Category: Criminal Page 6 of 39

Case Commented On: R v Brown, 220 ABQB 166

I am at the point in my 1L criminal law class where we start talking about capacity issues, namely whether a person by virtue of mental disorder, automatism and/or intoxication has the capacity to commit a criminal offence. This is a complex and controversial area of the law. In discussing these issues, we criss-cross across the lines between legal, medical and policy concerns. We wade through case law stretching back decades that sometimes fundamentally change the common law and at other times hold strictly to it. Although each capacity issue involves detailed legal tests, when these issues arise together, the legal directions become overly complex and downright confusing. This “perfect storm” of capacity issues arise in the recent decision of R v Brown, 220 ABQB 166, challenging our legal conception of capacity and leaving us wondering whether the criminal law has the capacity to adequately respond.

When is Legal Aid Funding a Right in Criminal Cases?

By Serena Eshaghurshan

On February 3, 2020

In Criminal

By: Serena Eshaghurshan

PDF Version: When is Legal Aid Funding a Right in Criminal Cases?

Case Commented On: R v Acain, 2020 ABPC 6 (CanLII)

On December 10^th, 2019, the Honourable Judge L.R. Grieve of the Provincial Court of Alberta (ABPC) heard and rendered a decision on a Rowbotham application, which is an application made for court-ordered counsel. The Applicant, Rowel Acain, was charged with impaired driving related offences pursuant to sections 320.14(1)(a) and 320.12(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Mr. Acain’s application for state-funded counsel was denied.

Legal Gaps Persist For Intimate Partner Sexual Violence After Key Ruling

By Jennifer Koshan

On January 30, 2020

In Criminal

By: Jennifer Koshan and Lise Gotell

PDF Version: Legal Gaps Persist For Intimate Partner Sexual Violence After Key Ruling

Case Commented On: R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38 (CanLII)

It has been over 25 years since Supreme Court of Canada Justice Claire L’Heureux Dubé discredited the myth that rape is most often perpetrated by strangers in R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 577. Sexual violence by men against their female intimate partners is, sadly, a common occurrence in Canada and worldwide. Yet myths about spousal sexual violence – marital rape myths – continue to infuse the approach to sexual assault by a wide range of legal actors, including police, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges.

These myths include the beliefs that consent can be assumed or implied within intimate relationships, that women frequently make false accusations to gain an advantage in family law proceedings, and that marital rape is less serious than rape between strangers because the parties have had sex before. Social science evidence has established that marital rape is often more violent, not less, that injuries are more commonly experienced, and that survivors experience higher rates of trauma.

Binding The Courts: The Use of Precedent in Sentencing Starting Points

By Lisa Silver

On December 16, 2019

In Criminal, Sentencing

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Binding The Courts: The Use of Precedent in Sentencing Starting Points

Cases Commented On: R v Felix, 2019 ABCA 458; R v Parranto, 2019 ABCA 457

The Alberta Court of Appeal recently released two companion decisions on sentencing starting points in R v Felix, 2019 ABCA 458, and R v Parranto, 2019 ABCA 457. In Felix and Parranto, the Alberta Court of Appeal considers the appropriate sentencing starting point for an offender involved in the wholesale trafficking of fentanyl, an insidious and dangerous drug responsible for the deaths of many Albertans. These decisions are prime examples of how an appellate court grapples with precedential authority in arriving at the final outcome. In this post, I will discuss these cases as exemplars of this precedential process, which lies at the heart of the rule of law under our common law system. These decisions give us a glimpse of the complexities of precedent, in cases where there is no issue of whether precedent should be followed but rather on the issue of how best to follow it.

W(D) Strikes Again!

By Lisa Silver

On September 13, 2019

In Criminal

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: W(D) Strikes Again!

Case Commented On: R v Ibrahim, 2019 ONCA 631 (CanLII)

W(D), [1991] 1 SCR 742, is entrenched in our justice system. This seminal Supreme Court of Canada decision provides a tight three-pronged approach to the application of reasonable doubt to the oft divergent evidence from the prosecution and the defence. W(D) has been considered, re-considered, and applied over 10,100 times since its release in 1991. It serves as a continual source of discussion and inspiration for scholars like me. Although the principle in and of itself is not overly complex, it is in the application of the principle to complex and unique scenarios that can raise unforeseen or even novel W(D) issues. In this post, I will consider R v Ibrahim, 2019 ONCA 631, a recent decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal, tackling the thorny issue of applying W(D) to objective mens rea offences. This will also require a detailed discussion on objective and subjective mens rea. The purpose of this robust and far reaching discussion is not to outline the differences between the two forms of liability but to appreciate the similarities. Although objective and subjective mens rea have differing aspects and sightlines, they are part of a continuum of awareness, which is key to understanding what makes conduct a crime. Such exploration is necessary to expand our understanding of why – and how – W(D) matters. For more background on subjective and objective mens rea, read my previous article on “The Subjective/Objective Debate Explained.”