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A Primer on Cannabis Regulation

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On October 17, 2018

In Cannabis, Health Law

PDF Version: A Primer on Cannabis Regulation

By: Lorian Hardcastle

Legislation Commented On: Cannabis Act, SC 2018, c 16; Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144; Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis Act, RSA 2000, c G-1; Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis Regulation, Alta Reg 143/996

Legal changes that decriminalize recreational cannabis come into effect today, with 17 Alberta stores set to open their doors to the public. This is a complex area of the law that involves all three levels of government (see Figure 1).

(Figure 1)

In addition to legal changes, scores of other organizations have developed or adapted policies to address cannabis, such as condominium corporation bylaws preventing cannabis consumption within their complexes, workplace policies addressing cannabis use by employees, and university policies governing cannabis on campus. This blog post, which is the first in a series relating to cannabis, describes the key features of federal, provincial, and municipal laws.

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Missing Ceilings for Trial Within a Reasonable Time in the Youth Justice Context

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On October 12, 2018

In Youth and the Law

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Missing Ceilings for Trial Within a Reasonable Time in the Youth Justice Context

Case Commented On: R v KJM, 2018 ABCA 278

R v KJM is yet another case addressing the changes to the Charter section 11 right to trial within a reasonable time set out in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. The question in KJM is how the Jordan framework applies in the youth justice context. The Court of Appeal was split three ways. Justices Wakeling and O’Ferrall concurred that KJM’s right to trial within a reasonable time was not violated, and that charges should not be stayed, but their reasons for why are fairly different. Justice Veldhuis found that the delay did violate KJM’s Charter right to trial within a reasonable time and would have stayed the charges.

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Preservation of Human Dignity as the Justification for Excluding Personal Rights of Action in Bankruptcy

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On October 9, 2018

In Bankruptcy and Insolvency

By: Jassmine Girgis

PDF Version: Preservation of Human Dignity as the Justification for Excluding Personal Rights of Action in Bankruptcy

Case Commented On: Cooke (Re), 2018 ABQB 628

This case considers whether a contractual “critical illness” benefit forms part of the property of the bankrupt’s estate. Personal rights of action arising out of tort claims have traditionally not formed part of the bankrupt’s estate, meaning the bankrupt gets to keep the money from these claims. Prior to this case, however, courts do not appear to have addressed the bankrupt’s entitlement to personal rights arising from contract. In this case, the court drew an analogy between the two types of claims. It found that both compensate for the pain and suffering of the bankrupt and consequently concluded that a contractual critical illness claim should also be excluded from the distribution to creditors.

The bigger question raised by this case is why these types of claims are not included in the distribution to creditors. This is not a statutory exemption, but courts have been excluding personal rights of action in bankruptcy distributions for more than a century. This blog explores one possible reason for the exemption. Rather than seeing the debtor as a financial problem that must be solved without requiring state assistance, which has been the pattern of bankruptcy law, this may be the courts seeing and treating the debtor as a human being.

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Avoiding Probate Does Not Eliminate Problems

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On October 4, 2018

In Wills and Estates

By: Arlene Blake

PDF Version: Avoiding Probate Does Not Eliminate Problems

Case Commented On: Dobransky v. Roteliuk, 2018 ABQB 660

Putting property in joint names is an oft used method of estate planning to avoid probate. While it is unclear if Dobranksy is such a case, it can serve as a cautionary tale for those contemplating using joint tenancy as a method of avoiding probate.

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“Marriage is not a rugby match”: Choking, Consent and Domestic Violence

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On October 3, 2018

In Criminal, State Responses to Violence

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: “Marriage is not a rugby match”: Choking, Consent and Domestic Violence

Case Commented On: R. v Gardiner, 2018 ABCA 298 (CanLII)

Sexual violence – how it is perpetrated and how allegations are handled by those in power – is at the forefront of public consciousness at the moment as a result of #MeToo and, most recently, the Brett Kavanaugh confirmation hearings. But discussions about the legal definition of consent have been happening in Canada for a long time. The current definition of consent dates back to 1992 and was the result of a law reform process that included consultations with groups representing the interests of survivors as well as accused persons. Consent is defined in s 273.1 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question” and it is to be assessed from the complainant’s subjective perspective (R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC)). Among several important principles that are well accepted in the case law (even if they are not always properly applied), consent cannot be implied or given in advance, can always be revoked, and must be present for each sexual activity in a particular encounter as well as the degree of force used for each activity (see e.g. Ewanchuk, R. v. J.A., [2011] 2 SCR 440, 2011 SCC 28 (CanLII); R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 (CanLII); leave to appeal granted, 2018 CanLII 11543 (SCC)).

How does this approach to consent change when the offence is one of domestic violence rather than sexual violence? For a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal in a recent case, R. v Gardiner, 2018 ABCA 298 (CanLII), the answer is – wrongly, in my view – quite a lot.

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