

Action No.: 1501-03776
E-File No.: CVQ16BEAUMONT
Appeal No.: _____

IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE OF CALGARY

BETWEEN:

BEAUMONT RESOURCES LTD.

Plaintiff

and

CARDINAL ENERGY LTD.

Defendant

P R O C E E D I N G S

Calgary, Alberta
January 22, 2016

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1 Proceedings taken in the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Calgary Courts Centre, Calgary,
2 Alberta

4 January 22, 2016 Afternoon Session

6 Master Farrington The Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

8 R.J. Hawkes, Q.C. For the Plaintiff

9 E.J. Baker For the Plaintiff

10 T. McDonald For the Defendant

11 B. Dufault Court Clerk

14 THE COURT CLERK: Order in chambers. All rise.

16 THE MASTER: Good afternoon, everyone.

18 MR. HAWKES: Good afternoon, Sir.

20 THE MASTER: Please, be seated.

22 MR. MCDONALD: Good afternoon.

24 MS. BAKER: Good afternoon.

26 THE MASTER: Please, be seated. Thank you all for coming and
27 making yourselves available. Let me make sure I've got my devices turned off, yeah.

29 **Reasons for Judgment**

31 THE MASTER: This is an application by Cardinal Energy Ltd.,
32 which I will refer to as Cardinal, for summary dismissal of an action which had been
33 brought against it by Beaumont Resources Ltd., which I will refer to as Beaumont.

35 Beaumont's claim is for what says is a standard amount of a broker fee on an oil and gas
36 transaction. Beaumont claims \$1,305,000 on what it alleges was a \$21,750,000
37 transaction, which is 6 percent of the value of the transaction. There are different figures
38 in the materials as to the exact value of the transaction, but they are of that order of
39 magnitude.

41 Alternatively, it seeks damages in that amount claiming that the opportunity to earn that

1 fee was lost as a result of what it claims was a breach of contract by Cardinal. Cardinal
2 says that it never agreed to pay such a fee and that it is not responsible for such a fee and
3 that the action ought to be dismissed.
4

5 Beaumont made some initial inquiries with Falcon Resources Corporation, which I will
6 refer to as Falcon, regarding a possible acquisition from Falcon. In that regard, Falcon and
7 Beaumont entered into a confidentiality agreement dated June 27, 2012. The agreement
8 included definition of what constituted confidential information. It appeared that the
9 material forwarded by Falcon to Beaumont fit within the definition. The Falcon/Beaumont
10 confidentiality agreement was executed. It contained the following terms, among others,
11 and bear with me as I go through some of these: (as read)
12

13 2(a) The recipient agrees that the confidential information will be
14 used solely for the purpose of evaluating and facilitating the
15 negotiation of the potential transaction between the recipient and
16 the disclosing party and not in any manner detrimental to the
17 disclosing party, its representatives or its joint venture partners.
18

19 2(b) It is understood that neither this agreement nor the disclosure
20 of the confidential information to you shall be construed as
21 granting to you, or any of your representatives, any licence or
22 right in respect of any part of the confidential information.
23

24 3(a) The recipient agrees that the confidential information will be
25 kept confidential by the recipient and will not be disclosed by the
26 recipient to any other person or other entity without the prior
27 written consent of the disclosing party except that;
28

29 (i) any such information may be disclosed to the recipient's
30 representatives or any bank or any professional consultant retained
31 by such bank that is financing the recipient's participation in the
32 potential transaction and will need to know such information for
33 the purpose of facilitating the transaction, it being understood that
34 such representatives shall be informed by the recipient of the
35 confidential nature of such information and shall be directed the
36 recipient to treat such information confidentially to the same extent
37 as if they were parties to this agreement.
38

39 3(b) The recipient will not make or permit to be made copies of or
40 otherwise reproduced any of the confidential information in any
41 manner unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the disclosing

1 party.

