Category: Vexatious Litigants Page 4 of 6

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Sources of Superior Courts’ Jurisdiction to Declare Litigants to be Vexatious

Case Commented On: Sikora Estate (Re), 2015 ABQB 467 (CanLII)

This decision indirectly raises a question about the jurisdiction of Alberta’s Court of Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal to declare that a person cannot start or continue court proceedings without first obtaining the court’s permission, i.e., to declare that a person is a vexatious litigant. Section 23.1 of the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2 grants the courts that authority, whether on their own motion or on an application by a party to the proceedings, if notice is given to the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General. But what if notice has not been given to the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General? Does the court have inherent jurisdiction to make such a declaration? If they do, how far does it extend? Can the court enjoin only further applications without its permission in the case before it, or can the court prohibit any and all future court actions in the province without its leave? This issue was explicitly raised, but not decided, by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Pawlus v Pope, 2004 ABCA 396 (CanLII), and the issue does not appear to have been resolved in the intervening ten years. The decision in Re Sikora Estate suggests it needs to be.

A Vexatious Litigant After Only Two Applications

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On March 5, 2015

In Access to Justice, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: A Vexatious Litigant After Only Two Applications in One Proceeding

Case Commented On: Re FJR (Dependent Adult), 2015 ABQB 112 (CanLII)

Although the Alberta law giving the courts more power to deal with “vexatious litigants” in a simplified process has only been in effect a little more than five years — since October 30, 2009 — the law is quite well settled. Under section 23.1(1) of the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, on application or the court’s own motion, and with notice to the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General, if a Court is satisfied that a person is instituting vexatious proceedings or is conducting a proceeding in a vexatious manner, then the court may order that the person not commence or continue proceedings without the court’s permission. Section 23(2) provides a non-exclusive list of examples of vexatious proceedings and conduct. These provisions have been considered in approximately 70 cases over the past five years. Recently and helpfully, in Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 (CanLII) at paras 80-93, Justice Michalyshyn undertook a comprehensive review of this case law. As a result of all of this consideration, most vexatious litigant proceedings now simply involve application of the established principles to the particular facts of each case. Nonetheless, the occasional new legal issue arises, as it does in Re FJR. This post considers a case in which the person found to be a vexatious litigant had only made two applications, and both of them were made in only one court proceeding.

Lawyers Who Write Bogus Demand Letters: The Freemen in Our Midst?

By Alice Woolley

On October 30, 2013

In Ethics and the Legal Profession, Vexatious Litigants

PDF Version: Lawyers Who Write Bogus Demand Letters: The Freemen in Our Midst?

The phenomenon of organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments (OPCA) being used to advance claims not recognized by law has received a great deal of attention in the past year. From last year’s judgment of Associate Chief Justice Rooke in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 [Meads], to the recent occupation of a Calgary apartment by a Freeman-of-the-land who claimed it as an “embassy”, OPCA litigants have disrupted the functioning of the legal system while attracting public attention and interest. In this column I argue that the defining indicia of OPCA are also present in the activities of some lawyers; specifically, in lawyers sending out demand letters based on spurious claims in the hope of extracting funds because of the fear and ignorance of those who receive them. I will further argue that our failure to address that conduct undermines our moral authority to challenge OPCA litigants and, worse, may contribute to a cultural climate of skepticism about the law’s legitimacy and authority, which helps OPCA to flourish.

Enforcing and Extending Vexatious Litigant Orders

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On September 18, 2013

In Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court, Vexatious Litigants

PDF Version: Enforcing and Extending Vexatious Litigant Orders

Case commented on: 1158997 Alberta Inc v Maple Trust Company, 2013 ABQB 483

This decision is interesting for two reasons. First, it illustrates a problem with the vexatious litigant provisions in Part 2.1 of the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2 or their administration namely, the absence of a list of those declared to be vexatious litigants that is easily and widely available both to those within and those outside the legal profession. As it stands now, it appears that even the clerks of the court do not have a list of who these orders have been made against, even though those orders state that the persons named vexatious litigants cannot commence or continue actions in the specified court without leave of that court. In this case, a company with two such orders made against it (in 2010 and 2011) was able to begin proceedings in 2012 and 2013 without the required leave of the court. Second, it illustrates the application of the seldom used subsection 23.1(4) of the Judicature Act. That subsection allows the court to make an order declaring someone who is not a party to an action to be a vexatious litigant as long as they are someone who, in the opinion of the court, is associated with the person against whom a vexatious litigant order is made. In this decision, five corporate plaintiffs in three different actions were declared to be vexatious litigants, and six individuals, who were not parties to any of the three actions but who were found to be associated with the corporate parties, were also declared to be vexatious litigants. One such individual was twice removed from the parties declared to be vexatious litigants. (The decision might also be noteworthy for a third reason: the number of persons — eleven — declared to be vexatious litigants by one order.)

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Consequences of being an OPCA Litigant?

By Alice Woolley

On May 10, 2013

In Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants

PDF version: Consequences of being an OPCA Litigant?

Case commented on: ANB v Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97.

ANB v Hancock is Associate Chief Justice John D. Rooke’s second written judgment about an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigant. As summarized by Justice Rooke in ANB (at para 15), “OPCA concepts are legally incorrect schemes marketed and promoted by a collection of conmen [“OPCA gurus”] that claim to allow a person to avoid or impose legal obligation outside of recognized legal processes.” These concepts and schemes are all associated with OPCA indicia, which are “unusual motifs that are unique to or strongly associated with OPCA concepts and schemes” (at para 16). ANB builds upon Justice Rooke’s ground-breaking decision in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571. Like Meads, ANB arose in the family law context, although Meads arose out of a divorce and matrimonial property action commenced by Mrs. Meads, and ANB arose from the seizure of A.N.B.’s two children by Alberta Family Services and a subsequent order granting permanent guardianship of the children to the province. ANB both applies and extends Meads. It applies it by following through on some principles set out in Meads, including the provision of an explanation of court costs, characterized in Meads (at paras 637-638) as “a crucial aspect in the ‘limited duty’ a judge owes to these self?represented litigants.” It extends Meads by allowing Crown counsel to hide their identities in the face of conduct by A.N.B. which is the subject of criminal charges.