Category: Contracts Page 8 of 12

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Unpaid AFE Amounts Constitute Liquidated Demands With No Right of Set-Off Under the 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure

Case Commented On: Talisman Energy Inc v Questerre Energy Corporation, 2015 ABQB 775 (MC)

This decision of Master Prowse offers an interesting example of careful parsing of the pleadings, and the agreed and contested facts, with a view to identifying possible issues for which summary judgment may be granted – while leaving the factually contested issues for a later trial. As in SemCAMS ULC v Blaze Energy Ltd. 2015 ABQB 218, (and see my post on that decision here) contractual language deeming billings to be liquidated demands and the “no set-off” provisions commonly found in oil and gas and other commercial agreements were important elements in the decision.

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By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Court of Appeal Assesses Damages for Production on a Dead Oil and Gas Lease: An Important but Ultimately Disappointing Decision

Case Commented On: Stewart Estate v TAQA North Ltd, 2015 ABCA 357

Courts of Appeal have at least two important functions. The first is a corrective function – the power and the authority to take a second look at a problem and to reach a decision which more properly accords with the law. For a recent example which demonstrates the crucial importance of this role see the Court of Appeal’s review of Judge Camp’s infamous decision in R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327, which was the subject of important commentary by my colleagues, Professors Koshan and Woolley here and here. In many cases, the scope of that corrective function turns on the applicable standard of review: correctness, unreasonableness or overriding and palpable error. One of the important issues in Stewart Estate v TAQA North Ltd was the application of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Creston Moly Corp v Sattva Capital Corp, 2014 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2014] 2 SCR 633 (Sattva) to the interpretation of oil and gas leases. Sattva is generally cited as authority for the proposition that unless there is an “extricable question of law”, a trial judge’s interpretation of a contract should generally be accorded deference. Thus, an appellate court should only intervene if it is of the view that the trial judge has made an overriding and palpable error – the traditional test for an appellate court’s assessment of a trial judge’s findings of fact. The principal rationale for applying the same test to contract interpretation issues as well as to findings of fact is that the rules on contractual interpretation allow a trial judge to take into account the factual and commercial matrix when assessing the intentions of the parties as revealed in the language used in the contract.

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By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Synthetic Transportation of Natural Gas

Case Commented On: Apache Canada Ltd v TransAlta Cogeneration LP, 2015 ABQB 650

In this decision Master Robertson concluded that the synthetic transportation of natural gas through a series of swap arrangements does not trigger the seller’s right of first refusal in a natural gas sales contract so as to allow the seller to re-acquire the gas, or that volume of gas, at the contract price and re-sell for its own account at the market price.

Apache agreed to sell natural gas to TAU for the specific purpose of fueling a cogeneration facility in Windsor, Ontario (the Windsor facility). The point of sale (i.e. where TAU took delivery of the gas) was Empress, Alberta. The contract had a 15-year term commencing in 1996. At that time, natural gas prices were depressed and Apache agreed to accept a fixed price with an escalation clause rather than a price determined by reference to an evolving spot market. Both parties clearly contemplated that TAU, having taken delivery of the gas at Empress, would transport that gas to its Windsor facility using TransCanada’s mainline and Union Gas’s facilities in Ontario. Indeed, the contract required TAU to arrange take-away pipeline capacity through agreements with “Buyer’s Transporters” (s.9.03) that were (at para 39):

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By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Interest Clause in a Drilling Contract Not a Penalty

Case Commented On: Precision Drilling Canada Limited Partnership v Yangaarra Resources Ltd, 2015 ABQB 649

This decision of Master Prowse follows on from his earlier decision on the merits of the dispute between the parties: Precision Drilling Canada Limited Partnership v Yangaarra Resources Ltd 2015 ABQB 433. The case involved so-called knock-for-knock provisions in a standard form drilling contract. My post on that decision is here and I note that it has also been the subject of a comment in The Negotiator here. This matter was back before Master Prowse because the parties could not agree on the terms of the formal judgement and in particular could not agree on two issues relating to Yangarra’s liability to pay interest on the amounts found to be owing. The contract provided for the payment of interest at 18% commencing 30 days after an invoice was tendered. If that clause were applicable Yangarra would be liable for approximately $2.4 million. Yangarra contested the validity or applicability of the interest provision on two grounds. First Yangarra argued that the clause operated as an unenforceable penalty. Second, Yangarra argued that a clause in the contract which afforded it the opportunity to contest an invoice meant that the interest clause was inapplicable so long as the invoices in question were subject to a bona fide dispute.

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By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Upstream UK Oil and Gas Contract Case of Interest to the Energy Bar

Case Commented On: Scottish Power UL Plc v BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd et al, [2015] EWHC 2658 (Comm)

This case involved a long term agreement for the sale and purchase of natural gas between BP and its fellow working interest owners in the offshore Andrew field (Andrew owners\vendors) and Scottish Power, the purchaser. The dispute arose because the Andrew owners decided to shut-in the Andrew field and platform in order to allow the processing and related facilities to be reconfigured so as to permit resources from the adjacent Kinnoull field to be tied into the Andrew facilities and platform, as well as production from a deeper pool in the Andrew field. The entire project was referred to as the Andrew Area Development (AAD). The Andrew field was ultimately shut-in from 9 May 2011 – 26 December 2014 with full production not being attained until March 2015. During that period there were no deliveries to Scottish Power under the contract. The shut-in continued for longer than originally anticipated by the Andrew partners but nothing seems to turn on that. There was considerable common ownership in the Andrew and Kinnoull fields such that at the time of the litigation two of the Andrew owners (BP and Eni between them held a 79% interest in the Andrew field) also owned a 93% interest in the Kinnoull field.

The matter came on for hearing as a trial of certain preliminary questions. A central issue in the case was whether (assuming liability on the part of the Andrew owners) Scottish Power should be confined to the specific “default gas” remedies provided by the contract for default delivery or whether it could sue for damages at common law and claim, inter alia for the difference between the price of gas under the contract and the price it had to pay for make-up gas. The decision also discusses contractual interpretation issues (see discussion of the factual matrix at paras 24 et seq), force majeure issues and the reasonable and prudent operator standard. The post begins with this last issue.

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