Category Archives: Administrative Law

The continuing mystery of standing at the Energy Resources Conservation Board

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Case considered: West Energy/Daylight Energy – Section 39 review hearing re: Linda McGinn, 2011 ABERCB 002

A couple weeks ago on ABlawg I suggested that the law governing standing to contest an energy project in front of the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) is becoming unglued (see The problem of costs at the Energy Resources Conservation Board: Leave to appeal granted in Kelly #4).The first change came out of the Court of Appeal’s October 2009 decision in Kelly v. Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board, 2009 ABCA 349, (and see The Problem of Locus Standi at the Energy Resources Conservation Board: A Diceyan Solution). The Court of Appeal has subsequently granted two leave applications made by Susan Kelly that concern the interpretation of sections 26 and 28 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act (ERCA), R.S.A. 2000, c. E-10. These additional appeals have yet to be heard, but I am certain the Court’s ruling in both matters will result in further changes to the law concerning who must be heard at the ERCB. The ERCB’s recent standing ruling in West Energy/Daylight Energy Section 39 Review Decision, 2011 ABERCB 002 suggests to me that the Board has lost its way on how to apply section 26(2) of the ERCA.

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The Continued Complexity of Administrative Law post-Dunsmuir

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Cases considered: Mitzel v. Alberta (Law Enforcement Review Board), 2010 ABCA 336; Calgary (City) v. Alberta (Municipal Government Board), 2010 ABQB 719

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, purported to identify a “more coherent and workable” approach to substantive judicial review (Dunsmuir at para. 32). Whether, as a general matter, Dunsmuir has achieved this ambition is uncertain. It does seem to have liberated courts from the formalistic analysis that was previously de rigueur in the standard of review analysis. On the other hand, it has left some significant questions unanswered, and in some respects has created new issues that did not exist formerly.

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What is the applicable standard of review in assessing the adequacy of reasons?

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Case considered: Calgary (City) v Alberta (Municipal Government Board), 2010 ABQB 719

This decision concerns an appeal by the City of Calgary from an order of the Municipal Government Board that set aside a business tax assessment on underground parking facilities owned by BTC Properties II in the downtown area. The Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26 and applicable City bylaws provide that a business tax is assessable on those persons who operate a business in premises located in Calgary. The issue at the Municipal Government Board was essentially whether BTC is in the business of selling parking, and one particular item of dispute was whether the fact that BTC charges its tenants a separate and additional fee for parking space is decisive evidence that it is in the parking business. The Municipal Government Board concluded that BTC did not operate a parking business, and accordingly set aside the City’s business tax assessment. The City was unsuccessful in seeking judicial review at the Court of Queen’s Bench. One ground of appeal argued by the City was that the Board did not provide adequate reasons in its decision to set aside the tax assessment. My comment here focuses solely on this issue, and in particular examines the following question: What is the applicable standard of review to be applied by a reviewing court in assessing the adequacy of reasons provided by an administrative decision-maker? Madam Justice Romaine confirms that this issue is not settled law in Alberta (at para 42).

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The Energy Resources Conservation Board proposes to repeal provincial legislation

Proposal commented on: ERCB Bulletin 2010 – 42, Invitation for Feedback on Draft Legislative Amendments for Removing Industrial Development Permits for Energy Resource Use

Yes. That’s right. In Bulletin 2010-42 issued on December 2, 2010 the ERCB announced that it is “proposing to remove industrial development permits (IDP) legislation from its mandate”. If that wasn’t clear enough the Bulletin goes on to state that “The ERCB is proposing to repeal Sections 28 to 31 of the CCA, [Coal Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c. C-17], Section 43 of the OGCA, [Oil and Gas Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c. O- 6] and Section 12 of the OSCA [Oil Sands Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c. O- 7]. The ERCB is also proposing to modify the definitions of a “processing plant” and “oil sands products” under the OSCA to provide greater clarity as to what types of facilities would fall under the ERCB’s jurisdiction.”

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The Supreme Court of Canada clarifies the role of administrative tribunals in discharging the duty to consult

PDF version: The Supreme Court of Canada clarifies the role of administrative tribunals in discharging the duty to consult 

Case considered: Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43

In the 1950s British Columbia authorized Alcan to develop the Nechako and Kemano Rivers for power purposes to supply Alcan’s aluminum facility at Kitimat. This development occurred in the traditional territory of the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (CSTC) First Nations. There was no consultation at that time. Since then Alcan has sold excess power from its facilities to BC Hydro (a Crown corporation) and in 2007 the parties negotiated an energy purchase agreement (EPA) to cover the period up until 2034. Sales have been growing in recent years as Alcan has found it more profitable to generate electricity than make aluminum: Kitimat (District) v. British Columbia (Minister of Energy and Mines), 2008 BCCA 81.

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