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A Smart Decision – Access to Counsel for the Poor and Disabled in a Legal Aid Crisis

By: Sarah Burton

PDF Version: A Smart Decision – Access to Counsel for the Poor and Disabled in a Legal Aid Crisis

Case commented on: R v Smart, 2014 ABPC 175

Access to justice advocates should to take a few moments to review R v Smart, 2014 ABPC 175, where the Honourable Assistant Chief Judge Anderson stayed proceedings against three accused persons who could not afford counsel, but did not qualify for Legal Aid. While such applications are not uncommon, the evidence considered in Smart extends far beyond the norm. This extensive evidence, coupled with Judge Anderson’s probing commentary on access to justice, places a welcomed spotlight on Alberta’s Legal Aid funding crisis. In Smart, Judge Anderson sought to provide concrete guidance to courts facing similar applications. While he accomplished this task, his engagement with access to justice issues may be the more lasting legacy of the judgment.

“Putting” Browne v Dunn into Perspective

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: “Putting” Browne v Dunn into Perspective

Case commented on: R v KWG2014 ABCA 124

The century old rule in Browne v Dunn (hereinafter “the rule”) holds that if counsel intends to present evidence contradictory to a witness’s testimony as part of his or her argument, he or she must put this version of events to the witness during cross-examination.  But just how far must counsel go to satisfy this requirement? The Alberta Court of Appeal has recently shed some light on this question.

The rule is summarized in R v Pasqua, [2009] AJ No 702, 2009 ABCA 247: “there is a general duty on counsel to put a matter directly to a witness if counsel is going to later adduce evidence to impeach the witness’ credibility or present contradictory evidence.” The purpose of the rule is well-grounded; witnesses should be given an opportunity to respond to competing versions of events. Applying a rigid interpretation to R v Pasqua, it would appear as if during cross-examination, counsel would have to say the words “I put to you …” before presenting the witness with contradictory evidence. This formal and rigid interpretation of the rule has now been clarified, and a more flexible approach adopted.

Access to Justice and Costs Against the Crown

By: Sarah Burton

PDF Version: Access to Justice and Costs Against the Crown

Case commented on: R v A.Y.A., 2014 ABQB 103

In R v A.Y.A., 2014 ABQB 103 [AYA], the Honourable Madam Justice C.A. Kent suggested that access to justice considerations have a role to play in awarding costs against the Crown. AYA built on pre-existing case law that laid the groundwork to make this exceptional award in situations where there was no Crown misconduct. Prior to AYA, however, applicants had been unsuccessful in achieving these ends. This decision is particularly fascinating because Justice Kent used access to justice concerns to distinguish the case before her from the earlier unsuccessful case law. In the process (and despite Justice Kent’s best efforts to narrowly confine the decision) AYA raises wide-ranging questions about remedial entitlements for access to justice breaches.

A Pricked Condom: Fraudulently Obtained Consent or No Consent in the First Place?

By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington

PDF Version: A Pricked Condom: Fraudulently Obtained Consent or No Consent in the First Place?

Case commented on: R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19

This post discusses a recent decision from the Supreme Court of Canada addressing consent in the context of sexual assault. The Court was unanimous on its final destination: dismissing the appellant’s appeal of his conviction for sexual assault. However, the Court narrowly split, 4-3, on the path taken to get there. More specifically, the Court split on whether deliberately and secretly sabotaging a condom renders sexual activity with that condom non-consensual because the victim’s consent was obtained fraudulently or because she never consented in the first place. This post reviews these two alternate approaches, notes their subtle overlap, and concludes that the state of consent in Canadian law is left unclear following this decision.

What does Fearn v Canada Customs add to OPCA jurisprudence?

By: Admin

PDF Version: What does Fearn v Canada Customs add to OPCA jurisprudence?

Case commented on: Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 (CanLII)

The leading case on Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigation is the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench decision of Justice John Rooke in Meads v Meads, 2013 ABQB 571 (CanLII) (summarized here). In Fearn v Canada Customs, Justice W A Tilleman very deliberately builds on Meads and develops the court’s responses to OPCA litigants in two ways. First, Fearn sets out guidelines for awarding costs against OPCA defendants in criminal proceedings, a context in which costs are very rarely awarded (at paras 113-139). Second, Fearn adds to what Meads had to say about when OPCA concepts and litigation strategies might amount to contempt of court, whether civil or criminal contempt (at paras 140-256). In this regard, Justice Tilleman identifies some OPCA strategies which, in and of themselves, are prima facie civil contempt. He also urges the use of criminal contempt prosecutions against some of the activities of OPCA “gurus”, i.e., those who sell instructional material and training in OPCA schemes.

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