2
3 Beaumont then approached the defendant, Cardinal. It indicated that it hoped to either put
4 together a transaction to purchase the assets of Falcon or, alternatively, place itself in a
5 position to claim a broker fee as a result of another entity purchasing Falcon or its assets.
6 On or about October 1, 2012, Beaumont entered into a confidentiality agreement with
7 Cardinal. It contained, among others, the following terms, and again please bear with me:
8 (as read)

9
10 4 Without limitation and in addition to any rights of Beaumont
11 against the recipient arising by reason of any breach thereof, the
12 recipient shall:

13
14 (a) be liable to Beaumont for all losses, costs, damages, and
15 expenses whatsoever which Beaumont may suffer, sustain, pay, or
16 incur and in addition;

17
18 (b) indemnify Beaumont against all actions, proceedings, claims,
19 demands, losses, costs, damages, and expenses whatsoever which
20 may be brought against or suffered by Beaumont or which it may
21 sustain, pay or incur.

22
23 And then the agreement has a numbering error because it goes on to five while it's still
24 within the paragraph four and it says: (as read)

25
26 5 Resulting from a breach of this agreement or the unauthorized
27 use or disclosure by the recipient or any of its representatives of
28 all or any part of the confidential information.

29
30 6 The restrictions set forth in paragraph 2 shall not apply to any
31 part of the confidential information which the recipient can
32 establish was;

33
34 (a) at the time of the disclosure or thereafter generally available to
35 the public other than as a result of disclosure by the recipient or
36 its representative or;

37
38 (b) at the time of the disclosure already in its possession on a
39 lawful basis or;

40
41 (c) subject to disclosure required by law, rule or regulation

1 provided that Beaumont has given ten days written notice prior to
2 such disclosure or;

3
4 (d) lawfully acquired by the recipient from a third party under no
5 obligation of confidence to Beaumont or;

6
7 (e) heretofore disclosed to the recipient by Beaumont on a
8 non-confidential basis.

9
10 And then paragraph 12: (as read)

11
12 The recipient shall not initiate or arrange, directly or indirectly, or
13 maintain contact regarding Falcon business operations, prospects or
14 finances except as contemplated herein and for those contacts
15 made in the ordinary course of business with any officer, director,
16 employee, consultant, or any other representative of Falcon or with
17 any customer, supplier, sales representative, or competitor of
18 Falcon except with the express prior written permission of
19 Beaumont to Falcon. Any such permission granted by Beaumont
20 and/or Falcon is revokable at any time.

21
22 And then paragraph 14: (as read)

23
24 This agreement shall supercede all prior understandings and
25 agreements, whether written or oral, between Beaumont and the
26 recipient with respect to matters provided herein.

27
28 In procuring the confidentiality agreement with Cardinal, Glen Tarrant (phonetic) of
29 Beaumont wrote an email dated September 25, 2012, to Tawnya Pipsey (phonetic) of
30 Cardinal: (as read)

31
32 Please find attached the draft copy of the confidentiality
33 agreement. Just to clarify, I am not a shareholder or interest holder
34 in the assets of the company. Ideally, I am trying to raise money
35 to buy it or, plan b, broker it out for a fee. Thank you, Glenn.

36
37 After the confidentiality agreement was signed, Mr. Tarrant emailed a short package of
38 material to Cardinal. The package of material consisted of a PowerPoint presentation
39 prepared by Falcon and production summaries by Falcon Well. The materials were
40 prepared by Falcon rather than Beaumont and they consisted of approximately 14 pages
41 when printed. In doing so, Beaumont may well have breached its confidentiality

1 agreement with Falcon in several respects. It forwarded materials without the consent of
2 Falcon. It allowed copies to be made and it commenced an effort to try and position itself
3 for a broker fee when its permitted uses of the information included its own efforts to
4 purchase.

5
6 While, of course, Cardinal cannot enforce Falcon's agreement without privity, the status
7 of Beaumont's conduct and agreement with Falcon is relevant to the damages which it
8 claims. It can only claim that to which it is entitled and had rights in relation to the
9 information which it claims was misused. The Beaumont/Cardinal confidentiality
10 agreement was stated to be in effect for one year from October 1, 2012. There was very
11 little, if any, interaction between Beaumont and Cardinal thereafter. Beaumont says there
12 were at least four breaches of the Beaumont/Cardinal confidentiality agreement by
13 Cardinal. It says that the first breach was when Falcon's outside counsel sent an email to
14 Scott Ratushny of Cardinal on April 19, 2013, which said: (as read)

15
16 Hi, Scott. Further to our discussion last Saturday, please find
17 attached a copy of the Falcon Resources Corp. business plan,
18 March 1, 2013, for your review. Should there be any interest in
19 this private company, or should you require further information,
20 please let me know and I would be delighted to introduce you
21 directly to Eric Falborn (phonetic), the president of Falcon.
22 Thanks, Bill. William DeJong, Q.C., Partner Dentons Canada LLP.

