, 2010, the Federal Court of Appeal granted a stay pending appeal of the most recent order of the Federal Court after hearing the appeal by teleconference on July 16, 2010. (See Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 FCA 199). For background on Khadr’s case, including a discussion of the Federal Court order at issue in the appeal, see my earlier ABlawg post, Maureen Duffy, The Third Time Is the Charm? The Ongoing Litigation Regarding Omar Khadr; see also Linda McKay-Panos, My Vote for R. v. Hape as a Significant Legal Case of the Decade.

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