Author Archives: Jennifer Koshan

About Jennifer Koshan

B.Sc., LL.B (Calgary), LL.M. (British Columbia). Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar. Please click here for more information.

Access to Justice and Representation by Agents

By: Jennifer Koshan

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Case Commented On: R v Frick, 2010 ABPC 280

Cutbacks to legal aid are a harsh reality in Alberta and the rest of Canada. As noted on the website of Legal Aid Alberta (LAA), “as of April 6, 2010, LAA’s eligibility guidelines for full representation by a lawyer have decreased by 30%”. This is due in part to the fact that in this province at present, legal aid funding is highly dependent upon Alberta Law Foundation revenue, and this revenue has been adversely affected by the economic downturn. It is also due to government cuts to Legal Aid. Legal Aid has developed a bandaid of sorts through Legal Services Centres, which “provide clients access to legal information, referral and brief services (in family, criminal, civil and immigration matters) with legal advice in immigration and non-family civil matters.” However, these centres exist only in Calgary and Edmonton, deal only with certain legal matters at present, and perhaps most importantly, do not provide full legal representation. Attempts by lawyers such as Dugald Christie and the Canadian Bar Association to bring constitutional claims asserting rights to representation by paid legal counsel in certain circumstances have not been successful. In such a climate, it is not surprising that other actors – such as agents – have stepped into the fray to provide legal services. A recent Alberta Provincial Court case, R v Frick, shows that there are legislative and constitutional limits to the role that agents can play in filling the gaps in legal aid.

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Sentencing for Spousal Sexual Violence: Different but Equal

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Cases considered: R. v. D.J.D., 2010 ABCA 207; R. v. D.J.D., 2009 ABPC 216

Until 1983, the definition of rape in Canada excluded offences committed by a husband against his wife. In that year, reforms to the Criminal Code did away with the offence of rape altogether, and implemented a new scheme of sexual offences that were gender neutral and could, explicitly, be committed by one spouse against another (see Bill C-127, Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980 81 82 83, c. 125, s. 246.8). The issue of spousal sexual violence has received little specific attention in Canada since the reforms of 1983. However, the African and Canadian Women’s Human Rights Project (ACWHRP) – a project involving lawyers, activists and academics in Canada, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi – is presently studying the lessons learned from the criminalization of marital rape in Canada in the context of efforts to criminalize this form of violence in the 3 African countries. I am completing a review of case law in Canada – some 275 decisions over the past 27 years – which shows that cases of spousal sexual violence still continue to be treated differently from other sexual assault cases when it comes to issues of consent, mistaken belief in consent, evidentiary matters, and sentencing. On the latter issue, a recent case of the Alberta Court of Appeal, R. v. D.J.D., brings to light some of the considerations faced by judges when sentencing offenders for spousal sexual violence.

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Access to Justice, the Charter and Administrative Tribunals in Alberta: Who holds the Holy Grail?

PDF version: Access to Justice, the Charter and Administrative Tribunals in Alberta: Who holds the Holy Grail?

Case considered: R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22

On June 11, 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada considered once again the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to grant Charter remedies as “courts of competent jurisdiction” under section 24(1) of the Charter in R. v. Conway. This decision purports to broaden the power of administrative tribunals to award Charter remedies found in previous Supreme Court decisions by taking an “institutional” rather than “remedy by remedy” approach to the question of jurisdiction (at para. 23). However, Justice Rosalie Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, was also clear that a tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction under the Charter could be constrained by statute (at para. 22). Conway must therefore be read subject to Alberta’s Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-3.

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Differential Treatment of Equality Law post-Kapp

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Differential Treatment of Equality Law post-Kapp 

Case Commented On: Woodward v Council of the Fort McMurray No. 468 First Nation, 2010 FC 337

There have been several posts on ABlawg concerning the Supreme Court’s most significant equality rights decision of late, R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41. Jonnette Watson Hamilton nominated Kapp as the leading equality rights case of the 2000s. She and I have also written on the application of Kapp (or lack thereof) in cases such as Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, 2009 SCC 9; Morrow v Zhang, 2009 ABCA 215 (see also here); and Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 239. We are hosting a continuing legal education session on Litigating Equality Claims Post-Kapp on June 15, 2010, and hope to have a good turnout of equality rights litigators, judges and NGOs to discuss the implications of Kapp (note: the last date to register is June 1, 2010). The need for this session is real because, even two years post-Kapp, some lower courts continue to ignore the ruling in that case. The latest example is a decision of Justice James O’Reilly of the Federal Court in a case involving voting rights of non-resident members of the Fort McMurray First Nation in Woodward v Council of the Fort McMurray No.468 First Nation.

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Questions About the Role of Reasonableness and Mutual Restraining Orders in Family Violence Cases

PDF version: Questions About the Role of Reasonableness and Mutual Restraining Orders in Family Violence Cases 

Cases considered: Petropoulos v. Petropoulos, 2010 ABQB 296; Andres v. Andres, 2009 ABQB 26

The Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-27 (PAFVA) has been in force since 1999. One of the motivations behind the PAFVA was to make it easier for victims of family violence to obtain emergency protection than the previous system of civil restraining orders had allowed for. Nevertheless, the practice of issuing restraining orders in family violence cases has not disappeared. In fact, there are a number of cases where judges have issued “mutual restraining orders” when deciding whether to confirm emergency protection orders issued under the PAFVA. This comment will raise some concerns with that practice. It will also review the propriety of an objective component to proving family violence in order to obtain relief under the PAFVA. Both of these issues arise in two recent decisions of Justice Joanne Veit of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.

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