Category Archives: Oil & Gas

English Court of Appeal Confirms that an Operator Entitled to be “held neutral”

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: English Court of Appeal Confirms that an Operator Entitled to be “held neutral”

Case Commented On: Spirit Energy Resources et al Marathon Oil UK LLC, [2019] EWCA Civ 11.

In a decision that will be of interest to the energy bar in all oil and gas jurisdictions in the common law world, the English Court of Appeal, in a unanimous decision, has confirmed the principle that operations conducted by an operator under the terms of a joint operating agreement are conducted for the joint account and for the shared risk of all working interest owners and that an operator is not an insurer for those other working interest owners. The Court did so in the somewhat unusual context of a liability for unfunded defined pension benefits.

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Lessons from Redwater: Discard the AbitibiBowater Test and Legislate Super Priority for the Regulator

By: Jassmine Girgis

PDF Version: Lessons from Redwater: Discard the AbitibiBowater Test and Legislate Super Priority for the Regulator

Case Commented On: Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Ltd, 2019 SCC 5 (CanLII)

Environmental cleanup costs are a natural consequence of operating in the oil and gas industry. Provincial regulations ensure these costs are borne by the company responsible for them, and these regulations work if that company is solvent. An insolvent company, however, cannot bear the costs of outstanding environmental orders, which leaves those costs to the company’s creditors or to the public.

The goal should be, and fairness dictates, that the debtor always covers the cost, regardless of its solvency, but that requires amending the governing legislation, preferably to give the regulator (in this case, the Alberta Energy Regulator (Regulator), and the equivalent regulators in other provinces) a super priority. Knowing the Regulator has a super priority in a bankruptcy will compel the adjusting creditors to modify their agreements ex ante, ensuring, in turn, that companies comply with regulations and have enough capital to cover environmental costs as they arise. This solution is better than our current system, in which creditors must wait for a court to apply the three-part test from Newfoundland and Labrador v AbitibiBowater Inc, 2012 SCC 67 (CanLII) (AbitibiBowater test) to determine who has priority, potentially leaving them to deal with the consequences ex post.

On a matter this important and this costly, a matter that has notable public policy considerations and far-reaching implications for private parties, both sufficient environmental protection as well as certainty in adherence to the legislated priorities, must be the ultimate goals. The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (“BIA”) does not currently provide enough environmental protection, which may compel courts to compensate through the AbitibiBowater test. It is hard to predict the outcome of the test and, depending on its application to a given set of facts, it undermines the BIA priority scheme. Throughout the proceedings of Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Ltd, 2019 SCC 5 (CanLII) (commonly known as the Redwater case), in three levels of court, there were five judgments. Eleven judges applied the same test and six of them ruled in favour of the Regulator, while five ruled in favor of the secured creditor. This much disagreement over one set of facts should indicate that these issues should not be handled by the courts through the application of the AbitibiBowater test. The required certainty in this area must come from Parliament by way of legislative amendment to clarify a super priority charge in favour of the Regulator in the BIA.

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Negotiated Settlements and Just and Reasonable Rates

By: Nigel Bankes

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Decision Commented On: National Energy Board, TransCanada Pipelines Limited (TransCanada) Application for Approval of 2018 to 2020 Mainline Tolls RH-001-2018, Reasons for Decision, December 13, 2018

This is the most recent decision in a string of decisions from the National Energy Board (NEB) over the last five years dealing with TransCanada PipeLines (TCPL) as TCPL and the NEB seek to grapple with the dramatic changes that have occurred in North American natural gas markets over this period, and more specifically how these changes pose the risk of stranded assets and as such threaten to affect the viability of one of the NEB’s most important regulated  pipelines: TCPL and TCPL’s mainline (or at least elements of that mainline). Perhaps the most dramatic of these changes is the increased availability of shale gas supplies, and specifically shale gas supplies from basins much closer to TCPL’s traditional markets than the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB), TCPL’s main source of gas.

What is interesting about these decisions, including this most recent decision, is the interplay or tension between the NEB’s statutory authority to establish just and reasonable rates and the market-based approaches as reflected in negotiated settlements. While the NEB and other regulators seek to encourage negotiated settlements between the regulated entity and its customers, it is plain from this decision that the regulator retains a power of review. While a regulator may be reluctant to exercise that power given that settlements typically involve some give and take, this decision demonstrates that the regulator will not always defer to the paradigm of settlement and contract if it perceives that the results of the settlement depart significantly from fundamental rate-making principles. While this decision happens to deal with TCPL and the NEB, the same interplay is apparent in any jurisdiction that allows for the possibility that a regulated utility may reach a negotiated settlement with some or all customers rather than going through an adversarial rate hearing.

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Payout under Alberta’s Oil Sands Royalty Regulation

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Payout under Alberta’s Oil Sands Royalty Regulation

Case Commented On: Fort Hills Energy Corporation v Alberta (Minister of Energy), 2018 ABQB 905

A year ago, ABlawg posted a case comment on a dispute related to the determination of payout with respect to the Hibernia project on the East Coast. That case, Newfoundland and Labrador v ExxonMobil Canada Properties, 2017 NLDT(G) 147, 2017 CanLII 56724 (NL SCTD), involved an arbitration followed by an unsuccessful application by the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador to have the court overturn the arbitral award. Fort Hills, perhaps more conventionally, involves the definition of payout under the terms of Alberta’s Oil Sands Royalty Regulation, 2009, Alta Reg 223/2008, (OSRR). In this case the matter arises as an application for judicial review with respect to the Minister’s decision on one element of the payout account for the Fort Hills Oil Sand Project (FHOS Project), namely a category of expenses referred to as ‘prior net cumulative balance’ (PNCB). The differences between the parties were massive. Suncor had originally claimed a PNCB of $1,898,205,145; the minister allowed a PNCB of a little more than $33 million, and a further review and audit reduced this to $NIL. Definitely worth fighting about!

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Alberta Court follows Third Eye Capital v Dianor in a Royalty Characterization Case

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Alberta Court follows Third Eye Capital v Dianor in a Royalty Characterization Case

Case Commented On: Manitok Energy Inc (Re), 2018 ABQB 488 (CanLII)

In a welcome development Justice Karen Horner has followed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Third Eye Capital Corporation v Resources Dianor Inc.2018 ONCA 253 (CanLII) (the subject of a post here) and concluded that the royalty agreements at issue in this case were intended to create an interest in land and did in law create such an interest notwithstanding that the royalty was described as in interest in oil volumes once produced rather than as in interest in the minerals themselves.

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