University of Calgary Faculty of Law ABLawg.ca logo over mountains

The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Reaches Canada: The Federal Court Opens Door to New Climate Claims

By: Kaitlin Schaaf

Case Commented On: Lho’Imggin v Canada, 2025 FC 1586 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Reaches Canada: The Federal Court Opens Door to New Climate Claims

In July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released an Advisory Opinion (AO) on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, [2025] ICJ Rep 456. As Professor Majekolagbe pointed out in their analysis, the AO affirmed that international climate change treaties create binding obligations on states and under customary international law, states have a duty to prevent significant harm to the climate system.

Alberta Water Act Amendments: No Bridge Over Troubled Waters

By: Arlene Kwasniak, David C Barrett, Kerry Black

Matter Commented On: Amendments to the Water Act, RSA 2000, c W-3 as set out in Bill 7: Water Amendment Act, 2025 (Bill 7)

PDF Version: Alberta Water Act Amendments: No Bridge Over Troubled Waters

On October 30th, the governing United Conservative Party of Alberta introduced Bill 7, the Water Amendment Act, 2025. Bill 7 passed third reading at the Legislative Assembly on December 2, 2025, and will come into force on proclamation. No amendments were made. This post assesses the Bill’s potential impacts on water management in Alberta. Part I of this post provides an overview of water law in Alberta, up to the amendments. Part II sets out the amendments Bill 7 presents and describes them in relation to traditional water management as prescribed by law in the province for over 130 years. Part II primarily takes a legal perspective. Part III then offers analyses of the amendments from an ecological, social, infrastructure, and related impacts and concerns perspective.

A Court Divided: What an Ontario Court Motion Reveals About Race in the Courtroom

By: Gideon Christian

Cases Commented On: Dosu v Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 6496 (CanLII); Dosu v Human Rights of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 6509 (CanLII)

PDF Version: A Court Divided: What an Ontario Court Motion Reveals About Race in the Courtroom

In a bizarre procedural twist, the Ontario Divisional Court issued two contradictory decisions on consecutive days in the same case. Two written motions for leave to intervene in Dosu v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario was sent to two different judges – Justice Sharon Shore and Justice Shaun Nakatsuru – who rendered opposite rulings. Justice Shore dismissed the would-be intervenors; the next day, in a separate ruling, Justice Nakatsuru granted them intervention, setting the stage for what appears to be an embarrassing judicial outcome for the court.

The Automatic Right of Appeal under Section 193(c) of the BIA: The Case for a Narrow Approach in Asset Sale Decisions

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd v Conacher Kingston Holdings Inc, 2025 ONCA 732 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The Automatic Right of Appeal under Section 193(c) of the BIA: The Case for a Narrow Approach in Asset Sale Decisions

Section 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA) sets out four circumstances in which a party has an automatic right of appeal to a provincial appellate court from any order or decision of a judge. Where none of these enumerated grounds are engaged, a party can seek leave to appeal under section 193(e).

This post is about appeals dealing with the disposition of the debtor’s assets by trustees or receivers.

Dorsey v Canada: A Rare and Necessary Advancement for Prisoners’ Rights

By: Amy Matychuk

Case Commented On: Dorsey v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 SCC 38 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Dorsey v Canada: A Rare and Necessary Advancement for Prisoners’ Rights

The decision in Dorsey v Canada, issued by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) on November 21, 2025, represents the first major jurisprudential development in the law of habeas corpus for several years. It expands the availability of habeas corpus to inmates whose applications to transfer to a lower security level have been denied. Prior to Dorsey, habeas corpus was only available in the context of institutional transfers if an inmate’s security level had been involuntarily raised. Writing for the majority in Dorsey, Justice Mary T. Moreau found that a decision denying an inmate transfer to a lower security level qualifies as a deprivation of liberty for which habeas corpus can offer a remedy.

Page 11 of 441

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén