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Author: Jassmine Girgis Page 1 of 10

B.A. (Calgary); JD (With Distinction) (Western); LL.M. (Cambridge). Associate Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar. Please click here for more information.

“Time is of the Essence” Clauses are Incompatible with Indefinite Time Provisions

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: Nova Fish Farms Inc v Cold Ocean Salmon Inc, 2025 NLCA 28 (CanLII)

PDV Version: “Time is of the Essence” Clauses are Incompatible with Indefinite Time Provisions

A “time is of the essence” (TOE) clause is a boilerplate contract clause that renders a time limit or deadline in a contract to be a fundamental term of the agreement, entitling the other party to terminate the agreement if that term is breached, even in a minor way.

In Nova Fish Farms Inc v Cold Ocean Salmon Inc, 2025 NLCA 28 (CanLII), the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador decided that a TOE clause does not apply to an indefinite time provision in a contract. On January 22, 2026, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal this decision.

Limiting Contractual Liability for Breaching the Duty of Good Faith

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: 1401380 Ontario Limited (Wilderness North Air) v Hydro One Remote Communities Inc, 2025 ONCA 827 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Limiting Contractual Liability for Breaching the Duty of Good Faith

The contractual duty to exercise discretion in good faith applies to every contract, regardless of the parties’ intentions; parties cannot exclude the duty altogether. But what if they do not seek to exclude the duty itself, and instead seek only to limit the consequences of breaching it? Is that distinction legally meaningful? And is it permitted?

This post discusses how the duty to perform in good faith endures on both conceptual and practical grounds as long as there is liability for breaching it, even where that liability is contractually limited.

In 1401380 Ontario Limited (Wilderness North Air) v Hydro One Remote Communities Inc, 2025 ONCA 827 (CanLII), the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that parties may limit the scope of their liability for breach of the duty of good faith, and that doing so does not constitute contracting out of the duty itself.

The Automatic Right of Appeal under Section 193(c) of the BIA: The Case for a Narrow Approach in Asset Sale Decisions

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd v Conacher Kingston Holdings Inc, 2025 ONCA 732 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The Automatic Right of Appeal under Section 193(c) of the BIA: The Case for a Narrow Approach in Asset Sale Decisions

Section 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA) sets out four circumstances in which a party has an automatic right of appeal to a provincial appellate court from any order or decision of a judge. Where none of these enumerated grounds are engaged, a party can seek leave to appeal under section 193(e).

This post is about appeals dealing with the disposition of the debtor’s assets by trustees or receivers.

Disgorgement Orders as Non-Dischargeable Debt

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: Williams (Re), 2025 BCSC 1128 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Disgorgement Orders as Non-Dischargeable Debt

Re Williams, 2025 BCSC 1128, deals with a debtor who, prior to his bankruptcy, was found by the British Columbia Securities Commission (the Commission) to have masterminded a Ponzi scheme. The Commission imposed a penalty on Mr. Williams and ordered him to disgorge a sum of $6.8 million, an obligation from which he later sought release upon applying for a bankruptcy discharge. The issue in this case was whether the Commission’s debt fell into one of the categories of non-dischargeable debts, namely those arising from obtaining property or service by fraudulent misrepresentation or false pretences (s 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA)).

Ponzi Scheme Payouts as BIA Preference Payments

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: My Mortgage Auction Corp (Re), 2025 BCSC 1520

PDF Version: Ponzi Scheme Payouts as BIA Preference Payments

When an insolvent debtor pays one creditor over others, it undermines the goal of ensuring a fair and equitable distribution to the bankrupt’s creditors, which is one of the goals of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA), and it disrupts the statutory scheme of distribution set out in the BIA (see my previous posts on BIA preferences here and here).

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