University of Calgary Faculty of Law ABLawg.ca logo over mountains

Category: Ethics and the Legal Profession Page 15 of 20

Lawyers regulating lawyers (redux)?

PDF version: Lawyers regulating lawyers (redux)?

Matter considered: Law Society of Upper Canada Complaint, Case No. 2012-105128

Introduction

On November 3, 2011 I wrote a blog on the Law Society of British Columbia’s decision to discipline Gerry Laarakker for unethical conduct (here). Laarakker had written rude things about (and to) a lawyer, M, who had sent a demand letter to Laarakker’s client. The demand letter claimed recovery of $521.97 on the basis that Laarakker’s client’s daughter had shoplifted from M’s client. In my earlier blog I suggested that directing regulatory attention at Laarakker’s incivility was a poor use of the Law Society’s regulatory resources. My argument was that lawyers who send demand letters without a legal basis for the claim made in the letter, and with no intention to pursue the claim in court, act unethically. Law societies do not, however, appear to discipline lawyers for sending improper demand letters. The only real sanction for those lawyers is social shaming and shunning. Disciplining lawyers who are uncivil in response to arguably unethical conduct takes away the only sanction on that behaviour, and may encourage it. Such discipline is, for that reason, problematic.

Mandatory Minimums and Lawyers’ Ethics

PDF version: Mandatory Minimums and Lawyers’ Ethics

Statute commented on: Safe Streets and Communities Act, Bill C-10, 60-61 Elizabeth II, Assented to March 13, 2012

Introduction

This week the New York Times had an article highlighting two recent federal court decisions criticizing the effect of mandatory minimums on criminal justice. One, a sentencing memorandum by a District Court judge in U.S.A. v Gurley, USDC, Mass., May 17, 2012, criticized the diminution of the role of the jury in the criminal trial that results from plea bargaining . The judge held that jury leniency must be taken into account in determining the range of minimum sentences to be applied, but noted that the increased place of plea bargaining in the American system had rendered the role of the jury functionally irrelevant, and the judge largely so. “Prosecutors run our federal criminal justice system today. Judges play a subordinate role – necessary yes, but subordinate nonetheless. Defense counsel take what they can get” (p. 50). The other, also a sentencing memorandum but this time from the District Court of New York, USA v Dossie, USDC, NY, March 30, 2012, was even harsher in its indictment. The accused in that case was a drug user who engaged in a minor way in the sale of drugs. As summarized by Judge Gleeson, “His sole function was to ferry money to the supplier and crack to the informant on four occasions for a total gain to himself of $140” (p. 8). Unfortunately, however, Dossie’s four transactions involved quantities of crack cocaine in excess of 28 grams. As a consequence, he fell within the mandatory minimum sentence for such offences of 5 years. The prosecutor sought that sentence, and Judge Gleeson had no choice but to impose it, even though in his view “It was not a just sentence” (p. 19). Judge Gleeson noted that this result was a product of a misapplication of the original intention of the mandatory minimum sentencing laws – in which quantities of drugs sold was intended to be a proxy for individuals who were managers or leaders in the drug trade – and of excessive prosecutor zeal.

Do Global Law Firm Mergers Expand an Arbitrator’s Continuing Obligation to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules?

PDF version: Do Global Law Firm Mergers Expand an Arbitrator’s Continuing Obligation to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules? 

Decision considered: ConocoPhillips Company et al. v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Two members of an ICSID arbitral tribunal – the Honourable Judge Kenneth J. Keith and Professor Georges Abi-Saab – have dismissed Venezuela’s challenge to the tribunal’s third member, Mr. L. Yves Fortier.

Venezuela filed a formal proposal to disqualify Mr. Fortier on October 5, 2011, one day after Mr. Fortier made a disclosure to the ICSID Secretary-General regarding the upcoming merger of Norton Rose OR LLP (“Norton Rose”), the firm in which he was a partner, and Macleod Dixon LLP (“Macleod Dixon”). Macleod Dixon was a Canadian-based law firm with international offices in, among other regions, South America. Venezuela’s proposal to disqualify Mr. Fortier arose out of concerns related to Macleod Dixon’s Caracas office. Specifically, Venezuela had concerns about “the extent and depth” of that office’s representation of ConocoPhillips (the Claimant in this arbitration) and other clients in matters adverse to Venezuela, its state-owned petroleum company and/or affiliates.

Lawyers regulating lawyers?

PDF version: Lawyers regulating lawyers? 

Decision considered: Law Society of British Columbia v Laarakker Law Society of British Columbia Disciplinary Hearing Reports, September 21, 2011

Introduction

A disciplinary decision by the Law Society of British Columbia does not fall within the usual mandate of ABlawg. It is not an Alberta decision, nor even a judicial one, and has no direct precedential significance for Alberta lawyers or courts. The decision warrants comment, however, because the threat it creates to the legitimacy of lawyer self-regulation applies to all Canadian law societies. Specifically, the misdirection in regulatory energy reflected by the decision of the Law Society of British Columbia in this case is something to which all Canadian law societies have shown themselves to be susceptible.

This comment is a plea to the law societies to think more carefully about the cases they pursue; to take more seriously conduct by lawyers that undermines the rule of law; and, to allow lawyers to hold each other to account in circumstances where there is a reasonable basis to allege misconduct, even if lawyers sometimes do so with “incivility”. Law societies suggest that the public will lose faith in the legal profession if we do not treat each other with courtesy and civility, perhaps thinking that our own criticisms will make the public critical, and less able to access legal services even if they need them. I want to offer an alternative suggestion: the public will lose faith in us if we silence legitimate criticism and debate, and if we do nothing about lawyers who engage in conduct that could be reasonably characterized as extortion with letterhead.

Conflicts of Interest and Good Judgment

PDF version: Conflicts of Interest and Good Judgment

Case considered: Dow Chemical Canada Inc. v Nova Chemicals Corporation, 2011 ABQB 509

Previously on ABlawg I have suggested that outcomes in conflicts cases turn more on a judge’s overall impression of the facts and the equities than on the precise articulation and application of specific rules (here). A recent judgment of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench aligns with this perception, insofar as the outcome of the case seems closely linked to the judge’s assessment of the good faith and propriety of the conduct of the law firm alleged to be in conflict. The case also, though, shows the continued evolution of the principles that govern conflicts of interest. Specifically, Chief Justice Wittmann’s judgment provides new analysis of the principles governing what is necessary for a client to consent to a conflict in advance, how imputation rules operate in national firms, lawyers transferring between law firms, and the intersection between law society rules and judicial determinations in assessing conflicts. In this way the judgment may indicate that contrary to my earlier suggestion, conflicts cases are in fact like other legal judgments, with outcomes determined by a complex interplay of principles, rules, facts and, above all, the “judgment” of the judge, what in the context of moral decision-making David Luban and Michael Milleman have described as the ability to identify “which principle is most important given the particularities of the situation” (“Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times,” (1995-96) 9 Geo J of Legal Ethics 31 at 39). In other words, it’s not so much whether judges perceive lawyers to have been “good” or not, as it is whether judges perceive lawyers to have been good enough that the applicable principles do not require that they be removed from a file. This does mean that the interplay of fact and law matters more than the precise articulation of the law – i.e., that there is some legitimacy to my general feeling that the fights between the CBA and the Federation of Law Societies over the precise wording of conflicts rules is not a very good use of anyone’s time. But it does not mean that principles are irrelevant.

Page 15 of 20

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén