ABLawg - - Page 136

By: Chad Haggerty

PDF Version: Evidentiary Issues with Claim of Racial Profiling in R v Kenowesequape

Case Commented On: R v Kenowesequape, 2018 ABQB 135 (CanLII)

In 1999, the Ontario Court of Appeal adopted the following definition of “racial profiling”

Racial profiling is criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour profiling refers to that phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an identified group in society on the basis of race or colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group. In this context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal propensity of an entire racial group (R v Richards, 26 CR (5th) 286, 1999 CanLII 1602 (ON CA) at para 24).

In R v Kenowesequape, Madam Justice Khullar of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was tasked, in part, with determining whether an allegation of racial profiling was justified. This post will focus on the court’s rejection of the argument that racial profiling was in play during this police action.

Bill C-69, the Impact Assessment Act, and Indigenous Process Considerations

By David Laidlaw

On March 15, 2018

In Aboriginal, Environmental

By: David Laidlaw

PDF Version: Bill C-69, the Impact Assessment Act, and Indigenous Process Considerations

Legislation Commented On: An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts (Bill C-69)

On February 8, 2018, the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change [Minister] submitted Bill C-69 for first reading. Bill C-69, should it pass, proposes to enact the Impact Assessment Act [IAA], continue the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency under the name Impact Assessment Agency of Canada [Agency], establish the Canadian Energy Regulator [CER] to replace the National Energy Board, and amend the Navigation Protection Act, RSC 1985, c N-22 with consequential amendments.

Power Purchase Arrangement Litigation Comes to an End

By Nigel Bankes

On March 14, 2018

In Energy

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Power Purchase Arrangement Litigation Comes to an End

Matter Commented On: Government of Alberta Press Release, March 9, 2018

The Government of Alberta issued a Press Release on March 9, 2018 indicating the Government and ENMAX “have agreed to withdraw ENMAX from the Power Purchase Arrangement (PPA) legal action initiated in 2016 by the Attorney General”. The agreement apparently “provides for the transfer from ENMAX to the Balancing Pool of 166,667 carbon offset credits and for a payment of equivalent value to ENMAX from the Balancing Pool for previously disputed and unpaid dispatch services and PPA transition matters”. The release goes on to note that “With this agreement, the legal action between the Government of Alberta, ENMAX and the remaining parties will be ended”.

ABlawg has published numerous posts on the PPA litigation (see here, here, here, here, here, and here) and there is a nice summary of the history of the litigation on the blog of the Alberta Power Market, a very informative blog prepared by members of the Electricity Markets Group of Borden Ladner Gervais LLP.

This post may be cited as: Nigel Bankes “Power Purchase Arrangement Litigation Comes to an End” (14 March, 2018), online: ABlawg, http://ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Blog_NB_PPA_Litigation_Ends.pdf

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Litigation Privilege, the Adversarial System, and the Search for Truth

By Drew Yewchuk

On March 13, 2018

In Evidence, Privacy

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Litigation Privilege, the Adversarial System, and the Search for Truth

Case Commented On: Waissmann v Calgary (City), 2018 ABQB 131 (CanLII)

Waissmann v Calgary (City) is a decision about occurrence reports produced by a Calgary transit bus driver following an accident on July 30, 2007 in which Mr. Waissmann was injured. Mr. Waissmann is suing the city and was seeking to compel the city to produce the occurrence reports. The city asserted litigation privilege over the occurrence reports. Master Robertson agreed with the city and determined the occurrence reports were subject to privilege and need not be produced (at para 44).

Wilful Blindness and the Contradictions of Sentencing

By Erin Sheley

On March 12, 2018

In Criminal

By: Erin Sheley

PDF Version: Wilful Blindness and the Contradictions of Sentencing

Case Commented On: R v Giroux, 2018 ABCA 56 (CanLII)

Sentencing is a notoriously self-contradictory component of the criminal process. On the one hand, it allows judges freedom from many of the oft-restrictive rules of evidence that govern the trial itself, giving them the flexibility to take into account aspects of the individual accused’s circumstances and history, often in favor of leniency within the very broad statutory ranges where the facts urge it. On the other, the rule of law requires a degree of consistency across sentences, and for particularly serious cases a trial judge’s broad discretion is limited by mandatory minimums created by Parliament. Furthermore, section 718 and related provisions of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, specify principles that must govern sentencing, codifying the various accepted theoretical purposes of criminal punishment, particularly denunciation, deterrence and rehabilitation. Often, these principles directly contradict one another when applied to the facts of a particular case: it is easy to imagine, for example, how the goal of rehabilitating the offender may urge a very different sentence from the goal of denouncing particularly serious conduct. Furthermore, case law construing these statutory sentencing provisions imposes further constraints on lower courts. Due, however, to the difficulties in navigating these choppy legal waters, sentencing judges typically receive a high degree of deference as they have the closest view of the facts before them and the testimony of the accused, victims, and other relevant witnesses. Indeed, a court of appeal may disturb a sentence only where: 1) the sentence reflects an error of principle; or 2) the sentence is demonstrably unfit (see R v Cowan, 2012 ABCA 199 (CanLII) at para 14). Finally, after R v Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), Parliament amended section 718(e) of the Code to require that sentencing judges take into account the particular circumstances of Aboriginal defendants in considering alternatives to incarceration.

Evidentiary Issues with Claim of Racial Profiling in R v Kenowesequape

Bill C-69, the Impact Assessment Act, and Indigenous Process Considerations

Power Purchase Arrangement Litigation Comes to an End

Litigation Privilege, the Adversarial System, and the Search for Truth

Wilful Blindness and the Contradictions of Sentencing