Author Archives: Emily Laidlaw

About Emily Laidlaw

Associate Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar. Please click here for more information.

Canada’s Proposed New Consumer Privacy Protection Act: The Good, the Bad, the Missed Opportunities

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: Canada’s Proposed New Consumer Privacy Protection Act: The Good, the Bad, the Missed Opportunities

Bill Commented On: Bill C-11, Digital Charter Implementation Act, 2020, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading 17 November 2020)

On November 17, 2020, the Federal Government unveiled the most sweeping consumer privacy law reform in the last twenty years with the proposed Digital Charter Implementation Act, 2020 (Bill C-11).  The Act would repeal and replace parts of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 (PIPEDA) with a new private sector privacy statute, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act (CPPA) (not to be confused with the well-known California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)), and would enact the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act (Tribunal Act). The Bill makes good strides in modernizing Canada’s privacy legislation. It is also, in the end, a missed opportunity for more profound law reform.

If passed, it will necessitate modernization of Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 (PIPA). PIPA is designated substantially similar legislation, meaning that PIPA rather than PIPEDA regulates personal information within our provincial borders (and through our ombudsman, the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta). Without this designation, PIPEDA would apply to all consumer privacy transactions within Alberta. As will be detailed below, Bill C-11 fundamental revamps consumer privacy legislation and therefore unless Alberta follows suit, it is highly unlikely the substantially similar designation can be maintained.

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COVID-19 and Cellphone Surveillance

By: Joel Reardon, Emily Laidlaw, and Greg Hagen

PDF Version: COVID-19 and Cellphone Surveillance

Matter Commented On: Premier Jason Kenney’s Address on the COVID-19 Pandemic (April 7, 2020)

Last week in Premier Kenney’s address to the province, he announced (at approximately 10:29 of the video) that a central component of Alberta’s strategy in relation to COVID-19 (and its related SARS-CoV-2 virus) could require the use of technology to enforce quarantine orders: “We will strictly enforce quarantine orders to ensure compliance, including using technology like smartphone apps.” When a spokesperson for the Alberta Privacy Commissioner’s Office raised privacy concerns about the use of a smartphone app to enforce quarantine, the Calgary Herald reported that Premier Kenney dismissed such concerns as “overblown”, seemingly because only a small group of people would be tracked and only for the purposed of enforcing a valid quarantine order. Continue reading

R v Jarvis, A Technologically Mindful Approach to the Meaning of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: R v Jarvis, A Technologically Mindful Approach to the Meaning of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Case Commented On: R v Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 (CanLII)

Last week the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its long-awaited judgment R v Jarvis 2019 SCC 10 (CanLII) (Jarvis) and it is potentially a game-changer. The case focuses on a singular issue that is the core of privacy law: the meaning of the reasonable expectation of privacy (REP). What makes this case stand out from all the others is that it deals directly with frictions that have existed for a long time in how to conceptualize REP, namely the nature and extent to which we have a REP in public, how evolving technologies factor into conceptualizing REP in public, and issues of sexual integrity and privacy.

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A Right to be Forgotten Online: A Response to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Draft Position

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: A Right to be Forgotten Online: A Response to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Draft Position

Document Commented On: Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) published its draft position on online reputation last week stating that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c-5 (PIPEDA) provides a right to de-index search results (remove a link to a webpage from search results based on a keyword search) and a right to source takedown (removal of a webpage from the host site). De-indexing and source takedown are specific ways that a person might deploy a right to be forgotten, an issue hotly debated for several years, but especially since the Court of Justice of the European Union decided Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proeccion de Datos (AEPD), Marios Costeja Gonzalez, (2014) Case C-131/12 (known as Google Spain). Scholars have already responded to the OPC, such as here, here and here. I offer a different commentary, reflecting my first critical thoughts on three key issues arising from the report: (a) the public interest test suggested by the OPC to balance freedom of expression and privacy; (b) the role of private technology companies; and (c) the blurring of the line between data protection and defamation regimes. While I will discuss source takedown briefly (and for a more thorough analysis of intermediary liability and defamation law, see my work with Dr. Hilary Young here), the focus in this post will largely be on search results.  Continue reading

@CanadaCreep and Privacy: Developing the Tort of Invasion of Privacy

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: @CanadaCreep and Privacy: Developing the Tort of Invasion of Privacy

As I prepared to write a blog post about the future of privacy the story broke of @CanadaCreep, the Twitter account with 17,000 followers that posted photos and videos of unsuspecting women around Calgary. The kicker was that the material focused on women’s breast, genital and buttocks regions, including upskirting videos (video up women’s skirts). A 42-year-old Calgary man was criminally charged for the upskirting videos, specifically voyeurism, distributing voyeuristic recordings, and possessing and accessing child pornography. However, there are currently no charges related to the other pictures, the bulk of them that focused on specific regions of the female body that were under layers of clothing and not visible to the public. This is unnerving and confusing, because while we expect to be viewed casually when we are out in public, we don’t expect specific body parts to be photographed and distributed to the world. It’s classically objectifying, but more than that, it communicates the message that the second women walk out the door their bodies aren’t theirs. Continue reading