Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 29 of 42

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.).
Professor Emerita.
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This brief judgment raises an interesting question. Is it possible to interpret section 44(2) of Alberta’s Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43 to require that leave to appeal be in the public interest, as so many Alberta decisions have done? At the end of his judgment, Mr. Justice M.A. (Mel) Binder suggested to counsel that they raise this question with the appropriate government department or legislative counsel. This is not a new issue but it has been surprisingly seldom raised during the twenty years that the provision has been in effect considering that the test for leave to appeal in section 44(2) speaks only of the “the importance to the parties” and “the rights of the parties.”

Tracing Original Property to Replacement Property: What Evidence is Required?

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On March 11, 2011

In Family, Property

PDF version: Tracing Original Property to Replacement Property: What Evidence is Required?

Case considered: Scheffelmeier v. Krassman, 2011 ABCA 64

In Scheffelmeier v. Krassman the Alberta Court of Appeal once again dealt with tracing exempt property under the Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-8 (MPA). Tracing is one of the more contentious matters in matrimonial property litigation, as is the matter of non-disclosure of financial information, also a factor in this case. Scheffelmeier is of interest because it includes a dissenting opinion on the application of the long-standing principle that “[t]racing can be inferred, implied, or presumed” (Harrower v. Harrower (1989), 97 A.R. 141; 21 R.F.L. (3d) 369 at 376 (C.A.)). The point of contention between the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Ronald L. Berger and Madam Justice Patricia Rowbotham and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice J.D. Bruce McDonald also illustrates the problem caused by the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the disclosure requirements in the MPA.

Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Charter: LEAF’s Intervention in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 16, 2010

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Charter: LEAF’s Intervention in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham

Cases Commented On: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), et al. v Barbara Cunningham, et al. (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Case number 33340, on appeal from Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 239

The Supreme Court of Canada is scheduled to hear the appeal of the Alberta government in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham on Thursday, December 16, 2010. Cunningham will be the first case in which the Supreme Court considers the application of section 15(2) of the Charter since that Court gave independent meaning to section 15(2) in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 and the first case in which the Court must consider the possible application of section 15(2) when the challenge is on the basis of under-inclusiveness. This comment is based on my experience serving on the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) case subcommittee in Cunningham, the factum filed by LEAF, and, to a much lesser extent and only to offer a contrast, the facta of the Appellants and the Attorney General of Ontario.

The Right of a Landlord to Withhold Consent to the Sub-leasing of Residential Premises

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On November 30, 2010

In Landlord/Tenant, Property

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: The Right of a Landlord to Withhold Consent to the Sub-leasing of Residential Premises

Case Commented On: Botar v Mainstreet Equity Corp., 2010 ABQB 710

It is unusual for a residential tenancy matter to be heard in the Court of Queens’ Bench of Alberta, as was Botar v. Mainstreet Equity Corp. Residential landlord and tenant law is intended to be accessible; the relationship is regulated by one, fairly comprehensible and comprehensive statute, the Residential Tenancies Act, S.A. 2004, c. R-17.1. Claims under that statute are usually heard in Provincial Court – Civil (also known as Small Claims Court), and that court has a helpful website on the Residential Tenancies Process. Accessible explanations of the process involved in making claims under the Residential Tenancies Act are an indication that Provincial Court – Civil is oriented toward self-represented litigants. Nevertheless, a tenant such as Andrew S. Botar might choose to represent himself in the Court of Queen’s Bench or be required to do so because his claim is for more than $25,000, the upper limit on damages that Provincial Court – Civil can award. In this case, Mr. Botar’s claim was for approximately $75,000. Mr. Botar had also enjoyed some success in the Court of Queen’s Bench against his landlord, Mainstreet, in 2007: see Botar v. Mainstreet Equity Corp., 2007 ABQB 608 and A Tenant’s Right to Withhold Payment of Rent, my comment on that earlier decision. Any preference Mr. Botar might have for the Court of Queen’s Bench, however, might be dissipated by this November 2010 decision by Mr. Justice J.J. Gill.

When is Delay “Undue” under Section 7(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act?

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On October 23, 2010

In Arbitration, Civil Procedure

PDF version: When is Delay “Undue” under Section 7(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act

Case considered: Eiffel Developments Ltd. v. Paskuski, 2010 ABQB 619

In June of 2007, Eiffel Developments Ltd. sued Geoffrey and Lisa Paskuski for $46,667, alleging non-payment under a contract for the construction of the Paskuskis’ home. Three years later, Eiffel asked Jodi L. Mason, Master in Chambers, to deem service of Eiffel’s Statement of Claim on the Paskuskis to be good and sufficient. The Paskuskis made three arguments opposing this simple application: (1) that there was no evidence of service of the Statement of Claim and an absence of service cannot be cured; (2) that even if an absence of service could be cured, there was no evidence to support the relief sought by Eiffel, and (3) that Eiffels’ claim should be stayed on the basis of an arbitration clause in the home construction agreement. The Paskuskis lost all three arguments. This comment will focus on the third argument seeking enforcement of an arbitration agreement.

Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 29 of 42

Leave to Appeal an Arbitration Award: Is There a Public Interest Requirement?

Tracing Original Property to Replacement Property: What Evidence is Required?

Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Charter: LEAF’s Intervention in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham

The Right of a Landlord to Withhold Consent to the Sub-leasing of Residential Premises

When is Delay “Undue” under Section 7(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act?