By: David V. Wright

Matter Commented On: Implementation of the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, SC 2021, c 22

PDF Version: Federal Climate Plans, Policies and Projections: Have no fear, CNZEAA is (still) here?

With so much attention around the proposed Building Canada Act and the expedited process for “national interest projects” contained therein (see recent ABlawg posts here and here, and related coverage here), one could be forgiven for thinking that climate change law and policy is getting lost in the shuffle at the federal level. And given Prime Minister Carney’s scrapping of the consumer carbon tax and hints that the proposed oil and gas cap might be next, there is a fair reason to fear that Canada’s pathway to achieving its climate change commitments is in jeopardy. But wait. Since 2021, the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, SC 2021, c 22 (CNZEAA or the Act, colloquially pronounced ‘sneeze-ee-yah’) has been more or less fulfilling its purpose and is about to do some more work.

As explained in this previous post (see also this paper), the CNZEAA was put in place as a bulwark against shifting political priorities. It requires a series of quantified emission reduction targets, detailed plans to achieve those targets, and many reports along the way. This post lays out recent activities under the Act, what the Act requires in the foreseeable future, and then assesses what this means in terms of where we are now. Overall, upcoming requirements under the Act should provide some assurances for those who fear the Carney government will substantially stray from Canada’s existing climate action pathway. However, is it reasonable to have no fear? In short, no. That’s because, while CNZEAA is indeed still here, right now is a particularly weak phase in time-bound requirements under the Act as well as under the Paris Agreement. Still, it would be fair to at least have less fear, CNZEAA is here.

CNZEAA Basics

The main purposes of CNZEAA are to enshrine in legislation Canada’s net zero by 2050 target, and to provide “a framework of accountability and transparency to deliver on it” (see this backgrounder). The Act requires that the federal government set national GHG emission reduction targets for 2026, 2030, and then every five years beyond. These are called milestones years, and each associated target must be more ambitious than the previous (s 7(1.1)). Those targets must be supported by detailed Emission Reduction Plans (ERPs, see s 9(1) and (2)) that comply with the detailed information requirements set out in the Act (s 10(1)). The government is required to prepare detailed progress reports by the end of 2023 (s 14(1.2), now complete), 2025, and 2027 (s 14(1.1)), and then at least one progress report related to each milestone year (s 14(1)). The government must also prepare detailed assessment reports in relation to milestone years (s 15) (1) and (2)). These plans and reports must be tabled in Parliament (s 18(3), which provides oversight as part of the accountability aspect of the regime. The Act also creates and Net Zero Advisory Body (s 20; NZAB), and creates a role for the federal Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) to examine and report on implementation of climate change mitigation measures (s 24 (1) and (2)).

“You Are Here”

The Act came into force in June 2021. Since then, implementation has been relatively smooth, which makes sense given that until the spring 2025 federal election all requirements under the Act were simply followed by the Trudeau government, the very same administration that enacted the law. A few notable implementation steps include a first ERP that was released in March 2022 (see commentary here), a first progress report released in 2023, several reports released by NZAB, a new and more ambitious 2035 emission reduction target announced in December 2024 (now 45-50% below 2005 levels by 2035, beyond the existing target of 40-45% below 2005 levels by 2030), and a first and second report by the CESD in 2023 and 2024, respectively. While there are certainly shortcomings in the federal government’s plans and in emission reductions expected from the plans, leading the CESD to conclude that things are not on track (see 2023 CESD report at 6.22 – 6.24), the transparency and accountability framework brought in under CNZEAA has been more or less achieving its intended purposes, even if achieving actual emission reduction targets remains far from certain.

What’s Next?

The next significant requirement under CNZEAA is the second progress report pursuant to s 14(1.1): “the Minister must prepare a progress report in respect of the first milestone year by no later than the end of 2023, another by no later than the end of 2025 and another by no later than the end of 2027”. This 2025 progress report “must contain an assessment of the 2030 greenhouse gas emissions target, based on the most recent developments in science, technology and greenhouse gas emissions management, and the Minister must consider whether the target should be changed, based on those developments” (s 14(1.2)). The 2025 report must also include detailed information set out in s 14(2) such as updates on implementation of federal measures, updates on cooperative measures with provinces, and details of additional measures that could be taken to increase the probability of achieving targets. Additionally, the 2025 progress report must include an update on progress toward the interim 2026 target (s 14(3)).

Looking to 2026, that year is also the deadline for achieving the interim 2026 target of reducing emissions by 20% below 2005 levels. Spoiler: this is likely to be yet another target that Canada misses, noting the CESD findings cited above and Canada’s brutal track record. Next year will also be CNZEAA’s fifth birthday, which means Parliament must conduct the first comprehensive review pursuant to s 27.1. For a helpful graphic depiction of upcoming requirements and other steps toward 2050, see the helpful exhibit in the 2023 CESD report, “Timeline of target setting, deadlines, and reports…” (Exhibit 6.1).

What’s Next: Have Less Fear?

