Category Archives: State Responses to Violence

Multiple Sexual Offence Proceedings and the Disclosure of “Records” under the Criminal Code

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Case considered: R. v. Leykin, 2010 ABQB 631

Ruslan Leykin was charged with a number of sexual offences relating to N.W, who is also the complainant in a second sexual assault case involving a different accused. Leykin sought access to records in the possession of the Crown in relation to the second case, and argued that the governing procedure was that in R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. The Crown argued that the proper procedure for determination of production of records was that set out under ss.278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 (“the production provisions”). In a short but important decision, Justice June Ross of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench agreed with the Crown, holding that the production provisions of the Criminal Code apply to records in the possession of the Crown in relation to a separate sexual assault proceeding. Continue reading →

Sentencing for Spousal Sexual Violence: Different but Equal

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Cases considered: R. v. D.J.D., 2010 ABCA 207; R. v. D.J.D., 2009 ABPC 216

Until 1983, the definition of rape in Canada excluded offences committed by a husband against his wife. In that year, reforms to the Criminal Code did away with the offence of rape altogether, and implemented a new scheme of sexual offences that were gender neutral and could, explicitly, be committed by one spouse against another (see Bill C-127, Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980 81 82 83, c. 125, s. 246.8). The issue of spousal sexual violence has received little specific attention in Canada since the reforms of 1983. However, the African and Canadian Women’s Human Rights Project (ACWHRP) – a project involving lawyers, activists and academics in Canada, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi – is presently studying the lessons learned from the criminalization of marital rape in Canada in the context of efforts to criminalize this form of violence in the 3 African countries. I am completing a review of case law in Canada – some 275 decisions over the past 27 years – which shows that cases of spousal sexual violence still continue to be treated differently from other sexual assault cases when it comes to issues of consent, mistaken belief in consent, evidentiary matters, and sentencing. On the latter issue, a recent case of the Alberta Court of Appeal, R. v. D.J.D., brings to light some of the considerations faced by judges when sentencing offenders for spousal sexual violence.

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Questions About the Role of Reasonableness and Mutual Restraining Orders in Family Violence Cases

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Cases considered: Petropoulos v. Petropoulos, 2010 ABQB 296; Andres v. Andres, 2009 ABQB 26

The Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-27 (PAFVA) has been in force since 1999. One of the motivations behind the PAFVA was to make it easier for victims of family violence to obtain emergency protection than the previous system of civil restraining orders had allowed for. Nevertheless, the practice of issuing restraining orders in family violence cases has not disappeared. In fact, there are a number of cases where judges have issued “mutual restraining orders” when deciding whether to confirm emergency protection orders issued under the PAFVA. This comment will raise some concerns with that practice. It will also review the propriety of an objective component to proving family violence in order to obtain relief under the PAFVA. Both of these issues arise in two recent decisions of Justice Joanne Veit of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.

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Faint Hope for the Faint Hope Clause?

Case considered: R. v. Ryan, 2010 ABQB 87

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Parliament commenced a new session last week. When it was prorogued in December 2009, 14 bills containing amendments to the Criminal Code died on the order paper, including Bill C-36, the Serious Time for the Most Serious Crime Act. Bill C-36 would have repealed the “faint hope” clause, a provision in the Criminal Code that currently allows persons convicted of first or second degree murder to seek early release on parole after serving 15 years of their sentence. Bill C-36 had passed through three readings in the House of Commons, and was before the Liberal dominated Senate before prorogation, where the amendments to the Criminal Code were a matter of some controversy. Now, there is some indication that the government will ask the opposition to reinstate rather than reintroduce the crime bills this session. Reinstatement would require a majority vote in the House of Commons to allow the process of considering the bills to resume where it left off. The difference of course is that the Senate now has several more Conservative members, appointed during the period of prorogation. A recent Alberta case helps to illustrate the potential consequences of Bill C-36 should it become law.

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What Counts as “Sexual Abuse” under the Protection Against Family Violence Act?

Cases considered: L.L.S. v. W.M.C., 2009 ABQB 527

PDF version: What Counts as “Sexual Abuse” under the Protection Against Family Violence Act?

Justice Donald Lee has written another decision dealing with a definitional issue under the Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.P-27 (PAFVA). In L.L.S. v. W.M.C., 2009 ABQB 527, Justice Lee had to consider whether to confirm an Emergency Protection Order (EPO) constraining a father’s access to his children because the father was watching pornography and openly engaging in sexual behaviours in the presence of his children. Unfortunately, Justice Lee concluded that this behaviour did not amount to “sexual abuse” without endeavouring to define the term. Further, the case highlights concerns about the interplay between child welfare legislation, custody and access laws and the PAFVA.

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