23
24
25 There is no evidence as to what or who initiated that exchange. Although there appears to
26 have been a brief discussion of some sort on the previous Saturday prior to Mr. DeJong's
27 email, there is no evidence as to exactly what happened in that exchange. Matters
28 pertaining to the email are contained in Mr. Ratushny's questioning at pages 19 to 22.

29
30 Beaumont next says that it was a breach of the Beaumont/Cardinal confidentiality
31 agreement when Falcon and Cardinal had discussions about entering into a confidentiality
32 agreement of their own in approximately -- prior to September 3, 2013.

33
34 Beaumont next says that the act of entering into a confidentiality agreement between
35 Cardinal and Falcon, on or about September 3, 2013, was a breach of the
36 Beaumont/Cardinal confidentiality agreement.

37
38 Finally, it says that subsequent ongoing discussions regarding a purchase of the Falcon
39 assets by Cardinal, and an eventual closing of the transaction, were breaches of the
40 Beaumont/Cardinal confidentiality agreement. The actual Cardinal/Falcon agreement was
41 signed on January 22, 2014, but the evidence is that there may have been an agreement in

1 principle earlier. There was clearly discussions earlier.

2
3 Prior to those events, in early 2013, Mr. Tarrant of Beaumont, through a corporation
4 named Alder Ridge Resources Limited, attempted to negotiate a transaction with Falcon,
5 but those discussions were unsuccessful.

6
7 Of course, a confidentiality agreement is not a catch-all agreement to create rights and
8 remedies which were not bargained for. If the cause of action is based upon the
9 agreement, the rights and remedies sought must be found either expressly, or at least
10 implicitly, in the agreement.

11
12 The issue in this case is whether the act of emailing material that had been prepared by
13 Falcon to Cardinal with the backing of the Beaumont/Cardinal confidentiality agreement
14 was sufficient to form the basis of a \$1,305,000 broker fee or some other amount,
15 although Beaumont makes no attempt to prove some other amount in its materials. For
16 that matter, it makes no attempt to prove that the fee that it claims would be a standard
17 fee in the industry or for whom such -- or, from whom such a fee is typically claimed.

18
19 Beaumont refers to *Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd.*, [1999] 1 SCR 142, 1999
20 CanLii 705 (SCC). At paragraph 85, Binnie, J.J. held that: (as read)

21
22 The law would lose its deterrent effect if defendants could
23 misappropriate confidential information and retain profits thereby
24 generated subject only to the payment of compensation if, as and
25 when they are caught and successfully sued.

26
27 The decision of Justice Martin in *Scott & Associates Engineering Ltd. v. Finavera*
28 *Renewables Inc.*, 2013 ABQB 273, is very instructive partly in relation to the applicable
29 law, but also in relation to its facts and how they compare to this case. Her decision was
30 affirmed on appeal at 2015 ABCA 51. *Scott & Associates* was a case where the claim was
31 expressly made on the basis of a cause of action founded upon an alleged breach of
32 confidentiality in the common law and equity sense. The claim was expressly not made on
33 the basis of a breach of contract claim. The present case is precisely the opposite. The
34 claim is made on the basis of an alleged breach of the confidentiality agreement, on a
35 contract basis and on no other basis. Nevertheless, *Scott & Associates* is of assistance in
36 identifying the type of claim being made and in -- and in identifying some of the basic
37 principles relating to the use of confidential information. At paragraph 68, Justice Martin
38 held: (as read)

39
40 Similarly, the suggestion by Sopinka, J., dissenting in *Lac*
41 *Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.*, that the

1 foundation for an action of breach of confidence is a *sui generis*
2 hybrid of contract, equity and property theories has not been
3 widely followed by Canadian courts. Thus, the prevalent modern
4 view in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence is that a claim for breach of
5 confidential business information is based in either contract or
6 equity. See Justice Julie A. Thorburn and Keith G. Fairbairn, *Law*
7 *of Confidential Business Information*.

