True Questions of Jurisdiction: Administrative Law’s Unicorns?

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Decision considered: Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers Association, 2011 SCC 61 

Introduction

In its recent decision reversing the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association (Teachers’ Association), 2010 ABCA 26, the Supreme Court of Canada made significant statements with respect to issues of administrative law. In particular, a majority of the Court held:

  1. When an issue is not raised before an administrative decision-maker it may nonetheless be raised in an application for judicial review. A court may, however, exercise its “discretion not to consider an issue raised for the first time on judicial review where it would be inappropriate to do so” (para 22).
  2. In such cases deference may still be granted: “Where the reviewing court finds that the tribunal has made an implicit decision on a critical issue, the deference due to the tribunal does not disappear because the issue was not raised before the tribunal” (para 50).
  3. In order to be deferential in such circumstances, the court may take into account the reasons that the administrator could have given had the issue been put before it. If a “reasonable basis for the decision is apparent to the reviewing court” then that will suffice (para 55). The court may also look at reasons offered by the administrative decision-maker on the issue in other cases to determine whether the decision-maker’s approach to the issue is reasonable. In some circumstances the court may remit the matter to the decision-maker to allow reasons to be prepared.
  4. Finally, and most significantly, a majority of the Court, in reasons prepared by Justice Rothstein, called into question the ability to identify a “true question of jurisdiction” to which deference should not be granted. Justice Rothstein stated that he was “unable to provide a definition of what might constitute a true question of jurisdiction” (para 42).
  5. Justice Rothstein held that when an administrative decision-maker interprets its home statute it is presumptively entitled to deference (para 34). Deference will not be offered where the interpretation raises constitutional questions, a question regarding the jurisdictional lines between tribunals or a question of law “that is of central importance to the legal system as a whole and that is outside the adjudicator’s expertise” (para 43). If a party claims that deference is not owed because the matter is a true question of jurisdiction, that party will “be required to demonstrate why the court should not review a tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute on the deferential standard of reasonableness” (para 39).
  6. Finally, Justice Rothstein held that once a deferential standard has been identified, it is not necessary to question further how deferential the court should be: “Once it is determined that a review is to be conducted on a reasonableness standard, there is no second assessment of how intensely the review is to be conducted” (para 47).  

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Rasouli v Sunnybrook Health Services Centre: End of Life matters reach the Supreme Court of Canada

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Case Considered: Rasouli v Sunnybrook Health Services Centre, 2011 ONCA 482

This case involves the issue of consent under Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO, 1996 c 2, Schedule “A” (the “Act”). While no similar law exists in Alberta, the case, through its discussion of the conflict between doctors’ ability to determine treatment, and the patient’s ability to refuse, raises issues that extend beyond the legislative boundaries of Ontario.

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Non-Biological Father from Separated Same-Sex Couple Declared a Legal Parent

By: Melissa Luhtanen

PDF Version: Non-biological Father from Separated Same-Sex Couple Declared a Legal Parent 

Case Commented On: D.W.H. v D.J.R., 2011 ABQB 608

Background

Mr. H. and Mr. R. lived together as partners and planned to have a baby through a surrogate mother. Mr. R’s sperm was used to conceive the baby, S, with Ms. D as the surrogate mother. Ms. D lived with the two fathers and Mr. R when the baby was first born. After that, the baby lived with the two male partners and visited the surrogate mother once or twice a week. The couple separated when S was 3 years old and Mr. H. applied for access. Madame Justice Eidsvik in D.W.H. v D.J.R., 2009 ABQB 438 found that the child had a mother (who was the surrogate), but no father who could be recognized in law (see my previous post “Gay fathers not seen as a parental unit under the Family Law Act“). Mr. H was given access until November 2007 when, based on a parenting assessment, contact was discontinued. Mr. H.’s relationship with S has since almost completely ceased. Mr. H. applied for guardianship but his application was opposed.

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“The proof of the pudding is in the eating” that litigation is not the best way to quantify interim costs.

PDF version: “The proof of the pudding is in the eating” that litigation is not the best way to quantify interim costs.

Case considered: R v Caron, 2011 ABCA 385

Gilles Caron has been a very present figure before the Alberta courts since ABlawg began posting comments in late 2007 (see here). Caron is challenging the constitutionality of Alberta’s legislation on the basis that the province’s laws are not enacted in both English and French. That issue is now before the Court of Appeal (see 2010 ABCA 343 and here). Caron’s litigation has also involved an access to justice component in that he has pursued interim costs awards to fund his litigation. That issue went to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled that the Alberta government was required to fund Caron’s language rights challenge (see 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 SCR 78 and here). The lingering question was, to what extent was such funding required? That issue was recently considered by the Alberta Court of Appeal. In a decision written by Justice Jean Côté, Caron was awarded far less funding than he sought for the Court of Appeal litigation, and in the form of a loan rather than a grant (see 2011 ABCA 385).

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Giving deference to the adequacy of reasons

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Case considered: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62

Earlier this month the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decision in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, upholding the ruling of an arbitrator concerning vacation entitlements in a labour dispute. This unanimous Supreme Court of Canada decision written by Madam Justice Abella has changed the law in Alberta governing judicial review for adequacy of reasons provided by an administrative decision-maker. For earlier commentary and background for this post, readers should review my December 2010 ABlawg entitled “What is the applicable standard of review in assessing the adequacy of reasons?” The issue concerns the measure of judicial deference owed to an administrative decision-maker in reviewing the adequacy of reasons given for decision. Continue reading