Author Archives: Nigel Bankes

About Nigel Bankes

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

Unjustly discriminatory rates on Ventures Pipeline to continue; the Commission decides that it lacks jurisdiction to set interim or final rates.

PDF version: Unjustly discriminatory rates on Ventures Pipeline to continue; the Commission decides that it lacks jurisdiction to set interim or final rates.

Cases and decisions commented on:

(1) AEUB Decision 2006-105, Suncor Energy Inc., Preliminary Decision Regarding Jurisdiction to have the Ventures Pipeline (Oil Sands Pipeline) Regulated Under the Provisions of the Gas Utilities Act, Section 24 of the Gas Utilities Act, October 24, 2006;

(2) TransCanada Pipeline Limited v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2008 ABCA 55 (appeal of AEUB Decision 2006-105);

(3) AUC Decision 2009-065, TransCanada Pipeline Ventures Ltd, Suncor Energy Inc, Application to Have the Ventures Pipeline (Oil Sands Pipeline) Regulated Under the Provisions of the Gas Utilities Act, Section 24 of the Gas Utilities Act – Investigation, May 20, 2009;

(4) TransCanada Pipeline Ventures Ltd v. Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2010 ABCA 96 (appeal of AUC 2009-065);

(5) AUC Decision 2012-164, Williams Energy (Canada), Inc, Application to Terminate the Williams Contract for Ventures Pipeline Transportation Service or, in the Alternative, Set Rates to be Imposed and Observed by the Owners of Ventures Pipeline, June 14, 2012.

On June 14, 2012 the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC\Commission) handed down its decision in the latest effort by the contract shippers on Ventures Pipeline to obtain relief from what the Commission has already ruled to be rates that are “unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential” (AUC Decision 2009-065 at paras 145 & 147).  The AUC declined to grant the relief sought.  How could this be?  The simple answer is that section 5 of the Gas Utilities Act, RSA 2000, c G-5 (GUA) provides that the Commission may only exercise its authority under certain key sections of the GUA (including the rate setting provisions) if the Commission has been authorized to do so by means of an Order in Council (OC), or if the gas utility in question is covered by an exemption under the regulations.  The Commission held that Ventures did not fall within any of the existing categories of exemption and further, that since there was no OC in place (despite the Commission’s request), the Commission had no jurisdiction to fix final or interim rates for Ventures.

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Building energy empires on (legal) foundations of sand, or, can I have my cake and eat it too?

PDF version: Building energy empires on (legal) foundations of sand, or, can I have my cake and eat it too?

Case commented on: Remington Development Corporation v Enmax Power Corporation, 2011 ABQB 694, aff’d 2012 ABCA 196.

Most people would think that if Utility Co (U Co) needs access to cross Y’s land in order to construct a major capital investment in the form of a utility right of way, U Co will secure any necessary access rights (easement or utility right of way) either: (1) by way of an agreement, or (2) by way of expropriation if Y tries to extract hold-out rents.  In either case, U Co will want the expropriation or agreement to bind the land: i.e. to run with the land no matter what Y does with it (sell it, assign it into bankruptcy etc.).  And in either case one would think that U Co (and its lawyers) would want to make sure that the agreement bound the land for so long as U Co needed the right of way – or at least for a reasonable amortization period for the investment that U Co is about to make, so as to ensure that it does not have stranded assets on its hands, or worse still, a gap in its transmission system.

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When is a registered joint tenancy not a joint tenancy and not even co-ownership?

PDF version: When is a registered joint tenancy not a joint tenancy and not even co-ownership?

Cases Considered: Lutz v Lutz, 2012 ABQB 300; Lemoine v Smashnuk, 2008 ABQB 193

On a statutory application to terminate co-ownership under Part 3 of the Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7, can a court conclude that there was no co-ownership?

Lucas Lutz wanted to buy a house but did not qualify for a mortgage. Lucas’ brother, Eric, agreed to help. The deal was structured so that title to the house was transferred to Lucas Lutz and Eric Lutz as joint tenants. Two mortgages used in financing the purchase were granted by both Lucas and Eric; one was paid off but the other still secured an outstanding balance of approximately $90,000. Lucas made all of the subsequent mortgage payments. Lucas and Eric both lived in the house and paid utilities, but Eric moved out after 7 years, in 2006. Up until 2006, Eric also made payments to Lucas that Lucas characterized as rent and Eric characterized as contributions to the mortgage payments. There was no written agreement between Lucas and Eric.

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Dower Consent Teasers

Case considered: Karafiat v Webb, 2012 ABCA 115 and Webb (Re), 2011 ABQB 89.

PDF: Dower Consent Teasers

This case shows that the Dower Act, RSA 2000, c D-15 can still throw up intellectual teasers 55 years after this version of the statute was first enacted (Dower Act, 1948 (Alta), c 7). The case highlights the distinction between the consent required by section 4 of the Act (the normal case), and the consent required under section 25(2). Section 25(2) deals with the situation where the homestead property is co-owned by the spouses. The issue is whether a request by both spouses to the holder of a charge to postpone that charge is a consent to a disposition (i.e. the charge) for the purposes of section 4 or section 25(2). The majority responds in the negative.

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More Grist for the Mill, Another Case of Gross Negligence under CAPL 1990

PDF version: More grist for the mill, another case of gross negligence under CAPL 1990

Case commented on: Trident Exploration Corp. (Re), 2012 ABQB 242

An operator under a pooling agreement who agrees to take charge of responding to a Crown offset notice and who fails to do so and fails to inform tract owners that it is no longer intending to respond, is grossly negligent within the meaning of Article 4 of the 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure.

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