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Author: Nigel Bankes Page 49 of 89

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

The Regulatory Treatment of Stranded Assets in Alberta

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Regulatory Treatment of Stranded Assets in Alberta

Case Commented On: Fortis Alberta Inc v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 295

The Court of Appeal has now handed down its unanimous decision on the appeal of the Alberta Utilities Commission’s (AUC) decision known as the Utility Asset Disposition (UAD) Decision in which the AUC endeavoured to provide guidance to both electric and natural gas utilities as to the implications of the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority decision in Stores Block, ATCO Gas and Pipeline Ltd v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4. I posted on the AUC’s decision here. The Court, in a reserved judgment written by Justice Myra Paperny (Justices Rowbotham and Watson concurring), declined to interfere with the AUC’s decision. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal emphasized that Stores Block and its progeny (see below) were still good law in Alberta. Furthermore, even though other jurisdictions had been able to distinguish Stores Block based upon the language of their utility statutes, or to confine it to its particular facts and circumstances, that was not possible in Alberta. Indeed, the jurisprudential record suggested (Fortis at para 74) that the Court of Appeal in Alberta had not taken a narrow and restrictive approach to Stores Block but had instead “applied the principles set out in that case more broadly”. As a result (Fortis at para 76):

The Commission, and this Court, are bound by Stores Block and the subsequent decisions from this Court. Only legislative amendment, reconsideration, or a reversal of Stores Block by the Supreme Court of Canada can change that.

For ease of reference the Stores Block progeny are as follows: ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2008 ABCA 200 (CanLII), 433 AR 183 (Carbon), ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2009 ABCA 171 (CanLII), 454 AR 176 (Harvest Hills), ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2009 ABCA 246 (CanLII), 464 AR 275 (Salt Caverns I), ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2014 ABCA 28 (CanLII), 566 AR 323 (Salt Caverns II).

Methodological Pluralism: Canadian Utility Law Does Not Prescribe any Particular Prudent Expenditure or Prudent Investment Test that a Regulator Must Apply

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Methodological Pluralism: Canadian Utility Law Does Not Prescribe any Particular Prudent Expenditure or Prudent Investment Test that a Regulator Must Apply

Case Commented On: Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2015 SCC 44, (OPG) and ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 SCC 45 (ATCO)

The last two weeks of September 2015 saw the release of three important court decisions dealing with utility regulation, two from the Supreme Court of Canada, the OPG case and the ATCO case, and one from Alberta’s Court of Appeal, the Utility Asset Disposition case (UAD): Fortis Alberta Inc v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 295. The two Supreme Court cases (which were heard together) deal with a utility’s opportunity to recover operating costs and the application of prudency tests to those costs. Justice Rothstein is the principal author of both judgments. The ATCO case is unanimous while Justice Abella offers a dissent in the OPG Case. The UAD case deals with what I have previously referred to as the continuing fall-out from the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Stores Block (ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140).

This post summarizes the holdings in the ATCO and OPG decisions and then offers some preliminary comments on their implications. The post begins with some general observations on utility regulation statutes. I will aim to do a separate post on the UAD case.

“Contract Depth” Does Not Mean Optimal Depth

By: Nigel Bankes

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Case Commented On: Shallow Gas Drilling Corp v Legacy Oil and Gas, 2015 ABQB 606

It would be nice to know a little more about the facts of this case; but what appears to have happened on the basis of the rather cryptic record provided by Justice Bensler’s judgement is as follows. 1346329 Alberta Ltd (134) drilled a series of wells to earn interests in the Pierson properties. Earning was contingent on drilling the wells to contract depth which was defined as “a subsurface depth sufficient to penetrate 15 metres into the Spearfish.” The wells were drilled between late 2007 and January 2008. It was admitted that all of the wells were drilled to depths between 28.3 and 30.65 metres into the Spearfish.

The Alberta Energy Regulator Announces that It will Publish a Broader Range of Decisions

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Alberta Energy Regulator Announces that It will Publish a Broader Range of Decisions

Matter Commented On: AER Bulletin 2015-28, Posting of Participation and Procedural Decisions, September 23, 2015

Over the past few years, ABlawg and this writer in particular, have criticized the practice of the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) in not publishing important procedural rulings. Examples of those posts are available here, here and here. It is therefore appropriate that we also acknowledge that the AER has recently announced an important and positive change in its practice. On September 23, 2015 the AER issued Bulletin 2015-28 in which it announced that “effective immediately” the AER will begin posting on its website participation or standing decisions and substantive procedural decisions made by both hearing panels and other AER decision-makers. These decisions will be available by following Applications & Notices > Decisions on the AER website.

ITLOS, The Enrica Lexie Incident and the Prescription of Provisional Measures: Saying That There is Urgency Does Not Make It So

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: ITLOS, The Enrica Lexie Incident and the Prescription of Provisional Measures: Saying That There is Urgency Does Not Make It So

Decision Commented On: ITLOS, The Enrica Lexie Incident: Order in respect of request for the prescription of provisional measures, Italy v India, 24 August 2015

Article 290 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (LOSC) accords the International Tribunal of the Law of Sea (ITLOS) the authority to prescribe provisional measures in two different circumstances. Paragraph one authorizes ITLOS (along with the International Court of Justice, and any relevant international tribunal properly seized with an application) “to prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision” provided that ITLOS, the Court or an arbitral tribunal (as the case may be) has prima facie jurisdiction, to consider the matter.

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