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Author: Emily Laidlaw

Associate Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar.
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A Right to be Forgotten Online: A Response to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Draft Position

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: A Right to be Forgotten Online: A Response to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Draft Position

Document Commented On: Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) published its draft position on online reputation last week stating that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c-5 (PIPEDA) provides a right to de-index search results (remove a link to a webpage from search results based on a keyword search) and a right to source takedown (removal of a webpage from the host site). De-indexing and source takedown are specific ways that a person might deploy a right to be forgotten, an issue hotly debated for several years, but especially since the Court of Justice of the European Union decided Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proeccion de Datos (AEPD), Marios Costeja Gonzalez, (2014) Case C-131/12 (known as Google Spain). Scholars have already responded to the OPC, such as here, here and here. I offer a different commentary, reflecting my first critical thoughts on three key issues arising from the report: (a) the public interest test suggested by the OPC to balance freedom of expression and privacy; (b) the role of private technology companies; and (c) the blurring of the line between data protection and defamation regimes. While I will discuss source takedown briefly (and for a more thorough analysis of intermediary liability and defamation law, see my work with Dr. Hilary Young here), the focus in this post will largely be on search results. 

@CanadaCreep and Privacy: Developing the Tort of Invasion of Privacy

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: @CanadaCreep and Privacy: Developing the Tort of Invasion of Privacy

As I prepared to write a blog post about the future of privacy the story broke of @CanadaCreep, the Twitter account with 17,000 followers that posted photos and videos of unsuspecting women around Calgary. The kicker was that the material focused on women’s breast, genital and buttocks regions, including upskirting videos (video up women’s skirts). A 42-year-old Calgary man was criminally charged for the upskirting videos, specifically voyeurism, distributing voyeuristic recordings, and possessing and accessing child pornography. However, there are currently no charges related to the other pictures, the bulk of them that focused on specific regions of the female body that were under layers of clothing and not visible to the public. This is unnerving and confusing, because while we expect to be viewed casually when we are out in public, we don’t expect specific body parts to be photographed and distributed to the world. It’s classically objectifying, but more than that, it communicates the message that the second women walk out the door their bodies aren’t theirs.

Pritchard v Van Nes: Imposing Liability on Perpetrator Zero of Defamatory Facebook Posts Gone Viral

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: Pritchard v Van Nes: Imposing Liability on Perpetrator Zero of Defamatory Facebook Posts Gone Viral

Case Commented On: Pritchard v Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686

Justice Saunders of the British Columbia Supreme Court recently decided Pritchard v Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686 (Pritchard) concerning the liability of individuals not only for their Facebook posts, but how their “friends” react to these posts, whether through comments, sharing or otherwise distributing the post. This case asks: if you start the fight, are you liable for the pile-on? The analysis of the Court could have significant repercussions concerning the uneasy balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression, arguably tipping the balance in favour of reputation in stark departure from recent Supreme Court of Canada cases on defamation (see Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, Grant v Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, WIC Radio Ltd. v Simpson, 2008 SCC 40).

Legal or Social Responsibility? What are the Responsibilities of Internet Companies for Free Speech?

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: Legal or Social Responsibility? What are the Responsibilities of Internet Companies for Free Speech?

The current controversy concerning the new Calgary-based app Peeple which will allow users to rate anybody they know – from their colleagues, to their friends, to their exes and neighbours – raises many questions familiar to internet lawyers. What are the rights of the subject matters of these ratings? To privacy? To dignity? What rights of free speech exist for anyone using these apps? And what are the responsibilities of the app developer, legally or ethically? For more on this controversy, see here, here, and here. There are some that question whether the app is a hoax, and I question it myself. Regardless, the Peeple controversy serves as a useful platform for discussions of wider issues in Internet governance. While there is much to be analysed concerning the privacy and harassment implications of this app, with this post I am going to focus on a different aspect of the controversy and that is the social responsibility of technology companies for human rights. By shedding light on the discussions happening in the international community I hope it contextualizes why things like Peeple are so controversial; they strike at the core of larger problems concerning the roles and responsibilities of businesses for human rights and the line between law and voluntary commitments. My recent research on this topic has been focused on free speech, so I will discuss the issue here in that context.

Worldwide Delisting from Google Search Results: The Significance of Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc.

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: Worldwide Delisting from Google Search Results: The Significance of Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc.

Case Commented On: Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc., 2015 BCCA 265

Last week the British Columbia Court of Appeal issued its much anticipated decision in Equustek Solutions Inc v Google Inc, 2015 BCCA 265, concerning an interlocutory injunction against Google requiring it to delist certain websites from its search results. There is much to analyze concerning this case. For the purposes of this post I will focus my discussion on why this case is of such significance, not only to Canada, but internationally, contextualizing the case within the wider international legal debates concerning the legal and social responsibilities of intermediaries such as Google.

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