Monthly Archives: September 2011

Conflicts of Interest and Good Judgment

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Case considered: Dow Chemical Canada Inc. v Nova Chemicals Corporation, 2011 ABQB 509

Previously on ABlawg I have suggested that outcomes in conflicts cases turn more on a judge’s overall impression of the facts and the equities than on the precise articulation and application of specific rules (here). A recent judgment of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench aligns with this perception, insofar as the outcome of the case seems closely linked to the judge’s assessment of the good faith and propriety of the conduct of the law firm alleged to be in conflict. The case also, though, shows the continued evolution of the principles that govern conflicts of interest. Specifically, Chief Justice Wittmann’s judgment provides new analysis of the principles governing what is necessary for a client to consent to a conflict in advance, how imputation rules operate in national firms, lawyers transferring between law firms, and the intersection between law society rules and judicial determinations in assessing conflicts. In this way the judgment may indicate that contrary to my earlier suggestion, conflicts cases are in fact like other legal judgments, with outcomes determined by a complex interplay of principles, rules, facts and, above all, the “judgment” of the judge, what in the context of moral decision-making David Luban and Michael Milleman have described as the ability to identify “which principle is most important given the particularities of the situation” (“Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times,” (1995-96) 9 Geo J of Legal Ethics 31 at 39). In other words, it’s not so much whether judges perceive lawyers to have been “good” or not, as it is whether judges perceive lawyers to have been good enough that the applicable principles do not require that they be removed from a file. This does mean that the interplay of fact and law matters more than the precise articulation of the law – i.e., that there is some legitimacy to my general feeling that the fights between the CBA and the Federation of Law Societies over the precise wording of conflicts rules is not a very good use of anyone’s time. But it does not mean that principles are irrelevant.

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The Elephant in the Courtroom

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Case Considered: Reece v Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 238

In March 2011 the Court of Appeal heard an appeal by Zoocheck Canada, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and Tove Reece (collectively referred to as Zoocheck here) from Justice John Rooke’s August 2010 decision to strike Zoocheck’s application for a declaration that the City of Edmonton is violating the Animal Protection Act, RSA 2000 c. A-41 by keeping Lucy the Elephant in its Valley Zoo. See my previous ABlawg comment Lucy the Elephant v Edmonton (City) for some analysis of Justice Rooke’s decision (Reece v Edmonton (City), 2010 ABQB 538), the background concerning Lucy’s health problems and living conditions in the zoo, the applicable legislative framework, and the City’s motion to strike the Zoocheck application. In its August 2011 Reece v Edmonton (City) decision the Court of Appeal dismisses the Zoocheck appeal, with the majority written by Justice Frans Slatter upholding the finding at the Court of Queen’s Bench that the application for a declaration constitutes an abuse of process. In her lengthy dissenting opinion, Madame Justice Catherine Fraser rules the Zoocheck application is not an abuse of process and should go to trial. This Court of Appeal decision is noteworthy to me for three reasons: (1) the sharp contrast of legal theory underlying the majority and the dissent; (2) the environmental ethic informing Justice Fraser’s dissent; and (3) the comments made by Justice Fraser concerning the availability of public interest standing.

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