Category: Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court Page 1 of 5

In adversarial litigation, oral questioning is an out-of-court pre-trial or pre-hearing proceeding where a party to litigation orally examines (by way of questioning) under oath another party adverse in interest, or their agents, for the purpose of adducing information that may be used as evidence. In the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010 (Alberta ROC), oral questioning can take the form of questioning for discovery (Rules 5.17 and 5.22) or questioning on application (Rules 6.7 and 6.8). Before the COVID-19 crisis and its social-distancing requirements, the default method of oral questioning in civil litigation was in person, with the parties and their lawyers present at a physical location accessible to all, such as the lawyer’s office or some other location chosen by the parties. A certified court reporter must also be present, who swears the witnesses and also takes record of the ‘question and answer’ proceeding.

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in public health and judicial directives enforcing isolation and social-distancing rules. Consequentially, in-person questioning became impractical on public health grounds. Although the justice system was substantially paralysed by the pandemic, litigation must go on even in that state of paralysis. In response to the realities imposed on the justice system, in-person oral questioning gave way to virtual or remote questioning using audio- or video-conferencing technologies. This method of questioning is what I refer to in this post as eQuestioning (short for electronic questioning).

Swift Judgment in a Complex Commercial Case

By Nigel Bankes

On June 2, 2014

In Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Swift Judgment in a Complex Commercial Case

Case commented on: Blaze Energy Ltd v Imperial Oil Resources, 2014 ABQB 326

The Commercial Court of the English High Court is well known for its capacity to give swift judgments in complex commercial cases. This decision confirms that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench can offer the same service provided that the parties can agree on the procedures to be followed.

The statement of claim in this matter was filed on April 23, 2014 and on April 29 Chief Justice Wittman granted a Consent Order for an expedited trial confined to three issues. Absent an Agreed Statement of Facts the trial proceeded on the basis of filed affidavits and the transcripts of cross examination on those affidavits. The Consent Order provided that there would be no questioning or viva voce evidence. The trial concluded on May 26 and Justice Frederica Schutz acceded to counsels’ request and gave well written reasons for judgement on May 30.

What does Fearn v Canada Customs add to OPCA jurisprudence?

By Admin

On March 24, 2014

In Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court, Criminal

By: Admin

PDF Version: What does Fearn v Canada Customs add to OPCA jurisprudence?

Case commented on: Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 (CanLII)

The leading case on Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigation is the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench decision of Justice John Rooke in Meads v Meads, 2013 ABQB 571 (CanLII) (summarized here). In Fearn v Canada Customs, Justice W A Tilleman very deliberately builds on Meads and develops the court’s responses to OPCA litigants in two ways. First, Fearn sets out guidelines for awarding costs against OPCA defendants in criminal proceedings, a context in which costs are very rarely awarded (at paras 113-139). Second, Fearn adds to what Meads had to say about when OPCA concepts and litigation strategies might amount to contempt of court, whether civil or criminal contempt (at paras 140-256). In this regard, Justice Tilleman identifies some OPCA strategies which, in and of themselves, are prima facie civil contempt. He also urges the use of criminal contempt prosecutions against some of the activities of OPCA “gurus”, i.e., those who sell instructional material and training in OPCA schemes.

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Pushing Back, Lock[e], Stock and Barrel on the Availability of Summary Judgment in Oil and Gas Lease Cases

By Nigel Bankes

On February 10, 2014

In Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Pushing Back, Lock[e], Stock and Barrel on the Availability of Summary Judgment in Oil and Gas Lease Cases

Case commented on: P. Burns Resources Limited v Locke, Stock and Barrel Company Ltd., 2014 ABCA 40

This decision of the Court of Appeal confirms that it will be a rare case in which the lessor of an oil and gas lease will be able to obtain summary judgment on the validity of the lease during its secondary term, especially where the third proviso offers a number of circumstances in which “time shall not be counted” against the lessee. In this case the third proviso read as follows:

Enforcing and Extending Vexatious Litigant Orders

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On September 18, 2013

In Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court, Vexatious Litigants

PDF Version: Enforcing and Extending Vexatious Litigant Orders

Case commented on: 1158997 Alberta Inc v Maple Trust Company, 2013 ABQB 483

This decision is interesting for two reasons. First, it illustrates a problem with the vexatious litigant provisions in Part 2.1 of the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2 or their administration namely, the absence of a list of those declared to be vexatious litigants that is easily and widely available both to those within and those outside the legal profession. As it stands now, it appears that even the clerks of the court do not have a list of who these orders have been made against, even though those orders state that the persons named vexatious litigants cannot commence or continue actions in the specified court without leave of that court. In this case, a company with two such orders made against it (in 2010 and 2011) was able to begin proceedings in 2012 and 2013 without the required leave of the court. Second, it illustrates the application of the seldom used subsection 23.1(4) of the Judicature Act. That subsection allows the court to make an order declaring someone who is not a party to an action to be a vexatious litigant as long as they are someone who, in the opinion of the court, is associated with the person against whom a vexatious litigant order is made. In this decision, five corporate plaintiffs in three different actions were declared to be vexatious litigants, and six individuals, who were not parties to any of the three actions but who were found to be associated with the corporate parties, were also declared to be vexatious litigants. One such individual was twice removed from the parties declared to be vexatious litigants. (The decision might also be noteworthy for a third reason: the number of persons — eleven — declared to be vexatious litigants by one order.)