8
9 While admittedly commenting on a breach of confidence action generally, as opposed to a
10 contractual action, Justice Martin held at paragraph 100: (as read)

11
12 It seems to me a logical starting point that a plaintiff alleging a
13 breach of confidence only has a right over information which he
14 or she has created, in a very general sense, with some measure of
15 his or her own time, skill and effort. There is no obligation of
16 confidence, for example, where the party asserting the right had no
17 part in creating the information, but merely summarized the
18 information made public by a third party. See *Ridgewood Resource*
19 *Ltd. v. Henuset*, 1982 ABCA 79, at paragraph 27, 35 AR 493,
20 leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, [1982] 1
21 SCR 12.

22
23 And further, at paragraph 105, Justice Martin held: (as read)

24
25 Scott claims a breach of confidence over information which is
26 primarily Penn West's. The person suing must be someone to
27 whom a duty of confidence is owed; as with *Ridgewood Resources*
28 *Ltd*, Scott had no part in creating most of the information in the
29 case at bar, but merely passed it along or summarized it.
30 Therefore, there is no obligation of confidence owed by Finavera
31 to Scott for Penn West's information. Neither can Scott establish
32 that it had the sole right to benefit from the use of the Penn West
33 information.

34
35 Ultimately, the plaintiff in *Scott & Associates* succeeded on only one of its claims. That
36 claim was a constructive trust monetary claim based on the fact that Scott & Associated
37 had created for itself a preferred position in negotiations for the sale of an asset by a third
38 party and the defendant used that preferred position to further its own interests and to
39 enter into a transaction directly with the third party. While much of the material covered
40 by the confidentiality agreement in *Scott & Associates* was created by the third party,
41 there was some not insignificant information which had been created, or at least

1 processed, through the skill and expertise of the plaintiff, Scott & Associates. The
2 combination of the use of that information with the use of the preferred position in the
3 negotiations that had been created by Scott & Associates was sufficient to impose the
4 constructive trust remedy. Monetary damages were awarded while a proprietary
5 constructive trust remedy was rejected.
6

7 No constructive trust remedy is sought or proven here. In addition, the facts of this case
8 are far weaker from the remedial point of view than those in *Scott & Associates*. Quite
9 apart from that, the cause of action is different as well. In the end, although the cause of
10 action in *Scott & Associates* was based upon a breach of confidentiality, Justice Martin
11 awarded a monetary amount to the plaintiff before her based upon what it had been
12 promised and not paid. In other words, even to award damages on a non-contractual basis,
13 Justice Martin based her award on the non-fulfilment of a promise. Promises are an
14 important part of reasonable expectation and that is particularly true in a claim that is
15 expressly framed in contract.
16

17 In this case, the evidence is that Beaumont had negotiated no exclusive right to market the
18 Falcon assets. Beaumont created no information that would typically be regarded as
19 confidential itself and it simply passed on Falcon created materials to Cardinal. Beaumont
20 claims that it had the right to do so because it was allowed to provide material to its
21 bankers. Beaumont filed a subsequent affidavit saying that in the oil and gas context
22 'bankers' often means other resource companies that would be part of a purchase. Even if
23 that is true, it is doubtful that it would extend to broker opportunities. In this action,
24 Beaumont seeks to create a broker fee opportunity for itself for which it did not negotiate.
25 Furthermore, it attempts to gain significant financial advantages for itself from information
26 in which it had little or no proprietary interest. At best, its interest in the information
27 which it relies upon was a right to use that information for putting together its own
28 transaction to purchase the Falcon assets.
29

30 It is hard to envision how generating brokerage opportunities is something that was
31 envisioned by the Falcon/Beaumont confidentiality agreement as a permitted use. Such a
32 use is certainly not contemplated in the wording of the Falcon/Beaumont confidentiality
33 agreement.
34

35 In my view, Falcon had the right to deal with whoever it wanted with respect to the sale
36 of its assets, as indicated by the exchange of Mr. DeJong in April, of 2003 (sic).
37 Beaumont did not bargain with Falcon for any restrictions on Falcon's ability to do so.
38 Beaumont bargained for a narrow set of rights with Falcon. Its rights were to use the
39 information with its bankers in attempting to raise financing for a transaction. It did not
40 bargain for the right to try and generate a broker fee.
41

1 In its confidentiality agreement with Beaumont, Cardinal agreed not to make any improper
2 use of any Beaumont confidential information. While it is difficult to conceive as to
3 exactly what Beaumont confidential information was provided, when it simply forwarded
4 a brief package of materials that had been prepared by Falcon, giving the benefit of the
5 doubt to Beaumont that the parties can agree upon whatever they deemed to be
6 confidential information, there is still a question as to what damages would flow from a
7 breach if there was one. Beaumont had not acquired for itself a right to a broker fee on a
8 Falcon transaction.

