Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 17 of 42

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.).
Professor Emerita.
Please click here for more information.

For Shame: An Obvious and Fundamental Breach of Natural Justice by the Residential Tenancies Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS)

On January 19, 2016

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: For Shame: An Obvious and Fundamental Breach of Natural Justice by the Residential Tenancies Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS)

Case Commented On: Kerr v Coulombe, 2016 ABQB 11 (CanLII)

A tenant, Gary Kerr, showed up for a hearing at the Residential Tenancies Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS) in Edmonton. The hearing, initiated by the landlord, Betty Coulombe, against Gary and Jason Kerr, was scheduled for November 27, 2015 at 1:30 p.m. The tenant arrived on time and checked in with the receptionist. The receptionist told him to have a seat in the waiting room and said they would call him. At 2:30 p.m., the tenant checked with the receptionist again, wanting to know if he should continue to wait. The receptionist disappeared into the back and returned with an Order against the tenant. The Order stated that the landlord appeared by telephone and “Tenants are not participating.” As the tenant succinctly put it in his affidavit, “I did not have a chance to speak on our behalf” (at para 3). This scenario is reminiscent of Franz Kafka’s parable, “Before the Law”, where the man from the country patiently sits before a gatekeeper controlling entry into the law.

What the RTDRS did to Gary Kerr was, without question, a breach of natural justice: “an obvious and fundamental failure of natural justice” (at para 14). No administrative tribunal in the Canadian legal system — no matter how “fast, inexpensive, less formal” it bills itself — can leave a party cooling his heels in the waiting room and conduct a hearing without giving him a chance to speak. It may be fast, it may be inexpensive, and it may be informal — but it is not justice.

Setting Aside Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service Orders for Problems with Service: It Can’t Be Done

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 7, 2015

In Landlord/Tenant

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Setting Aside Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service Orders for Problems with Service: It Can’t Be Done

Case Commented On: Abougouche v Miller, 2015 ABQB 724 (CanLII)

As the recently-appointed Master in Chambers, James R. Farrington, clearly and concisely sets out in Abougouche v Miller, there is no way for a tenant to have an order made by the Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS) set aside if a tenant fails to appear at the hearing before a Tenancy Dispute Officer because the tenant did not receive actual notice of that hearing. The tenant cannot go back to the Tenancy Dispute Officer; that person only has the power to correct typographic, grammatical, arithmetic or other similar errors in their orders, clarify their orders, and deal with obvious errors or inadvertent omissions in their orders (Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service Regulation (RTDRS Reg), Alta Reg 98/2006, section 19(1)). The tenant cannot apply to the only body with the power to cancel or vary an RTDRS order — the Court of Queen’s Bench (sections 23(1) and 25(1)(b) RTDRS Reg) — because new evidence is not permitted on appeals (section 25(1) RTDRS Reg) and evidence about service in technical compliance with the regulations but inappropriate nonetheless would be evidence that was not before the Tenancy Dispute Office, i.e., new evidence. So a tenant — even a tenant as apparently well-prepared with legal arguments as the self-represented tenant was in this case — has no opportunity to be heard on the merits. Worse, a tenant like Ms. Miller, who appears to have vacated the rented premises because of significant deficiencies, including internal flooding, seems to be set up by the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA), SA 2004, c R-17.1. That Act allows her landlord to serve notice of a RTDRS hearing on her by posting it on the rented premises that she vacated, even if the landlord knows the tenant has vacated those premises, even if she vacated for good reasons, and even if the landlord is still in regular communication with the tenant by email and text messages about the deficiencies in the rented premises (section 57(3) RTA).

The Residential Tenancies Act and Domestic Violence: Facilitating Flight?

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 4, 2015

In Landlord/Tenant, Property, State Responses to Violence

By: Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: The Residential Tenancies Act and Domestic Violence: Facilitating Flight?

