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Author: Nigel Bankes Page 68 of 87

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

When is a registered joint tenancy not a joint tenancy and not even co-ownership?

PDF version: When is a registered joint tenancy not a joint tenancy and not even co-ownership?

Cases Considered: Lutz v Lutz, 2012 ABQB 300; Lemoine v Smashnuk, 2008 ABQB 193

On a statutory application to terminate co-ownership under Part 3 of the Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7, can a court conclude that there was no co-ownership?

Lucas Lutz wanted to buy a house but did not qualify for a mortgage. Lucas’ brother, Eric, agreed to help. The deal was structured so that title to the house was transferred to Lucas Lutz and Eric Lutz as joint tenants. Two mortgages used in financing the purchase were granted by both Lucas and Eric; one was paid off but the other still secured an outstanding balance of approximately $90,000. Lucas made all of the subsequent mortgage payments. Lucas and Eric both lived in the house and paid utilities, but Eric moved out after 7 years, in 2006. Up until 2006, Eric also made payments to Lucas that Lucas characterized as rent and Eric characterized as contributions to the mortgage payments. There was no written agreement between Lucas and Eric.

Dower Consent Teasers

Case considered: Karafiat v Webb, 2012 ABCA 115 and Webb (Re), 2011 ABQB 89.

PDF: Dower Consent Teasers

This case shows that the Dower Act, RSA 2000, c D-15 can still throw up intellectual teasers 55 years after this version of the statute was first enacted (Dower Act, 1948 (Alta), c 7). The case highlights the distinction between the consent required by section 4 of the Act (the normal case), and the consent required under section 25(2). Section 25(2) deals with the situation where the homestead property is co-owned by the spouses. The issue is whether a request by both spouses to the holder of a charge to postpone that charge is a consent to a disposition (i.e. the charge) for the purposes of section 4 or section 25(2). The majority responds in the negative.

More Grist for the Mill, Another Case of Gross Negligence under CAPL 1990

PDF version: More grist for the mill, another case of gross negligence under CAPL 1990

Case commented on: Trident Exploration Corp. (Re), 2012 ABQB 242

An operator under a pooling agreement who agrees to take charge of responding to a Crown offset notice and who fails to do so and fails to inform tract owners that it is no longer intending to respond, is grossly negligent within the meaning of Article 4 of the 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure.

Competing Uses of Geological Space: Resolving Conflicts Between Production and Natural Gas Storage

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Competing Uses of Geological Space: Resolving Conflicts Between Production and Natural Gas Storage 

Decision Commented On: Kallisto Energy Corp. Application for a Well Licence Crossfield East Field, 2012 ABERCB 005, February 24, 2012

This decision deals with the potential for conflict between conventional oil and gas operations and natural gas storage projects.

The idea of resource use or landscape level conflicts is familiar to us in the context of the use of the surface. Consider, for example, the conflicts between recreation and forestry interests, between forestry and oil sands or conventional oil and gas exploration. The idea of competing uses of the subsurface is less familiar but our search for new resources or the application of new technologies to known resources is increasing the potential for those subsurface conflicts. High pressure fracturing operations to stimulate production either from shallow oil formations or deeper shale gas formations raises concerns about the effect of these operations on potable groundwater resources, and proposals to sequester carbon dioxide in saline formations or depleted oil or gas reservoirs raises concerns of sterilizing hydrocarbon resources. The province’s new CCS regime explicitly addresses this scenario through a provision in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, (OGCA) RSA 2000, c O-6, s. 39(1.1) which provides that the ERCB “may not approve a scheme for the disposal of captured carbon dioxide to an underground formation…unless the [applicant] satisfies the Board that the injection of the captured carbon dioxide will not interfere with (a) the recovery or conservation of oil or gas, or (b) an existing use of the underground formation for the storage of oil or gas.”

Federal Court of Appeal confirms that a SARA protection statement must offer the critical habitat of a listed species real legal and non-discretionary protection

Case commented on: Minister of Fisheries and Oceans v. David Suzuki Foundation (the Killer Whale case) 2012 FCA 40

PDF Version: Federal Court of Appeal confirms that a SARA protection statement must offer the critical habitat of a listed species real legal and non-discretionary protection

A unanimous Federal Court of Appeal in a decision authored by Justice Mainville has largely affirmed Justice Russell’s decision at trial in a case dealing with the legal protection of the critical habitat of two populations of killer whale listed as threatened or endangered under the terms of the Species at Risk Act (SARA), SC 2002, c 29. ABlawg’s post on the trial decision is available here: “SARA has a spine as well as teeth.”

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