9
10 Beaumont argues that had Cardinal not dealt directly with Falcon, it would have been in a
11 position to approach Falcon and negotiate a broker fee. The difficulty is that Beaumont
12 had negotiated, at best, the right to use the Falcon confidential information for trying to
13 put together its own purchase transaction. It was likely in breach of its Falcon
14 confidentiality agreement in using that information in other ways to its own advantage and
15 to attempt to create a broker fee and it is unlikely that any successful claim could be
16 argued for a broker fee then or now. The probability of negotiating one then, in my view,
17 is the same as the probability of obtaining one now, minimal. It would have to be based
18 upon the rights that Beaumont had to profit from materials, which did not belong to it,
19 and those were minimal.

20
21 Confidentiality agreements, at least the ones before me, have two purposes, one is to
22 indemnify the owner of the confidential information about any loss arising from its
23 information losing its confidentiality, the other is to give a right to damages arising from
24 the loss of confidentiality. The damages still need to be proven. Paragraph 16, of the
25 statement of claim, alleges: (as read)

26
27 As a result of Cardinal's flagrant breach of the agreement
28 Beaumont is entitled to a broker fee in the amount of 6 percent of
29 the acquisition price payable by Cardinal to Beaumont in the
30 amount of \$1,350,000.

31
32 It appears there is a transposition of the figures in the statement of claim. (as read)

33
34 Alternatively, Beaumont is entitled to a broker fee at fair market
35 rates. Beaumont has not received payment of the broker fee or any
36 portion thereof from Cardinal. The full broker fee remains due and
37 owing from Cardinal to Beaumont.

38
39 On the facts of *Scott & Associates*, Beaumont would not meet the test for success on a
40 claim based upon a confidential information cause of action, presumably that is why this
41 claim is based upon a breach of contract basis. Unfortunately for Beaumont, the contract

1 which it sues upon does not provide for a broker fee and it is not in any way connected to
2 broker activities, whether that is in the confidentiality agreement between Beaumont and
3 Cardinal or whether it is in the original confidentiality agreement between Falcon and
4 Beaumont. Beaumont obtained a confidentiality agreement from Cardinal, not an
5 agreement for a broker fee.
6

7 In all of the circumstances, in my view, it takes more than forwarding a small package of
8 Falcon information, that was prepared by Falcon, to earning a \$1,305,000 broker fee. The
9 matter might be different if Beaumont actually had the Falcon information in the
10 circumstances where it had been given consent to use the information for the purpose of
11 trying to generate a broker fee for its own gain, but it did not. In *Hryniak v. Mauldin*,
12 [2014] 1 SCR 87, 2014 SCC 7 (CanLii) the Supreme of Canada held at paragraphs 49 and
13 50: (as read)
14

15 There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is
16 able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a
17 motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the
18 process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of
19 fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a
20 proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to
21 achieve a just result.
22

23 These principles are interconnected and all speak to whether
24 summary judgment will provide a fair and just adjudication. When
25 a summary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary
26 facts and resolve the dispute, proceeding to trial would generally
27 not be proportionate, timely or cost effective. Similarly, a process
28 that does not give a judge confidence in her conclusions can never
29 be the proportionate way to resolve a dispute. It bears reiterating
30 that the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as
31 exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that
32 she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal
33 principles so as to resolve the dispute.
34

35 The cases generally award damages on lost opportunity matters where the disclosing party
36 has shown that it has established itself in a real position of opportunity. That is not the
37 case here. There was no opportunity lost as a purchaser. That avenue was attempted and it
38 failed. There was no reasonable expectation of a broker fee based upon the position that
39 Beaumont had negotiated for itself with Falcon. This is a case where a fair and just
40 adjudication can be made on the existing record.
41

1 I find that this is an appropriate case for summary judgment. There are very few facts in
2 dispute and it is unlikely that the evidence would be significantly different at trial. There
3 are no potentially dispositive facts in dispute. Furthermore, *Windsor v. Canadian Pacific*
4 *Railway Ltd.*, 2014 ABCA 108, reminds at paragraph 15: (as read)

