Author: Nigel Bankes Page 67 of 87

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

Low Carbon Energy Policies: Vested Rights, Legitimate Expectations, and Differential Treatment in Domestic and International Law

By Nigel Bankes

On July 13, 2012

In Administrative Law, Carbon Capture and Storage, Climate Change, Energy, International Law

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Low Carbon Energy Policies: Vested Rights, Legitimate Expectations, and Differential Treatment in Domestic and International Law

Cases and Matters Commented On: Secretary of State for Climate Change v Friends of the Earth and Others, [2012] EWCA Civ. 28, aff’g lower decision; Mesa Power Group LLC v Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, July 6, 2011; Mercer International Inc v Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 26 January 2012, and request for arbitration (ICSID Additional Facility), April 30, 2012

Governments around the world are adopting a variety of low carbon and green energy policies designed to increase the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix. In addition, some governments, including the government of Alberta, have also adopted policies to provide for the sequestration of carbon dioxide emissions where carbon fuels continue to make up a significant part of the energy mix. These policies often provide financial incentives to investors in order to persuade them to commit to the new technology. For example, many governments provide for feed-in-tariffs (FIT) to encourage the development of wind and solar energy. A FIT represents a commitment by the government directly or through the incumbent utility to purchase the output from the designated facility (e.g. wind generator, solar panels or biomass generation) at a specified price for a prescribed number of years (typically representing the amortization period of the asset). Such commitments are designed to be “bankable” in the sense that the proponent will be able to use the commitment to raise capital to fund the venture. Similarly, many governments have found it necessary to provide financial support (subsidies or “state aid” in the language of the European Union) for the first commercial scale carbon capture and storage projects. For example, the province of Alberta is currently providing support for three different sequestration related projects in the province (see here).

The implications of the Tsilhqot’in Case for the Numbered Treaties

By Nigel Bankes

On July 11, 2012

In Aboriginal, International Law

PDF version: The implications of the Tsilhqot’in Case for the Numbered Treaties

Cases Considered: Williams v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285, and Lameman v Alberta, 2012 ABQB 195

The unanimous decision of the British Columbia in Williams, (a.k.a. the Tsilhqot’in land claim case or the Brittany Triangle case) continues the trend in Canadian case law (beginning with R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCR 43) of insisting that a claimant First Nation or other aboriginal people must establish exclusive occupation of particular tracts of land in order to obtain a declaration of aboriginal title. Indeed, the case comes close to suggesting, and as a matter of law, that a claimant people will hardly ever\never succeed on the basis of what the court describes as a territorial claim (at para 219) i.e. the claim that these lands (e.g. a particular watershed) are our lands because we were present in that territory (at para 206), living in accordance with our laws (including property laws) and using that territory to the exclusion of all others.

Disgorgement Damages Awarded against Canada for Breach of a Modern Land Claim Agreement

By Nigel Bankes

On July 5, 2012

In Aboriginal, Property

PDF version: Disgorgement Damages Awarded against Canada for Breach of a Modern Land Claim Agreement

Case commented on: NTI v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 NUCJ 11

In this important case Justice Earl Johnson in the Nunavut Court of Justice has granted summary judgement against Canada in the amount of $14,817,500 for breach of Article 12.7.6 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) which provided for the establishment of a monitoring program to cover “the long term state and health of the ecosystemic and socio-economic environment in the Nunavut Settlement Area.” Justice Johnson assessed damages on a disgorgement basis calculated by reference to the expenditures that Canada avoided making by failing to implement this provision of the NLCA in a timely way. In doing so the judgement draws upon the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL).

Unjustly discriminatory rates on Ventures Pipeline to continue; the Commission decides that it lacks jurisdiction to set interim or final rates.

By Nigel Bankes

On July 4, 2012

In Administrative Law, Energy

PDF version: Unjustly discriminatory rates on Ventures Pipeline to continue; the Commission decides that it lacks jurisdiction to set interim or final rates.

Cases and decisions commented on:

(1) AEUB Decision 2006-105, Suncor Energy Inc., Preliminary Decision Regarding Jurisdiction to have the Ventures Pipeline (Oil Sands Pipeline) Regulated Under the Provisions of the Gas Utilities Act, Section 24 of the Gas Utilities Act, October 24, 2006;

(2) TransCanada Pipeline Limited v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2008 ABCA 55 (appeal of AEUB Decision 2006-105);

(3) AUC Decision 2009-065, TransCanada Pipeline Ventures Ltd, Suncor Energy Inc, Application to Have the Ventures Pipeline (Oil Sands Pipeline) Regulated Under the Provisions of the Gas Utilities Act, Section 24 of the Gas Utilities Act – Investigation, May 20, 2009;

(4) TransCanada Pipeline Ventures Ltd v. Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2010 ABCA 96 (appeal of AUC 2009-065);

(5) AUC Decision 2012-164, Williams Energy (Canada), Inc, Application to Terminate the Williams Contract for Ventures Pipeline Transportation Service or, in the Alternative, Set Rates to be Imposed and Observed by the Owners of Ventures Pipeline, June 14, 2012.

On June 14, 2012 the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC\Commission) handed down its decision in the latest effort by the contract shippers on Ventures Pipeline to obtain relief from what the Commission has already ruled to be rates that are “unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential” (AUC Decision 2009-065 at paras 145 & 147). The AUC declined to grant the relief sought. How could this be? The simple answer is that section 5 of the Gas Utilities Act, RSA 2000, c G-5 (GUA) provides that the Commission may only exercise its authority under certain key sections of the GUA (including the rate setting provisions) if the Commission has been authorized to do so by means of an Order in Council (OC), or if the gas utility in question is covered by an exemption under the regulations. The Commission held that Ventures did not fall within any of the existing categories of exemption and further, that since there was no OC in place (despite the Commission’s request), the Commission had no jurisdiction to fix final or interim rates for Ventures.

Building energy empires on (legal) foundations of sand, or, can I have my cake and eat it too?

By Nigel Bankes

On June 27, 2012

In Energy, Property

PDF version: Building energy empires on (legal) foundations of sand, or, can I have my cake and eat it too?

Case commented on: Remington Development Corporation v Enmax Power Corporation, 2011 ABQB 694, aff’d 2012 ABCA 196.

Most people would think that if Utility Co (U Co) needs access to cross Y’s land in order to construct a major capital investment in the form of a utility right of way, U Co will secure any necessary access rights (easement or utility right of way) either: (1) by way of an agreement, or (2) by way of expropriation if Y tries to extract hold-out rents. In either case, U Co will want the expropriation or agreement to bind the land: i.e. to run with the land no matter what Y does with it (sell it, assign it into bankruptcy etc.). And in either case one would think that U Co (and its lawyers) would want to make sure that the agreement bound the land for so long as U Co needed the right of way – or at least for a reasonable amortization period for the investment that U Co is about to make, so as to ensure that it does not have stranded assets on its hands, or worse still, a gap in its transmission system.