Category Archives: Aboriginal

Albexit/Wexit/Albwexit and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

By: Robert Hamilton and David V. Wright

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Matter Commented On: Secession by Alberta or Western Provinces

 Talk of western alienation has been on the rise over the past year, reaching a point where notions of secession by one or more western provinces is a daily focus of headlines (see e.g. here and here) and social media threads. Most recently, this is visible in the #wexit hashtag that has been circulating since the re-election of the Liberal government. While the specifics around secession are thin, a reasonably representative version can be found in an op-ed penned by Dr. Jack Mintz in the Financial Post late last year. His version of Alberta separatism is a decent starting point for analysis of the matter, though we note that his focus was on “Albexit” as opposed to “Wexit”. Dr. Mintz was riding the prevailing winds at that time, which have only seemed to intensify. His argument, put briefly, is this: Alberta would benefit significantly from secession and, while Alberta leaving the federation may seem unlikely, so too did Britain leaving the EU until it voted to do so. If it happened there (in principle), he reasoned, what’s to say it can’t happen here. We ask, then, is this a tenable argument? Setting aside complications apparent in the final Brexit steps, does the Wexit or Albexit idea withstand scrutiny?

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Crown Consultation Obligations and a National Infrastructure Corridor: Simple Meets Complex

By: David V. Wright

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Matter Commented On: National Infrastructure Corridor

Renewed interest in a cross-Canada infrastructure corridor has surfaced in recent months and weeks, including as a federal election issue. Details were thin in the recent Conservative campaign announcement, but a substantial amount of information about a similar concept can be found in a 2017 report from the Senate Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce (the focus of the former is on an ‘energy corridor’ while the focus of the latter and the below-cited article by Sulzenko and Fellows is on a multi-modal infrastructure corridor). That report rightly acknowledges that “such a major undertaking – which would require the accommodation of a multitude of varying interests and priorities – would undoubtedly be difficult to complete, and a number of complex issues – including in relation [to] Indigenous peoples, financing and the environment – would need to be addressed” (p 12). In this post, I provide a brief overview and initial comments in relation to a fundamental “complexity” pertaining to the corridor concept: Crown consultation and accommodation duties with respect to the Indigenous peoples of Canada. Continue reading →

Gladue Factors: Still Not a “Race-Based Discount”

By: Amy Matychuk

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Case Commented On: R v Matchee, 2019 ABCA 251

In R v Matchee, Justices Patricia Rowbotham, Ritu Khullar, and Dawn Pentelechuk of the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) overturned Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Justice Eldon J. Simpson’s sentencing decision because it did not give proper effect to Gladue factors (named for the case that created them, R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)). The ABCA sentenced the offender afresh, substituting a six-year sentence for the original seven-year sentence (though with the deduction of three years 7.5 months credit for pre-sentence custody the remaining sentence was two years 4.5 months). The ABCA also commented on the correct application of Gladue factors, which are frequently misapplied and misunderstood as a “race-based discount” rather than “a partial remedy for the systemic discrimination suffered by [A]boriginal people which has led to their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system” (at para 31). Continue reading →

In Pausing Taseko’s New Prosperity Mine Exploration Program BCCA Recognizes Unsettled Questions Relating to the Duty to Consult; Consent and Justification Analysis and Proven Aboriginal Rights

By: Sharon Mascher

PDF Version: In Pausing Taseko’s New Prosperity Mine Exploration Program BCCA Recognizes Unsettled Questions Relating to the Duty to Consult; Consent and Justification Analysis and Proven Aboriginal Rights

Case Commented On: William v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2019 BCCA 112 (CanLII)

On April 1, 2019, the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA), in William v British Columbia (Attorney General) granted Chief Roger William, on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of the Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government and the Tsilhqot’in Nation (the Applicants), a stay of an order allowing an exploratory drilling program in relation to the New Prosperity Mine Project to proceed pending the outcome of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). The application for leave to appeal relates to a petition for the judicial review of a Notice of Work Approval granted to Taseko Mines Limited (TML) by the Province of British Columbia on July 17, 2017 allowing the exploratory drilling work to proceed. Chief William’s petition for judicial review of the Approval was dismissed by a chambers judge (William v British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 1425 (CanLII)) who found that the Province’s decision was reasonable and that the Province’s consultation process and degree of accommodation had maintained the honour of the Crown. On March 1, 2019, the BCCA (William v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2019 BCCA 74 (CanLII)) agreed with the findings of the chambers judge and dismissed Chief William’s appeal.

In reaching a decision that the stay should be granted, and specifically that the Applicants have met the merits test, Justice Bruce Butler rejects TML’s argument that this is just another duty to consult case applying a long line of settled law. In so doing, Butler JA recognizes that the law relating to sufficiency of consultation and accommodation, the role of consent, and the justification analysis from Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 (CanLII) is unsettled when proven s 35 Aboriginal rights are at issue. Continue reading →

Turning a Blind Eye? The Scope of the Charter Right to a Representative Jury

By: Amy Matychuk

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Case Commented On: R v Newborn, 2019 ABCA 123 (CanLII)

In R v Newborn, Justices Frans Slatter, Ritu Khullar, and Barbara Lea Veldhuis of the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) dismissed an argument from the appellant (the accused) that “the array from which his jury was selected was constitutionally flawed because it disproportionately excluded [A]boriginal citizens” (Newborn ABCA, at para 1). It also dismissed his argument that inadmissible expert evidence was allowed at the trial. However, this post will focus on the right to a representative jury as defined in the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Kokopenace, 2015 SCC 28 (CanLII), R v Newborn’s application of Kokopenace, and the appropriate scope of the state’s obligations under Charter s 11. Continue reading →