Author Archives: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

About Jonnette Watson Hamilton

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.). Professor Emerita. Please click here for more information.

Umpires: Qualifications, etc.

Cases Considered: Matti v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 ABQB 451

PDF version:  Umpires: Qualifications, etc.

This is a post about insurance, not baseball. Umpires decide certain types of financial disputes between property owners and insurance companies in particular circumstances. Insurance claims involve umpires when the insured and insurer disagree about the value of damaged or destroyed property or the amount of the insured’s loss. The insured and the insurer each appoint an appraiser and the appraisers appoint an umpire. If the appraisers cannot agree on how to resolve the dispute, then the two appraisers submit their arguments to the umpire. The decision of two of those three persons decides the matter, which means, in effect, that the umpire decides. If the appraisers cannot agree on an umpire, then the insured or insurer can ask the court to appoint one. What qualifications should these decision-makers have? That question has not been the subject of much judicial consideration in Canada and so this decision by Mr. Justice W.P. Sullivan is a welcome one. But it still leaves open many other questions about insurance appraisals; they are a rather ill-defined process.

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More Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: More Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries

Case Commented On: Morrow v Zhang, 2009 ABCA 215, overturning 2008 ABQB 98

In her post critiquing the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Morrow v Zhang, Some Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries, Professor Jennifer Koshan asks, “Did the Court actually apply the new approach to section 15 of the Charter?” I would like to focus on that question and raise a few additional and related matters. I agree with Professor Koshan that the Court of Appeal seems to apply the old test from Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 in its section 15(1) analysis in Morrow v Zhang. However, they do so without a focus on human dignity, which seems to result in the application of the Law test in a very formalistic way, rather than substantively. Does it matter? I think that the use of the original Law test, complete with a focus on human dignity, could have rather easily resulted in an affirmation of the trial judge’s decision. Alternatively, and perhaps more importantly, I think that an application of the test in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, could also have resulted in an affirmation of the trial judge’s decision had that application really focused on stereotyping.

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Is a Bison Squeeze Real or Personal Property? A Question of Law or a Question of Interpretation?

Case considered: Olson v. Angermeier, 2009 ABQB 356

PDF version: Is a Bison Squeeze Real or Personal Property? A Question of Law or a Question of Interpretation?

One of the first things a law student in first year property law class learns is the distinction between real property and personal property, the most basic of divisions in this area of law. The distinction is usually taught with reference to a case or two about the law of fixtures. The law of fixtures is the area of law that encompasses the legal rules that apply to transform personal property to real property and vice versa. There are hundreds of cases concerned with classifying something as real or personal property. The controversies usually arise in connection with the sale of real property. For example, is the dishwasher real or personal property? Does it go with the house on the sale of the real property or can the seller move it out with his or her other personal property? This type of question was the issue in Olson v. Angermeier. Was a bison squeeze a chattel (personal property) or a fixture (real property)? Answering that question would determine whether or not the bison squeeze was part of the sale of the NE¼-9-62-5-W5th.

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The perils of selling the same property twice (with an aside on styles of appellate decision-making)

Case considered: Castledowns Law Office Management Ltd. v. FastTrack Technologies Inc., 2009 ABCA 148

PDF version: The perils of selling the same property twice (with an aside on styles of appellate decision-making)

This was a dispute between two purchasers of the same piece of commercial real estate in Edmonton, the Vienna Building at 7708-104 Street. The vendor, 1131102 Alberta Ltd, sold the property first to FastTrack Technologies Inc. (FastTrack). That agreement was conditional upon the vendor’s lawyer’s approval. The vendor also entered into a second or back-up agreement with Castledowns Law Office Management Ltd. (Castledowns). The back-up agreement with Castledowns was conditional on “satisfactory confirmation of termination” of the FastTrack agreement. The resolution of the dispute turned on the interpretation to be given those words. This was the issue on which the dissent of Mr. Justice Frans Slatter parted ways with the majority judgment of Madam Justice Carole Conrad, concurred in by Mr. Justice Clifton O’Brien. Was it enough if the vendor could legally terminate the agreement with FastTrack and did so? Or did FastTrack have to ratify any purported termination by the vendor? This contract interpretation issue is perhaps less interesting than the fact that neither the majority nor the dissenting judgment engage with the other on that or any other issue. This style of appellate decision-making has been called “uncooperative” in the empirical literature that examines why justices decide as they do. (See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus and Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada.”) The label “uncooperative” is not necessarily intended to be pejorative, depending on the reason for the lack of cooperation. Some judges value independence as the best method for achieving internally consistent reasoned decisions. Some Chief Justices encourage certain styles of interaction in the preparation of judgments. Sometimes, however, the lack of cooperation is due to ideological or personal differences. It usually takes a very large number of judgments before the reason becomes clear, with ideological or personal constraints on cooperation tending to lead to more plurality and dissenting judgments.

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Do testators have moral as well as legal obligations to their dependants? Not in Alberta

Case considered: Petrowski v. Petrowski Estate, 2009 ABQB 196

PDF version: Do testators have moral as well as legal obligations to their dependants? Not in Alberta

Alberta’s Dependants Relief Act, RSA 2000, c. D-10.5 allows adult children who are unable to earn a livelihood by reason of physical or mental disability to challenge their parent’s will if that will does not made “adequate” provision for their “proper maintenance and support.” There is similar legislation in other provinces and the leading precedent on what factors a judge should take into account in exercising their discretion to vary a will is a Supreme Court of Canada decision on appeal from British Columbia: Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807. The Supreme Court held in Tataryn that a judge was not limited to a needs-based analysis, but should also consider the deceased’s moral obligations. However, the British Columbia legislation the Supreme Court interpreted in Tataryn differs from Alberta’s in two important respects and the Alberta Court of Appeal has yet to consider the relevance of these differences. It is therefore still an open question in Alberta as to whether or not Tataryn applies to the interpretation of this province’s statute and whether moral obligations can or should be taken into consideration. The Petrowski v. Petrowski Estate judgment is the latest Queen’s Bench decision to grapple with this issue. It holds that, in Alberta, only the obligations imposed in law by the legislature are moral obligations; law is co-extensive with morality in this context. The result of this decision is that a property owner’s freedom to dispose of his property is enhanced.

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