5
6 The theory that disputes eventually "went to trial" was always
7 something of a legal fiction. Even when the Court implied that a
8 trial was called for, and declined to grant summary judgment, or
9 declined to strike pleadings, it was well known that trials were a
10 rarity. *Hryniak v. Mauldin* refers several times to the need for a
11 change in culture. In other words, the myth of trial should no
12 longer govern civil procedure. It should be recognized that
13 interlocutory proceedings are primarily to "prepare an action for
14 resolution", and only rarely do they actually involve "preparing an
15 action for trial". Interlocutory decisions that can resolve a dispute
16 in whole or in part should be made when the record permits a fair
17 and just adjudication. *Hryniak v. Mauldin* rejected the ruling by
18 the Ontario Court of Appeal to the effect -- to the effect that the
19 old test for summary judgment should continue to apply the face --
20 even in the face of the newly amended Ontario rule.

21
22 *Windsor* also reminds, at paragraph 21, that a plaintiff facing a summary dismissal
23 application is "bound to put its best foot forward" in response to that application.
24 Beaumont provides no evidence of actual damages and no evidence that the 6 percent fee
25 that it claims is a standard fee in the industry for what it did. At paragraph 21, of
26 *Windsor*, the Court of Appeal held: (as read)

27
28 A party faced with an application for summary judgment must put
29 its best foot forward, and present evidence to show sufficient
30 "merit" to establish a genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to
31 the outstanding issues: *Lameman* at paragraph 19. Speculating that
32 evidence might be available at a trial is not sufficient to create a
33 genuine issue requiring a trial.

34
35 I find that the probability of success of Beaumont's claim for a broker fee or damages in
36 lieu thereof at trial is minimal and that this is an appropriate case for summary dismissal.
37 In light of the approach required by *Hryniak*, I dismiss Beaumont's claim.

38
39 Now, costs. Anyone wish to speak to costs?

40
41 **Submissions by Mr. McDonald (Costs)**

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MR. MCDONALD: My friend and I are agreed, Master, on costs being tabled under schedule 'C', column 4, for all steps in the application and the action.

THE MASTER: That sounds reasonable.

MR. MCDONALD: Okay.

Ruling (Costs)

THE MASTER: I'll confirm that.

MR. MCDONALD: Okay. Thank you, Sir.

THE MASTER: Thank you. Thank you, all. It was well-argued. It was helpful.

MR. HAWKES: Thank you.

THE MASTER: Thank you.

MS. BAKER: Thank you, Sir.

PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED

1 Certificate of Record

2

3 I, Brett Default, certify that this recording is the record made of the evidence in the
4 proceedings in the Court of Queen's Bench, held in courtroom 904, at Calgary, Alberta,
5 on the 22nd day of January, 2016, and that I was the court official in charge of the
6 sound-recording machine during the proceedings.

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1 **Certificate of Transcript**

2

3 I, Penny Best, certify that

4

5 (a) I transcribed the record, which was recorded by a sound-recording machine, to the
6 best of my skill and ability and the foregoing pages are a complete and accurate transcript
7 of the contents of the record, and

8

9 (b) the Certificate of Record for these proceedings was included orally on the record
10 and is transcribed in this transcript.

11

12

13

Digitally Certified: 2016-01-26 16:43:24

14

Penny Best, Transcriber

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Order No. 1503-16-1

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35 Pages: 16
36 Lines: 629
37 Characters: 23847

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39 File Locator: 2178f58ec47c11e5a18f0017a4770810
40 Digital Fingerprint: 6a6570bd068509f3e404a11d354b360a19ca5c6654209584fa2f2bf7ffc0ab89

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Detailed Transcript Statistics	
Order No. 1503-16-1	
Page Statistics	
Title Pages:	1
ToC Pages:	1
Transcript Pages:	14
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Line Statistics	
Title Page Lines:	52
ToC Lines:	6
Transcript Lines:	571
Total Lines:	629
Visible Character Count Statistics	
Title Page Characters:	526
ToC Characters:	135
Transcript Characters:	23186
Total Billable Characters:	23847
Multi-Take Adjustment: (-) Duplicated Title Page Characters	23321