Material and Cultural Causes of Delay

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Material and Cultural Causes of Delay

Case Commented On: R v King, 2019 ABQB 467

This is the seventh instalment in my long-running series of blog posts covering Alberta decisions dealing with the fallout of R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, released almost three years ago. This post starts with a discussion of the recent R v King, 2019 ABQB 467, which covers one of the two live issues about Jordan that will be going up before the SCC: whether or not the time between when an application or case is heard and when it is decided (often called ‘judicial delay’; I will refer to it as ‘judicial decision-making time’) is excluded from the delay calculation. This issue will be before the Supreme Court as part of R v KGK2019 MBCA 9, on September 25, 2019. (The second issue is how the timelines apply to minors, an issue in the appeal of R v KJM2018 ABCA 278, which the SCC heard in February 2019). The second part of the blog post discusses some longer-term impacts of Jordan, and some of the limitations of the decision. Continue reading

Carbon Security or Carbon Whimsy?

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Carbon Security or Carbon Whimsy?

Document commented on: Alberta’s Proposed Technology Innovation and Emissions Reduction System: Discussion Document, July 2019

This Discussion Document contains the Government of Alberta’s proposal to replace the current Carbon Competitiveness Incentive Regulation, Alta Reg 255/2017, (CCIR) with a Technology Innovation and Emissions Reduction (TIER) system for Alberta’s large final emitters (LFEs). If promulgated, the TIER system will effectively return us to the model of the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, Alta Reg 139/2007 (SGER) first introduced by the Stelmach government in 2007, and then repealed and replaced by the Notley government’s CCIR effective January 1, 2018. Both the SGER and the CCIR are greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation measures; both are emissions intensity schemes rather than cap and trade schemes; both require increased carbon efficiency over time (i.e. reduced carbon emissions per unit of output); both schemes offer covered entities access to flexibility mechanisms (including payments into a fund) to allow them to meet their targets in the most efficient manner; both impose a liability only on excess emissions over the target rather than on all emissions but still provide a pricing signal; both are designed to protect trade exposed sectors; and both focus on LFEs. Continue reading

Boulachanis v Canada: Transgender Inmate Moved to Women’s Prison

By: Amy Matychuk

PDF Version: Boulachanis v Canada: Transgender Inmate Moved to Women’s Prison

Case Commented On: Boulachanis v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 456 (CanLII)

In Boulachanis v Canada, Justice Sébastien Grammond of the Federal Court granted Jamie Boulachanis’ application for an interlocutory injunction ordering that she be transferred to a women’s prison. Ms. Boulachanis, who is a transgender woman, initially made a transfer request to Correctional Service Canada (CSC) and was denied. She applied for judicial review of the decision denying the transfer. While waiting for resolution of her judicial review application, she was moved to administrative segregation due to threats to her safety from other (male) inmates. Accordingly, she successfully applied for an interlocutory injunction and an order that she be moved to a women’s prison immediately.

Justice Grammond’s decision discusses Ms. Boulachanis’ history, the rights of transgender people in a correctional environment, and the tripartite test for an interlocutory injunction. He found, “the refusal to transfer Ms. Boulachanis to a women’s institution constitutes prima facie discrimination based on gender identity or expression” (at para 3). Justice Grammond’s decision is an important victory for the rights of transgender inmates, who face unique roadblocks and safety risks and who must contend with persistent myths and misinformation about their gender identities and expressions. Continue reading

Alberta Human Rights Tribunal Decision Reinstates Reinstatement

By: Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: Alberta Human Rights Tribunal Decision Reinstates Reinstatement

Case Commented On:  Pratt v University of Alberta, 2019 AHRC 24 (CanLII)

While it has always been legally possible for an employer to be ordered to reinstate an employee after there has been a finding of discrimination, recent tribunals and courts have been reluctant to award this remedy. However, the Pratt case may open the doors again to this possibility in some circumstances.

Carmen Pratt (Mittelstadt) made a human rights complaint in June 2013 alleging discrimination on the ground of mental disability in the area of employment under s 7(1) of the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5 (AHRA) (at paras 1, 4). After completing her Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Alberta (U of A), in December 2011, Pratt started working as a casual employee at the U of A’s Book and Record Depository. This became a permanent position on March 1, 2012. As an assistant, her job duties were split between the Special Collections Library (SCL) and the University Archives (at para 2), and she had one supervisor in each department. Three weeks later, on March 24, 2012 Pratt learned that her brother had committed suicide and she was thereafter involved with dealing with her brother’s estate and burial (at para 2). Continue reading

Three Leaves to Appeal the Claimed Jurisdiction of Court of Queen’s Bench Over Vexatious Litigants

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Three Leaves to Appeal the Claimed Jurisdiction of Court of Queen’s Bench Over Vexatious Litigants

Cases Considered: Lymer (Re)2018 ABCA 368 (CanLII); Jonsson v Lymer, 2019 ABCA 113 (CanLII)Makis v Alberta Health Services, 2019 ABCA 23 (CanLII); Vuong Van Tai Holding Inc v Alberta (Minister of Justice and Solicitor General), 2019 ABCA 165 (CanLII); Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 (CanLII)

The Alberta Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal three different vexatious litigant orders made by the Court of Queen’s Bench in Edmonton that restricted individual litigant’s access to the courts and, in one case, to administrative tribunals. Hopefully the three appeals will be heard either together or on the same day by the same panel, as suggested by Justice Bielby when she granted leave to appeal in Vuong Van Tai Holding Inc v Alberta (Minister of Justice and Solicitor General), 2019 ABCA 165 (CanLII) (at para 21). The National Self-Represented Litigants Project (NSRLP) has been granted leave to intervene in one of the three appeals – Jonsson v Lymer, 2019 ABCA 113 (CanLII) – bringing its wider perspective on self-represented litigants and its national research on access to justice into the courtroom. The Alberta Minister of Justice and Solicitor General, who was represented on the leave to appeal application in Vuong, has been invited to participate as a party in that appeal. The arguments and outcomes of these three appeals should be very interesting on a number of issues of civil procedure, access to justice and procedural justice, but primarily on the question of the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench. In this post, I will look at what is at stake in these three appeals. Continue reading