Category Archives: Criminal

Bill C-332 and the Criminalization of Coercive Control

By: Jennifer Koshan

Matter Commented On: Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Study of Bill C-332, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (controlling or coercive conduct), 44th Parliament, 1st session

PDF Version: Bill C-332 and the Criminalization of Coercive Control

On February 26, 2024, I appeared before the federal Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (JUST), which is currently studying Bill C-332, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (controlling or coercive conduct).

After hearing from a number of witnesses speaking in favour of, and cautioning against, the criminalization of coercive control (as well as taking positions in between), JUST begins its clause-by-clause study of the Bill today. This post sets out my prepared five-minute opening remarks to JUST, which were followed by a question and answer period. A recording of the hearing is available here and the minutes are available here. In addition, I submitted a 10-page written brief to JUST with colleagues Janet Mosher, Shushanna Harris, and Wanda Wiegers that is available here. Continue reading →

The Myth of False Allegations of Intimate Partner Violence

By: Jennifer Koshan

Case Commented On: R v RMD, 2022 ABKB 851 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The Myth of False Allegations of Intimate Partner Violence

A colleague recently brought to my attention a decision concerning intimate partner sexual violence that was released earlier this year. In R v RMD, Justice Robert Graesser dealt with an application by the accused to cross-examine the complainant – his previous partner – on her past sexual activity in a criminal trial for alleged sexual assault. The court’s reasons for decision on this application arguably perpetuate one of the most common myths about intimate partner violence (IPV): that litigants make false or exaggerated claims of violence to gain an advantage in family law disputes. Indeed, the court went so far as to take judicial notice of this “fact” (at para 45). This post unpacks the decision, placing it in the larger context of gendered myths and stereotypes about IPV and the relevant research and case law. Continue reading →

Submission to Justice Canada on the Criminalization of Coercive Control

By: Janet Mosher, Shushanna Harris, Jennifer Koshan, and Wanda Wiegers

Bill Commented On: Bill C-332, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (controlling or coercive conduct), First Session, Forty-fourth Parliament (2023)

PDF Version: Submission to Justice Canada on the Criminalization of Coercive Control

Justice Canada has been holding an engagement process on the issue of whether an offence of coercive control should be added to the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. This offence has been proposed in a series of private members bills, most recently, Bill C-332. Our submission (link below) argues that it is imperative that actors in all legal domains acquire a nuanced and contextual understanding of coercive control derived from an intersectional analysis that attends to how multiple systems of oppression interact to shape the tactics of coercion and control. However, we do not support the criminalization of coercive control, either as a standalone offence or within a broader offence of domestic abuse/violence. We argue that it is the former approach – the acquisition of deep and contextualized knowledge by legal system actors – and not criminalization, that holds promise in enhancing safety for women and children. Continue reading →

R v Hills and R v Hilbach and Section 12 of the Charter: The Twelfth Dimension of Sentencing

By: Lisa Silver

Cases commented on: R v Hills, 2023 SCC 2 (CanLII); R v Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3 (CanLII)

PDF Version: R v Hills and R v Hilbach and Section 12 of the Charter: The Twelfth Dimension of Sentencing

Editors’ Note: This is the third in our series of posts to mark Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Week at the University of Calgary, which deals with the impact of mandatory minimums sentences on the Charter rights of Indigenous persons.

 

We live in four dimensions of space, famously described by the space-time continuum imagined by Albert Einstein. In legal terms, a courtroom is an example of this kind of space we perceive when practicing law. If we look outside of law and further into the field of physics, even more dimensions are possible – upwards of 26 according to the Closed Unoriented Bosonic String Theory. This article is concerned with a previously unacknowledged dimension of the law, found within the confines of the sentencing hearing. In the recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions of R v Hills, 2023 SCC 2 (CanLII) and R v Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3 (CanLII) a new dimension of the sentencing hearing is revealed through the application of s 12 of the Charter, which protects the right “not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”. Specifically, in Hills and Hilbach this section is engaged by the minimum terms of imprisonment mandated by the offence provisions, both of which involve firearms. The subsequent s 12 inquiry is, like the dimensions conjured by string theory, not necessarily perceived by everyone in every sentencing hearing but is an ever-present reminder of core sentencing principles, like proportionality and parity, which ensure the continual presence of human dignity in the sentencing process. Although this twelfth dimension has been revealed by virtue of the Hills and Hilbach decisions, the s 12 inquiry itself reveals much about the limits of sentencing and the frailties of our system of justice. Continue reading →

The Right to Your Day in Court

By: Kaye Booth

Case commented on: Heiser v Bowden Institution, 2022 ABCA 300 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The Right to Your Day in Court

Courts have the responsibility to listen to the applications brought before them, especially when an individual’s liberty is at issue. On the other hand, courts have the inherent power to prevent the misuse of their procedures and to control proceedings. These two roles of the court may conflict with each other – if the court has the inherent power to label litigants as vexatious and prevent them from making further applications, how is this squared with the litigant’s right to access the court and the court’s duty to hear them? Continue reading →