Category Archives: Civil Procedure

The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

Cases Considered: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53

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The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

* Brett Code acknowledges the able assistance of Shankar Kamath, a student-at-law at Bennett Jones LLP.

In F.H. v. McDougall, released October 2, 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that there is only one standard of proof in a civil case: proof on a balance of probabilities. A mixed series of cases over the last 50 years had caused uncertainty as to the applicable standard of proof when trying allegations of morally blameworthy conduct, for example, of fraud, of sexual assault in the civil context or of dishonesty in the context of professional conduct by lawyers (see for example Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 at 459 (C.A., Lord Denning); H.F. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] B.C.J. No. 436, 2002 BCSC 325 at para 154; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138; Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164 at 169-171). What had evolved was an apparently sliding scale, sometimes requiring plaintiffs to meet a higher standard of proof, a standard often said to be commensurate with the occasion. That uncertainty is now resolved, perhaps finally.

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Obtaining Leave to Intervene in a Leave to Appeal Application

Cases Considered: Provident Energy Ltd. v. Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2008 ABCA 316

PDF Version:  Obtaining Leave to Intervene in a Leave to Appeal Application

This decision deals with a unique and interesting point of civil procedure. It answers the following question: what is the test for obtaining leave to intervene in a leave to appeal application before Alberta’s Court of Appeal?

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Is Proof of Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiff or Proof of Wilful Delay by the Defendant Required to Defeat an Application to Set Aside Default Judgment?

Cases Considered: Alberta v. Fjeld, 2008 ABQB 558

PDF Version: Is Proof of Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiff or Proof of Wilful Delay by the Defendant Required to Defeat an Application to Set Aside Default Judgment?

Some debtors seem to think they can avoid being held accountable for money they owe if they refuse to answer the phone, or pick up registered mail, or accept documents being served upon them. They act as if, by mimicking the proverbial ostrich and hiding their head in the sand at the first hint of collection efforts, they will be able to make their debts go away. The taxpayers of Alberta should be pleased to know that the ostrich approach did not work in the case of Alberta v. Fjeld. Ignoring collection efforts merely resulted in the provincial government obtaining an easy default judgment against Rhonda Fjeld, which was upheld by a Master in Chambers, Rod Wacowich, and then, on appeal, by Mr. Justice Keith Yamauchi of the Court of Queen’s Bench.
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Leisurely Pace, Standstill and Drop Dead: A Lawsuit’s Journey

Cases Considered: Hein v. Barrett, 2008 ABQB 548

PDF Version: Leisurely Pace, Standstill and Drop Dead: A Lawsuit’s Journey

An application by a party for an extension of time is a very common application in a lawsuit. There is nothing especially note-worthy about this particular application by two Defendants, David Barrett and Chinook Accounting and Tax Services Ltd., for an order extending the time to file and serve a third party notice on two other Defendants, William Herman and Ross Todd and Company, save and except that seven years had gone by since Barrett and Chinook should have filed and served their third party notice. Nevertheless, the judgment by Master Judith Hanebury of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench includes a nice summary of the relevant principles to be applied to applications such as this. It also includes a striking trio of metaphors used to refer to the progress or lack of progress of a lawsuit, the “leisurely pace,” “standstill,” and “drop dead” used in the heading for this post.

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Something Happened (with apologies to Joseph Heller)

Case Considered: Brentech Services Ltd. v. Sunray Manufacturing Inc., 2008 ABQB 301

PDF Version:  Something Happened (with apologies to Joseph Heller)

“Want of prosecution” is a curious and old-fashioned phrase. It refers to an absence of steps taken in a court action by the person who started the lawsuit. It is an allegation and finding of indefensible and excessive delay in carrying a lawsuit through to its conclusion.

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