Author Archives: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

About Jonnette Watson Hamilton

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.). Professor Emerita. Please click here for more information.

Establishing Aboriginal Title: A Return to Delgamuukw

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

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Case commented on: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44

The declaration of Aboriginal title by the Supreme Court of Canada on June 26, 2014 — a first in Canada — is a momentous decision that should have long-lasting significance for the Tsilhquot’in Nation, other Aboriginal groups, and the rest of Canada. The unanimous Supreme Court decision made new law in the areas of the duty to consult and accommodate, governments’ justification of infringements of Aboriginal title, and federalism — matters that my colleagues Nigel Bankes, Sharon Mascher and Jennifer Koshan will be writing about. On the law of Aboriginal title — the focus of this post — the decision is extremely important for at least two reasons. First, as part of its return to principles set out in the Court’s 1997 decision in Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, Tsilhqot’in Nation includes a return to an equal role for Aboriginal perspectives that includes Aboriginal  laws, instead of the exclusive focus on Aboriginal practices that was a feature of R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220, the Court’s second post-1982 decision on Aboriginal title. Second, Tsilhqot’in Nation clarifies an understanding of occupation that accords with a territorial approach to Aboriginal title, one that does not require and piece together intensive use of well-defined tracts of land. In doing so, the Court turned its back on the approach it took in Marshall/Bernard, an approach that was the source of the arguments made by the governments of Canada and British Columbia in Tsilhqot’in Nation and the basis of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in this case (William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285). The June 26 decision therefore brings increased certainty to the law of Aboriginal title by clarifying the type of occupation that will ground Aboriginal title. It also increases the likelihood of more successful Aboriginal title claims and, hopefully, more intensive and good faith negotiations in modern land claims and treaty processes.

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Conservation Easements and Fraud under the Land Titles Act

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

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Case commented on: Nature Conservancy of Canada v Waterton Land Trust Ltd, 2014 ABQB 303

This 130 page, 605 paragraph judgment penned by Justice Paul R. Jeffrey deals with a number of note-worthy legal issues in a fascinating factual context. The case started when the Nature Conservancy of Canada (NCC) tried to enforce a conservation easement that it had registered against its title to the Penny Ranch, a large cattle ranch near Waterton Lakes National Park in the south-west corner of the province. One of the main purposes of the conservation easement was to ensure that, when the NCC sold the Penny Ranch, development by the purchasers or their successors in title would not impede wildlife migration through the area, an area which the NCC described as the “North American Serengeti.” The case ended (barring appeals) with Justice Jeffrey finding that defendant’s new bison fence was not a breach of the conservation easement and ordering the NCC to pay over $700,000 to Thomas Olson for the NCC’s failure to issue him a timely tax receipt. In between, numerous legal issues arose, including: (1) the nature of conservation easements under the Alberta Land Stewardship Act; (2) contract rectification; (3) fraud as an exception to indefeasibility; (4) rectification of a caveat with a missing page in the underlying document; and (5) damages for the late issuance of a tax receipt. In this post, I will deal with only one of those issues and that is the fraud issue. Colleagues will address some of the other issues. Continue reading →

Constraining a Landlord’s Ability to Terminate a Residential Tenancy by Raising the Rent

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Constraining a Landlord’s Ability to Terminate a Residential Tenancy by Raising the Rent

Case commented on: Milner’s Aloha Mobile Home Park (1998) Ltd v Jenkins, 2014 ABQB 229 (CanLII)

This is an important decision for residential tenants, with potentially far-reaching impact. If a residential tenant is not in breach of his or her tenancy agreement, a landlord is unable to evict them except for a small number of reasons prescribed by the applicable legislation, either the Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004, c R-17.1 or the Mobile Home Sites Tenancies Act, RSA 2000, c M-20. But because Alberta has no law limiting the amount by which landlords can increase rent, everyone knows that landlords can force tenants out by raising their rent beyond what they can afford or are willing to pay. This decision by Master Andrew Robertson calls into question that received wisdom. Indeed, by finding that the increase in rent in Milner’s Aloha Mobile Home Park (1998) Ltd v Jenkins was really a notice to terminate a periodic tenancy and of no effect as either a notice to terminate or a notice of a rent increase, Master Robertson’s decision potentially signals a significant shift in the power balance between landlords and residential tenants in Alberta. Continue reading →

The Abatement of Rent Remedy under Alberta’s Residential Tenancies Act

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: The Abatement of Rent Remedy under Alberta’s Residential Tenancies Act

Case Commented On: Perpelitz v Manor Management Ltd., 2014 ABPC 63

There are few enough written decisions considering the landlord’s duties under Alberta’s 10-year-old Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004, c R-17.1, that almost any decision considering the statute is worth bringing to the notice of the province’s landlords and tenants. But this decision by Judge Gordon Yake is interesting on its own merits for a few reasons.

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What is the Legal Effect of an Unenforceable Agreement in an Unjust Enrichment Claim?

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: What is the Legal Effect of an Unenforceable Agreement in an Unjust Enrichment Claim?

Case commented on: Lemoine v Griffith, 2014 ABCA 46

The recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Lemoine v Griffith is interesting for what it tells us, in the context of a claim of unjust enrichment, about the legal effects of a prenuptial agreement that was both found and admitted to be unenforceable because of undue influence and a lack of independent legal advice. According to the majority, Justices Ronald Berger and Clifton O’Brien, once the trial judge found the agreement unenforceable for those reasons — and the appellant abandoned his challenge to that finding — the prenuptial agreement was not a factor in either supplying a juristic reason for any enrichment or evidence of the parties’ intentions. However, despite the fact that the unenforceability of the prenuptial agreement was not an issue, in his dissent Justice Frans Slatter would have overturned the finding of undue influence, holding (at para 103) that the “trial judgment cannot stand.”  While that is not the only point of disagreement between the majority and the dissent, it is the point that I will focus on in this comment.

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