Category Archives: Administrative Law

Are Regional (and other) Assessments pursuant to the Impact Assessment Act Justiciable? Ecology Action Centre v Canada (Part 1)

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Case Commented On: Ecology Action Centre v Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2021 FC 1367 (CanLII)

The applicants sought judicial review in Federal Court of the “Regional Assessment of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploratory Drilling East of Newfoundland and Labrador” (the Offshore Exploratory Regional Assessment), initiated as a “regional study” under the previous Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 (CEAA, 2012) but converted into a “regional assessment” under the current Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1 (IAA) when the latter came into force in 2019. The Offshore Exploratory Regional Assessment and Report were prepared by a committee established by both the federal and provincial governments and submitted to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change Canada (the Minister). The applicants also sought judicial review of the subsequently promulgated Regulations Respecting Excluded Physical Activities (Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Exploratory Wells) (the Offshore Exploratory Regulations) pursuant to paragraph 112(1)(a.2) of the IAA, the effect of which was to exclude offshore exploratory drilling from undergoing individual impact assessments on a go-forward basis. Both applications were dismissed. Continue reading →

Procedural Fairness When Challenging Timeline Extensions for Freedom of Information Requests

By: Drew Yewchuk

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Decision Commented On: Blades v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2021 ABQB 725 (CanLII)

The recent decision in Blades v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2021 ABQB 725 (CanLII) (Blades) relates to two issues ABlawg has previously covered. First, the challenges of getting government records in a timely manner using the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25 (FOIP). Prior posts on FOIP have discussed the challenges with the information request process, and the challenges presented by the review process at the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner. Second, the Alberta government’s decision to revoke the 1976 Coal Development Policy for Alberta. See the list of coal-related ABlawg posts listed at the top of this post. Looking past those specifics, Blades is a judicial review decision about an administrative body’s obligation of procedural fairness and the right to be heard by the administrative decision-maker. Continue reading →

Stakeholders Expected Consultation on the Coal Policy Rescission: Was There a Legal Duty?

By: Aimee Huntington, Niall Fink & Peter Shyba

PDF Version: Stakeholders Expected Consultation on the Coal Policy Rescission: Was There a Legal Duty?

Cases Commented On: Blades et al v Alberta; TransAlta Generation Partnership v Regina, 2021 ABQB 37 (CanLII)

This is the sixth ABlawg post on Alberta Energy’s decision to rescind the 1976 Coal Development Policy for Alberta (the “Coal Policy”) in May of 2020 (the “Rescission”). Much has happened since May. At the time of writing, Energy Minister Sonya Savage has temporarily reinstated the Coal Policy with a commitment to “engage with Albertans in the first half of 2021 about the long-term approach to coal development in Alberta.” A Coal Policy Committee has been established, although details on public consultation remain unclear. It is also unclear whether the reinstatement renders moot the case of Blades et al v Alberta, an application for judicial review by two cattle ranchers initiated in July of 2020 (the “Blades Application”). Finally, it is still unclear how the reinstatement will affect approvals for coal exploration granted between rescission and reinstatement (on this point, see Nigel Bankes’ previous post). What is clear is that the government’s duty to consult stakeholders on changes to the Coal Policy will remain contentious in the foreseeable future.

The Blades Application highlighted multiple potential sources of an obligation to consult stakeholders, including provisions in the Alberta Land Stewardship Act, SA 2009, c A-26.8 (ALSA), the common law, and constitutional claims raised by Indigenous intervenors. This post considers one particular source for this obligation: the legitimate expectations of stakeholders in the South Saskatchewan Region. We do so in light of the recent treatment of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in TransAlta Generation Partnership v Regina, 2021 ABQB 37 (CanLII). Continue reading →

The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 2

By: Howard Kislowicz and Robert Hamilton

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Case Commented On: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII)

In our last post, we laid out some background on how the standard of review applies in cases involving the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult and accommodate (DTCA) Indigenous peoples. We argued that the changes brought by Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII) with respect to statutory appeals – where a statute provides that a government decision may be appealed to a court – might allow legislatures to insulate the decisions of the executive by subjecting them to a “palpable and overriding error” standard of review rather than a reasonableness standard. In this post, we look at the other, more common kind of case that arises in administrative law: judicial scrutiny of government decisions through an application for judicial review. Here, the standard of review analysis differs.

In applications for judicial review, Vavilov establishes a general presumption that the standard of review for an administrative decision will be reasonableness (at paras 23–32). However, it also carves out some exceptions to this presumption, in which the standard of review will be correctness. The relevant exception for this post is for questions regarding “the scope of Aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (at para 55). Important ambiguities persist about what this means for the DTCA. On one hand, DTCA litigation does not determine Aboriginal rights. The DTCA was designed to apply where the Crown considered an action that could impact an Aboriginal right that had not yet been adjudicated. Though it was later extended to established rights, it remains a procedural duty on the Crown rather than an Aboriginal right per se). If this is the case, this would suggest that the correctness exception does not include DTCA issues. On the other hand, the DTCA is a constitutional obligation understood as a limit on the exercise of sovereignty; it shares much in common with the other issues to which Vavilov applies the correctness standard. We argue that the logic supporting the existence of the constitutional exception in Vavilov also supports the application of the correctness standard to a broader range of DTCA issues than is currently the practice. This post considers how Vavilov may have changed considerations of judicial reviews arising in DTCA contexts.

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The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 1

By: Howard Kislowicz and Robert Hamilton

PDF Version: The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 1

Case Commented On: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII)

This is a two-part post that examines the potential impact of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII) on the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate (DTCA) Indigenous peoples. Part 1 deals with statutory rights of appeal. Part 2 deals with applications for judicial review. Other ABlawg contributors have touched on related questions; Nigel Bankes’ “Statutory Appeal Rights in Relation to Administrative Decision-Maker Now Attract an Appellate Standard of Review: A Possible Legislative Response” is particularly relevant, as is Shaun Fluker’s post “Vavilov on Standard of Review in Canadian Administrative Law.”

The Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov (and the Vavilov-trilogy as a whole) was intended by the Court to provide much needed clarity to Canadian administrative law. The impact of the decision is clear: it has been cited by no fewer than 1500 lower court decisions in less than a year. Despite the Court’s attempt at comprehensive refinement of the doctrine, however, Vavilov left considerable uncertainty concerning the applicability of the new rules in the context of the Crown’s DTCA Indigenous peoples. Two things lead to this uncertainty. Vavilov changes the standard of review analysis in two kinds of cases: (1) where a court reviews an administrative decision under a statutory appeal mechanism, and (2) where a court reviews an administrative decision through an application for judicial review. The first uncertainty arises in relation to statutory appeals. Under Vavilov, the standard of review on statutory appeals follows the case law on appeals: questions of law will generally be reviewed on a correctness standard and questions of fact or mixed fact and law will be reviewed on the palpable and overriding error standard (Vavilov at para 37; Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII)). In the context of the DTCA, uncertainty attends the application of this framework, as it appears to secure greater judicial deference to decision-makers on issues of fact and mixed fact and law. Because of this, it appears to be possible for a legislature to ensure greater judicial deference for executive action (such as ministerial decisions) where it anticipates issues with the DTCA through the inclusion of a statutory right of review. This seems contrary to Vavilov’s reasoning that statutory appeals are indications that the legislature prefers less, rather than more, deference. It is not clear that the court contemplated this possibility and, if so, whether it considered it an acceptable consequence of the doctrinal refinement.

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