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Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 29 of 43

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.).
Professor Emerita.
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Specific Performance of Contracts for the Sale and Purchase of Land: Is Deeming Land to be Unique Enough to Return to Pre-Semelhago Days?

PDF version: Specific Performance of Contracts for the Sale and Purchase of Land: Is Deeming Land to be Unique Enough to Return to Pre-Semelhago Days? 

Case commented on: Raymond v. Raymond Estate, 2011 SKCA 58

Fifteen years ago, before the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Semelhago v. Paramadevan, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415, 1996 CanLII 209 (S.C.C.), it was taken for granted that land is inherently unique and therefore, as a matter of course, the equitable remedy of specific performance would be awarded for breaches of contracts for the sale of real property. However, in Semelhago, Justice Sopinka questioned those assumptions, stating in obiter dicta on behalf of the majority that specific performance should “not be granted as a matter of course absent evidence that the property is unique to the extent that its substitute would not be readily available” (at para. 22). Subsequent confusion in the case law about under what circumstances specific performance is available and the unforeseen consequences of the loss of automatic grants of specific performance in a Torrens land titles system attracted the attention of the Alberta Law Reform Institute (ALRI). Its October 2009 Final Report No. 97 on Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Land: Purchasers’ Remedies recommended (at paras. 8, 61) that “for the purpose of determining whether a purchaser under a contract for the sale of land is entitled to specific performance of the contract, the land that is the subject of the contract be conclusively deemed to be unique at all material times, and legislation should be enacted to that effect”. However, no such legislation has been tabled in the Alberta legislature in the past 18 months. Now, the May 2011 decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Raymond v. Raymond Estate suggests that ALRI’s recommendation, even if enacted, may not be enough to return the law to its pre-Semelhago state. It does so by holding that Semelhago introduced a two part test for the granting of specific performance, with an objective component and a subjective one. It appears that the ALRI recommendation only addresses the objective component.

Perennial Problem of Section 8 of the Interest Act

PDF version: Perennial Problem of Section 8 of the Interest Act 

Case considered: Equitable Trust Co. v. Lougheed Block Inc., 2011 ABQB 193

This is one of several recent cases concerning the Lougheed Building at 604 – 1st Street SW in Calgary. The issue in this particular case was whether section 8 of the Interest Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-15, rendered mortgage terms providing for interest rate increases and administrative fees on default and in the final month of the mortgage unenforceable. Section 8 prohibits penalties for non-performance on loans secured by mortgages and is a statutory version of a long-standing equitable rule. This decision is of interest because the Master in Chambers, Judith Hanebury, adopts a limiting approach to section 8 which was rejected by the British Columbia Court of Appeal and because the mortgaged building, the Lougheed Building, is of historic interest. (The Lougheed Building has been designated a Historic Resource at both the municipal and provincial levels and was recently restored. Its heritage value lies in its representation of Calgary’s tremendous commercial growth prior to World War One; it is also an excellent example of the imposing Chicago Style of commercial architecture. For photos and details of the restoration, see the Canada’s Historic Places web site).

Vindication of a Residential Tenant’s Rights – At Least Temporarily

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Vindication of a Residential Tenant’s Rights – At Least Temporarily

Case Commented On: Lautner v Searle, 2011 ABQB 263

This very short decision by Master Walter H. Breitkreuz, Q.C., is about an unjustified and unsuccessful attempt by a landlord to quickly evict an elderly and ill tenant from rental premises that had been his home for more than 10 years. Memorandums of Decision – even 8 paragraph ones – are not often written about residential tenancy matters. But this is a victory by a tenant that deserves publicizing, even if the only apparent result of the victory is to extend the time that the tenant has to vacate the premises from 14 days to 3 months. Without publicity, there is no possibility of discouraging other landlords from acting in an equally heavy-handed manner.

Leave to Appeal an Arbitration Award: Is There a Public Interest Requirement?

PDF version: Leave to Appeal an Arbitration Award: Is There a Public Interest Requirement? 

Case considered: Milner Power Inc. v. Coal Valley Resources Inc., 2011 ABQB 118

This brief judgment raises an interesting question. Is it possible to interpret section 44(2) of Alberta’s Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43 to require that leave to appeal be in the public interest, as so many Alberta decisions have done? At the end of his judgment, Mr. Justice M.A. (Mel) Binder suggested to counsel that they raise this question with the appropriate government department or legislative counsel. This is not a new issue but it has been surprisingly seldom raised during the twenty years that the provision has been in effect considering that the test for leave to appeal in section 44(2) speaks only of the “the importance to the parties” and “the rights of the parties.”

Tracing Original Property to Replacement Property: What Evidence is Required?

PDF version: Tracing Original Property to Replacement Property: What Evidence is Required? 

Case considered: Scheffelmeier v. Krassman, 2011 ABCA 64

In Scheffelmeier v. Krassman the Alberta Court of Appeal once again dealt with tracing exempt property under the Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-8 (MPA). Tracing is one of the more contentious matters in matrimonial property litigation, as is the matter of non-disclosure of financial information, also a factor in this case. Scheffelmeier is of interest because it includes a dissenting opinion on the application of the long-standing principle that “[t]racing can be inferred, implied, or presumed” (Harrower v. Harrower (1989), 97 A.R. 141; 21 R.F.L. (3d) 369 at 376 (C.A.)). The point of contention between the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Ronald L. Berger and Madam Justice Patricia Rowbotham and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice J.D. Bruce McDonald also illustrates the problem caused by the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the disclosure requirements in the MPA.

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