Case considered: Calgary (City) v Alberta (Municipal Government Board), 2012 ABCA 13

On January 16, 2012 the Alberta Court of Appeal issued a judgment that applies the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 – ruling in Calgary (City) v Alberta (Municipal Government Board), 2012 ABCA 13 that the adequacy of reasons given by a statutory decision-maker are to be reviewed as a matter of substantive review on the reasonableness standard.

The decision in question results by way of appeal by the City of Calgary from Madam Justice Romaine’s decision in Calgary (City) v Alberta (Municipal Government Board), 2010 ABQB 719. I previously discussed that decision in a December 2010 Ablawg post (see here) and I have recently commented on the Supreme Court’s Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union decision (see here).

The purpose of this short comment is simply to note that the Court of Appeal has now applied the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent change in the law on sufficiency of reasons, and that earlier jurisprudence on reviewing the sufficiency of reasons given by a statutory decision-maker should be read with caution.

PDF version: True Questions of Jurisdiction: Administrative Law’s Unicorns?

Decision considered: Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers Association, 2011 SCC 61 

Introduction

In its recent decision reversing the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association (Teachers’ Association), 2010 ABCA 26, the Supreme Court of Canada made significant statements with respect to issues of administrative law. In particular, a majority of the Court held:

1. When an issue is not raised before an administrative decision-maker it may nonetheless be raised in an application for judicial review. A court may, however, exercise its “discretion not to consider an issue raised for the first time on judicial review where it would be inappropriate to do so” (para 22).
2. In such cases deference may still be granted: “Where the reviewing court finds that the tribunal has made an implicit decision on a critical issue, the deference due to the tribunal does not disappear because the issue was not raised before the tribunal” (para 50).
3. In order to be deferential in such circumstances, the court may take into account the reasons that the administrator could have given had the issue been put before it. If a “reasonable basis for the decision is apparent to the reviewing court” then that will suffice (para 55). The court may also look at reasons offered by the administrative decision-maker on the issue in other cases to determine whether the decision-maker’s approach to the issue is reasonable. In some circumstances the court may remit the matter to the decision-maker to allow reasons to be prepared.
4. Finally, and most significantly, a majority of the Court, in reasons prepared by Justice Rothstein, called into question the ability to identify a “true question of jurisdiction” to which deference should not be granted. Justice Rothstein stated that he was “unable to provide a definition of what might constitute a true question of jurisdiction” (para 42).
5. Justice Rothstein held that when an administrative decision-maker interprets its home statute it is presumptively entitled to deference (para 34). Deference will not be offered where the interpretation raises constitutional questions, a question regarding the jurisdictional lines between tribunals or a question of law “that is of central importance to the legal system as a whole and that is outside the adjudicator’s expertise” (para 43). If a party claims that deference is not owed because the matter is a true question of jurisdiction, that party will “be required to demonstrate why the court should not review a tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute on the deferential standard of reasonableness” (para 39).
6. Finally, Justice Rothstein held that once a deferential standard has been identified, it is not necessary to question further how deferential the court should be: “Once it is determined that a review is to be conducted on a reasonableness standard, there is no second assessment of how intensely the review is to be conducted” (para 47).  

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