Legislation Commented On: Bill 204: Residential Tenancies (Safer Spaces for Victims of Domestic Violence) Amendment Act, 2015

Bill 204, the Residential Tenancies (Safer Spaces for Victims of Domestic Violence) Amendment Act, 2015, was introduced by Deborah Drever, Independent MLA for Calgary-Bow, to mark Family Violence Prevention Month on November 15, 2015. At that time, MLA Drever stated that “This bill seeks to empower and support survivors of violence by removing some of the barriers to leaving an unsafe home environment.” (Hansard, November 15, 2015). At Second Reading on November 16, 2015, MLAs from all parties expressed support for the Bill, which passed unanimously. Perhaps most powerful was the statement of the MLA for Lethbridge-East, Maria Fitzpatrick, who told her own story of domestic violence and the barriers to leaving her former spouse (Hansard, November 16, 2015). Amendments to the Bill were agreed to and introduced by the Committee of the Whole on November 30, 2015. This post will describe the ways in which Bill 204, as amended, proposes to revise the Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004 cR-17.1, and will raise a number of issues that the Legislature may wish to consider before it passes the Bill in final form.

Section 6 of the Federal Interest Act is Obsolete

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On August 20, 2015

In Creditors’ Remedies

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Section 6 of the Federal Interest Act is Obsolete

Case Commented On: David v Premiere Canadian Mortgage Corporation, 2015 ABQB 505 (CanLII)

In this decision, Justice Robert A. Graesser makes an interesting policy argument about section 6 the Interest Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-15, using it to bolster his conclusions about the application of the doctrine of precedent. As a result, this decision is useful for teaching about precedents, the principle of stare decisis, and how to use policy in making legal arguments. This decision also illustrates the need for reform of the 135 year old federal Interest Act.

Section 6 of the federal Interest Act provides that if a mortgage is repayable in one of three ways — on a “sinking fund plan”, by blended payments of principal and interest, or involving “an allowance of interest on stipulated repayments” — then the mortgage must contain a statement of the interest payable calculated annually or semi-annually and not in advance. If the mortgage does not contain that statement, then “no interest whatever shall be chargeable, payable or recoverable”. The consequences of not complying with section 6, if it applies, are therefore significant. In this particular case, the interest paid by the Davids, which they were seeking to have returned to them, amounted to more than $83,000. (This was not a mortgage foreclosure case. The Davids had satisfied all of their obligations under the mortgage and were suing the mortgagee for non-compliance with section 6 of the Interest Act.)

“Champagne Wishes and Caviar Dreams”

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On August 18, 2015

In Family, Property

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: “Champagne Wishes and Caviar Dreams”

Case Commented On: Hood v Skauge, 2015 ABQB 476 (CanLII)

Those who are old enough to remember — and who liked — the 1984-1995 TV show, “Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous”, which featured the extravagant lifestyles of wealthy entertainers, athletes and business moguls, might be thrilled to know that NBC is reviving the series. They might also be delighted to read the 97-paragraph Parts V and VI in this decision by Justice Craig M. Jones interpreting a Cohabitation Agreement entered into by Cheryl Hood and Richard Skauge (see “Q&A w/ Olympia Trust Founder Rick Skauge”, Exempt Edge). The TV show was said to give special attention “to the prices paid for the various luxuries with which the rich enhanced their daily lives, ranging from spacious seaside villas, to classic cars, to gold-plated bathroom fixtures” (plot summary here). Justice Jones engages in an account of the lifestyle led by Ms. Hood and Mr. Skauge for a little over four years, between December 2004 and May 2009 — a lifestyle that included a yacht, three homes in Calgary, Mercedes automobiles, a cabin near Penticton, trips to Italy, Paris, New York, Thailand, St. Thomas, Disneyland, Fiji, and Hawaii (as well as Vancouver, Banff, Toronto, Quebec City and North Battleford), a $100,000 ring and various sexual relationships outside the relationship that is scrutinized in this case.