Author Archives: Jennifer Koshan

About Jennifer Koshan

B.Sc., LL.B (Calgary), LL.M. (British Columbia). Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar. Please click here for more information.

Leave to Appeal Granted in Language Rights Case

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Case Considered: R. v. Caron, 2010 ABCA 343

Gilles Caron was charged with a traffic violation under Alberta’s Use of Highways and Rules of the Road Regulations, A.R. 304/2002, back in 2003. He sought to defend himself against that charge on the ground that Alberta legislation is unconstitutional because it is not enacted in both English and French. Caron’s case has two important dimensions to it. First, he argued that he was entitled to an interim costs award to permit him to pursue his language rights challenge, relying on British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371. This argument was successful at the Court of Queen’s Bench (see Special Enough? Interim Costs and Access to Justice) and at the Court of Appeal (see Interim Costs Order Upheld in Language Rights Case). The Supreme Court granted the Alberta government leave to appeal in August 2009, and heard the appeal on the interim costs issue on April 13, 2010.

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Multiple Sexual Offence Proceedings and the Disclosure of “Records” under the Criminal Code

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Case considered: R. v. Leykin, 2010 ABQB 631

Ruslan Leykin was charged with a number of sexual offences relating to N.W, who is also the complainant in a second sexual assault case involving a different accused. Leykin sought access to records in the possession of the Crown in relation to the second case, and argued that the governing procedure was that in R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. The Crown argued that the proper procedure for determination of production of records was that set out under ss.278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 (“the production provisions”). In a short but important decision, Justice June Ross of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench agreed with the Crown, holding that the production provisions of the Criminal Code apply to records in the possession of the Crown in relation to a separate sexual assault proceeding. Continue reading →

Access to Justice and Representation by Agents

By: Jennifer Koshan

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Case Commented On: R v Frick, 2010 ABPC 280

Cutbacks to legal aid are a harsh reality in Alberta and the rest of Canada. As noted on the website of Legal Aid Alberta (LAA), “as of April 6, 2010, LAA’s eligibility guidelines for full representation by a lawyer have decreased by 30%”. This is due in part to the fact that in this province at present, legal aid funding is highly dependent upon Alberta Law Foundation revenue, and this revenue has been adversely affected by the economic downturn. It is also due to government cuts to Legal Aid. Legal Aid has developed a bandaid of sorts through Legal Services Centres, which “provide clients access to legal information, referral and brief services (in family, criminal, civil and immigration matters) with legal advice in immigration and non-family civil matters.” However, these centres exist only in Calgary and Edmonton, deal only with certain legal matters at present, and perhaps most importantly, do not provide full legal representation. Attempts by lawyers such as Dugald Christie and the Canadian Bar Association to bring constitutional claims asserting rights to representation by paid legal counsel in certain circumstances have not been successful. In such a climate, it is not surprising that other actors – such as agents – have stepped into the fray to provide legal services. A recent Alberta Provincial Court case, R v Frick, shows that there are legislative and constitutional limits to the role that agents can play in filling the gaps in legal aid.

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Sentencing for Spousal Sexual Violence: Different but Equal

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Cases considered: R. v. D.J.D., 2010 ABCA 207; R. v. D.J.D., 2009 ABPC 216

Until 1983, the definition of rape in Canada excluded offences committed by a husband against his wife. In that year, reforms to the Criminal Code did away with the offence of rape altogether, and implemented a new scheme of sexual offences that were gender neutral and could, explicitly, be committed by one spouse against another (see Bill C-127, Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980 81 82 83, c. 125, s. 246.8). The issue of spousal sexual violence has received little specific attention in Canada since the reforms of 1983. However, the African and Canadian Women’s Human Rights Project (ACWHRP) – a project involving lawyers, activists and academics in Canada, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi – is presently studying the lessons learned from the criminalization of marital rape in Canada in the context of efforts to criminalize this form of violence in the 3 African countries. I am completing a review of case law in Canada – some 275 decisions over the past 27 years – which shows that cases of spousal sexual violence still continue to be treated differently from other sexual assault cases when it comes to issues of consent, mistaken belief in consent, evidentiary matters, and sentencing. On the latter issue, a recent case of the Alberta Court of Appeal, R. v. D.J.D., brings to light some of the considerations faced by judges when sentencing offenders for spousal sexual violence.

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Access to Justice, the Charter and Administrative Tribunals in Alberta: Who holds the Holy Grail?

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Case considered: R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22

On June 11, 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada considered once again the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to grant Charter remedies as “courts of competent jurisdiction” under section 24(1) of the Charter in R. v. Conway. This decision purports to broaden the power of administrative tribunals to award Charter remedies found in previous Supreme Court decisions by taking an “institutional” rather than “remedy by remedy” approach to the question of jurisdiction (at para. 23). However, Justice Rosalie Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, was also clear that a tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction under the Charter could be constrained by statute (at para. 22). Conway must therefore be read subject to Alberta’s Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-3.

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