Category: Criminal Page 25 of 39

Agent Regulation: The Case of Emmerson Brando (AKA Arturo Nuosci, AKA Maverick Austin Maveric, AKA Landon Emmerson Brando)

On June 15, 2015

By: Heather White & Sarah Burton

PDF Version: Agent Regulation: The Case of Emmerson Brando (AKA Arturo Nuosci, AKA Maverick Austin Maveric, AKA Landon Emmerson Brando)

Case Commented On: R v Hansen, 2015 ABPC 118

On May 12, 2015, CBC news reported that Emmerson Brando – a well-known Calgary-based court agent – had an extensive criminal history (Meghan Grant, “Emmerson Brando’s criminal past outlined in Calgary court memo” CBC News (12 May 2015) (“CBC News”). This was of great interest to the Calgary Bar owing to his regular appearances in court. Mr. Brando had served 90 days in Canadian jail and 33 months in U.S. prison for offences including fabricating evidence, fraud, identity theft, misuse of a social security number, and making a false statement in a passport application (CBC News). Upon completing his sentence in the United States, Mr. Brando was deported back to Canada, where he set up practice as an agent in Ontario. A few years ago, Mr. Brando moved his practice to Alberta where paralegals are not regulated (CBC News).

Once Mr. Brando’s criminal history was uncovered, Chief Crown counsel Lloyd Robertson, Q.C., brought an objection to Mr. Brando being given leave to represent a client at an upcoming trial. The resulting decision, R v Hansen, 2015 ABPC 118, written by Judge Gaschler, provides a thorough analysis of Brando’s criminal history and the way in which it affects the Court’s willingness to grant him leave to appear as an agent. After a careful review of the circumstances, Judge Gaschler held that Mr. Brando’s appearance would undermine the integrity of the justice system, and denied him leave to appear as an agent (at para 29).

Life, Liberty, and the Right to CanLII: Legal Research Behind Bars

By Sarah Burton

On June 3, 2015

In Access to Justice, Criminal

By: Sarah Burton

PDF Version: Life, Liberty, and the Right to CanLII: Legal Research Behind Bars

Case Commented On: R v Biever, 2015 ABQB 301

The link between access to information and access to justice is not often discussed, but it is implicit in our legal process. Document production, questioning, and Crown disclosure are all premised on the notion that one needs access to relevant information in order to present one’s case. This idea should also extend to legal research. Without access to precedents, case law and procedural texts, the ability to adequately argue a case is significantly impaired.

R v Biever, 2015 ABQB 301, tackles the issue of access to legal information in a unique context – the right of an imprisoned accused to conduct online legal research. While prisons provide access to criminal law texts, the Court in Biever considered whether those resources were adequate for an inmate to meet and defend the case against him. In ruling that the accused was entitled to more materials, the Court raised questions about how prisons should be providing access to legal information. Biever also raises interesting questions about how we deal with self-represented parties who simply do not want a lawyer.

A “Convicted Terrorist” By Any Other Name

By Maureen Duffy

On May 13, 2015

In Constitutional, Criminal, International Law, Youth and the Law

By: Maureen Duffy

PDF Version: A “Convicted Terrorist” By Any Other Name

Cases Generally Considered: Pelham, Warden of the Bowden Institution, et al. v. Khadr, No. 36081 (Alberta) (Criminal) (SCC, By Leave); Bowden Institution v Khadr, 2015 ABCA 159; Khadr v Bowden Institution, 2015 ABQB 261; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Warden of Bowden Institution, 2015 FC 173; Khadr v Edmonton Institution, 2014 ABCA 225; Khadr v Edmonton Institution, 2013 ABQB 611

“What’s In a Name?”

Shakespeare famously wrote:

’Tis but thy name that is my enemy;

Thou art thyself though, not a Montague.

What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,

Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part

Belonging to a man. O! be some other name:

What’s in a name? that which we call a rose

By any other name would smell as sweet …

The idea, of course, is that names may be superficial labels, which do not, by themselves, define the character of the person to whom they are attached. Rather, they can be misleading, giving an impression of a person that is entirely different from reality.

Does the Stinert Decision Signal the End of the Preliminary Inquiry?

By Lisa Silver

On April 17, 2015

In Criminal

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Does the Stinert Decision Signal the End of the Preliminary Inquiry?

Case Commented On: Regina v Stinert, 2015 ABPC 4

For years the efficacy of the preliminary inquiry has been questioned, studied and pronounced upon by lawyers, government officials, and the courts. Despite debate and amendments, the inquiry still exists as the legislative “shield” between the accused and the Crown, protecting, as Justice Estey explains in the 1984 majority decision of Skogman v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 93 (at page 105), “the accused from a needless, and indeed, improper, exposure to public trial where the enforcement agency is not in possession of evidence to warrant the continuation of the process.” However, the preliminary inquiry is at risk. Both levels of government see no value in the procedure, only costs. The courts, since Skogman, have followed suit finding the preliminary inquiry irrelevant and contrary to the efficient and effective administration of justice. Certainly, the recent Alberta Provincial Court decision in Regina v Stinert, 2015 ABPC 4 reflects this view and, as argued in this post, may signal the end of the preliminary inquiry.

Mental Illness and Sentencing: Blaming the Mentally Ill for their Lack of Cooperation with Inadequate Treatment in R v Maier

By Glen Luther

On March 30, 2015

In Criminal

By: Glen Luther, Q.C. and Dr. Mansfield Mela

PDF Version: Mental Illness and Sentencing: Blaming the Mentally Ill for their Lack of Cooperation with Inadequate Treatment in R v Maier

Case Commented On: R v Maier, 2015 ABCA 59

Mental illness presents a difficult issue for the sentencing judge. The Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 requires that in sentencing an accused a court must apply the fundamental principle of sentencing, contained in s. 718.1, which requires that:

A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

In sentencing a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of an offence a judge must decide on the degree of responsibility of the offender and balance that against the gravity of the offence. It is clear of course that many mentally ill individuals are in fact guilty of the offence they committed as the provisions of s.16 of the Code relating to criminal responsibility are very narrow and exempt only the rare individual from being seen as having committed their crime. How then do we sentence the guilty but mentally ill offender and how do we decide how responsible they are for the offending behaviour?