The present juncture reveals a weakness in the CNZEAA structure. While the 2030 ERP, released in 2022, was reasonably detailed and compliant with the Act, the next ERP is not required until 2029. That might be fine if federal emission reduction measures remained steady and aggressively implemented, but in this post-election context that is clearly not going to be the case. As noted at the outset, the consumer carbon price has been jettisoned, the oil and gas cap might be next, and global political turmoil may create circumstances where climate action becomes secondary to perceived economic imperatives (to wit: the summary and statements coming out of the recent G7 talks include little to no mention of climate action). In practical terms this means that emission reductions projected to result from any changed or cancelled federal measures (e.g., carbon pricing) are off the books and it is not clear from where those amounts of emission reductions will come. Waiting until 2029 for a detailed plan that provides such clarity will be a very, very long wait. Of course, nothing precludes the Carney government from developing a comprehensive ERP at any time, it’s just not required under the Act until 2029.

Notwithstanding this disconcerting coinciding of a weak phase in the CNZEAA cycles and changes in federal law and politics, the Act does have other requirements that will require the Carney government to explain the current state of affairs and the path ahead. First will be the above-noted 2025 progress report, which will be released later this year. This report must include an update on progress toward the 2026 interim target, as well as the detailed information required under s 14(2). Most notable in the present uncertain context, ss 14(2)(b) requires “an update on the implementation of the federal measures, sectoral strategies and federal government operations strategies described in the relevant emissions reduction plan and, if available, updated projections of annual greenhouse gas emission reductions resulting from those combined measures and strategies”.

These statutory requirements mean the federal government will have no choice but to take stock of the remaining measures in the 2030 ERP and explain implications of recent and upcoming changes. The government will also have to present projections that lay bare any shortcomings in future emissions reduction trajectories. Additionally, missing the 2026 target (virtually guaranteed at this point) will trigger s14(2)(b.2): “if the projections indicate that the plan’s greenhouse gas emissions target will not be met, [the progress report must contain] details of any additional measures that could be taken to increase the probability of achieving that target”. That is a mandatory provision, meaning the government will have to put its cards on the table and show what could be done. One has to hope that the government takes these obligations seriously and provides meaningful, coherent, well substantiated analysis. Given how detailed the requirements are in the Act, failure to comply with these statutory obligations could provide a basis for interested parties and environmental organizations to commence a law suit on the basis of non-compliance with the Act (see discussion on justiciability in this paper at pages 15 -19).

Frightful Paris Agreement Timing

Beyond the four corners of CNZEAA, international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement continue to apply. Detailed review of these regimes is beyond the scope of this post, but it is worth noting that right now is also a relatively weak phase in the international compliance regime. Just a few months ago, the Trudeau government submitted its updated 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC, see this explainer for context). That submission outlines Canada’s updated commitment of reducing emissions by 45-50% below 2005 levels by 2035; it also sets out in detail the measures that have been and are expected to be put in place to achieve that target. However, given the above-noted law and policy changes the Carney government is undertaking, and likely more to come, that NDC is already out of date.

Unfortunately, these domestic policy changes coincide with an oddly quiet period for the transparency and accountability guardrails in place under the Paris Agreement. This is because the next Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement does not wrap up not until 2028, and the next NDC is not due until 2030. That means that the framework for international scrutiny of the extent to which Canada is on or off track to achieve its commitments is about as weak as it gets at the present time. Of course, there will be the annual UN Climate Change Conference (this year is COP 30 in Brazil) and other technical meetings, which have some soft force in terms of promoting follow-through on emission reduction commitments. However, it is far from clear whether such international peer pressure will be sufficient for the Carney government to present an updated comprehensive plan that explains things like how to make up for emission reductions that will now not happen due to the shelved carbon pricing regime.

Conclusion

In the nearly four years since coming into force, CNZEAA has more or less been fulfilling its purposes. It was always going to be the case that the first real test for the Act would be in the months after the end of the Trudeau government. That time has come. While CNZEAA implementation challenges would likely have been much more existential had Prime Minister Carney not been elected (e.g. potential repeal of the Act), and while the Carney government seems to be staying the course on much of the climate change law and policy put in place by the preceding government (see the election campaign climate plan here), change is still in the air and the political winds are shifting with new leadership and fearsome geopolitical storm clouds.

When it comes to follow-through on Canada’s climate change commitments, it is reassuring to some degree that upcoming CNZEAA requirements will drive the new Carney government toward providing transparency and clarity around changes in federal climate law and policy. However, the near-term requirements under the Act are relatively mild, focused primarily on reporting as opposed to providing a new and comprehensive ERP. This reality, coupled with a relatively weak phase in the international compliance regime under the Paris Agreement, is cause for at least some fear (and certainly not no fear). If the controversial approach taken toward the Building Canada Act is any sign, such fears and concerns are well founded in the climate policy realm.


This post may be cited as: David V. Wright, “Federal Climate Plans, Policies and Projections: Have no fear, CNZEAA is (still) here?” (23 June 2025), online: ABlawg, http://ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Blog_DW_CNZEAA.pdf

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