Category Archives: Ethics and the Legal Profession

Why Wreck-It Ralph Went to Law School

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Matter commented on: The Ontario Bar Association’s marketing campaign, Why I went to Law School

 “I’m bad, and that’s good. I will never be good, and that’s not bad. There’s no one I’d rather be than me.” – Wreck-It Ralph

The Ontario Bar Association’s marketing campaign, Why I went to Law School, has attracted media attention (see National Post article here and Globe and Mail article here) as well as being cogently criticized by Jordan Furlong on SLAW back in February (see article here). I want to add my two cents to that conversation. What I say is informed by two things.  First, in my role as Director of Admissions at the University of Calgary I have read some 2000 statements by law school applicants answering the very question posed by the OBA: “Why do you want to go to law school?” Second, as a law professor, and in particular as a law professor interested in regulation of things like lawyer civility, I have thought a lot about how the profession ought to respond to its oft-referenced “poor public image”.

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Problem solved? Assessing the Supreme Court’s Latest Statement on the Law Governing Conflicts of Interest

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Case commented on: Canadian National Railway Co v McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39.

On July 5 2013 the Supreme Court issued its much anticipated judgment in Canadian National Railway v McKercher LLP.  The case invited the Court to reconsider its “bright line” rule for current client conflicts, as previously set out by the Court in R v Neil, 2002 SCC 70.  The bright line rule provides that, absent client consent, a “lawyer may not represent one client whose interests are directly adverse to the immediate interests of another current client – even if the two mandates are unrelated” (Neil at para 29, emphasis in original).

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Independence of the Bar and the Prevention of Money-Laundering

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Case considered: Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada (Attorney General) 2013 BCCA 147.

Introduction

On April 4, 2013 the British Columbia Court of Appeal issued its decision in Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 BCCA 147 which upheld the earlier decision of a chambers judge that aspects of Canada’s money-laundering legislation violate section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and cannot be saved under section 1.

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What has Meads v Meads wrought?

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Cases commented on: R v Duncan, 2013 ONCJ 160 (CanLII); R v Tyskerud, 2013 BCPC 27 (CanLII); Cassa v The Queen, 2013 TCC 43 (CanLII); R v Martin, 2012 NSPC 115 (CanLII); R v Lavin, 2013 ONCJ 6 (QL); Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Gutierrez, 2012 ABQB 683 (CanLII); Stancer (Re), 2012 BCSC 1533 (CanLII); Grattan (Re), 2012 NBQB 332, [2012] NBJ No 353 (QL).

I.          Introduction

Associate Chief Justice John D. Rooke’s decision in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII) — one of CanLII’s Top Ten Cases of 2012 — established a category of vexatious litigants that he called “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” (OPCA) litigants. OPCA litigants “employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by ‘gurus’ … to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations, and individuals” (Meads at para 1). Although those techniques and arguments are varied, the essence of the OPCA litigants’ position is that they deny the authority of the state and the courts. Both of us have commented on the Meads case previously on ABlawg: see “The Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) Litigant Case” and “The Top Ten Canadian Legal Ethics Stories – 2012”. What we want to look at in this post is the use that has been made of Meads in the intervening six months. We will also consider the extent to which OPCA and similar litigants may influence judges to embrace styles of judgment that are disrespectful of the parties appearing before them. The post will touch on the ethical problems created when judges embrace “literary flourishes” and “dry wit” in their decisions (Katie Daubs, “Legal Decision with literary flourish and dry wit making the round…” Toronto Star, March 29, 2013).

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The Legality of Legal Advising

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Matter considered: Edgar Schmidt v Canada (AG) Federal Court File #T-2225-12.

Introduction

On December 13, 2012 Edgar Schmidt, a Department of Justice lawyer, filed a Statement of Claim in Federal Court naming the federal Attorney General as Defendant. The Statement of Claim alleges that the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Justice have violated their obligations under various pieces of legislation that impose duties on the Minister of Justice to examine proposed legislation to determine if it is “inconsistent with the purposes and provisions” of the Canadian Bill of Rights or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and to advise the House of Commons if it is so (see in particular: section 3 of the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44; section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985 c J-2; section 3(2) and (3) of the Statutory Instruments Act, RSC 1985 c S-22).

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