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ABlawg: The Year in Review

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It is the time of year for making lists, and at ABlawg we have decided to put together a compilation of our highlights from 2014. It is also the season for the Canadian Law Blog Awards (Clawbies), and we have included a list of some of our favourite blogs as well.

A Series of Series

In 2014 ABlawg ran several series of posts on important judicial decisions and legislative developments in Alberta and Canada more broadly. These series provided an opportunity for the authors to discuss the nuances and impacts of these developments and to share that dialogue with ABlawg readers. Our series covered the following:

  • July / August 2014: Posts by Nigel Bankes, Jennifer Hocking, Jennifer Koshan, Kirk Lambrecht, Q.C., Sharon Mascher, Martin Olszynski, and Jonnette Watson Hamilton on Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 and Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48 covered issues including the scope of Aboriginal title, treaty rights, and the duty to consult, and the demise of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and the “lands reserved” head of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867. Faculty, students, research associates and guests discussed this commentary and the underlying decisions in a roundtable discussion in July.

Alberta Introduces Amendments to PIPA

By: Ronaliz Veron

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Bill Commented On: Bill 3, Personal Information Amendment Act, 3rd Sess, 28th Leg, Alberta, 2014

On November 15, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401, 2013 SCC 62 (AIPC v UFCW) that Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c. P-6.5 (PIPA) and Personal Information Protection Act Regulation, Alta Reg 366/2003 (PIPAR) violated section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as they limited a union’s ability to collect, use, or disclose personal information in a lawful strike (See Linda McKay-Panos’ post on the decision). In oral argument, the Attorney-General of Alberta and the Information and Privacy Commissioner indicated that, if they were unsuccessful, they would prefer to have the entire legislation struck down to allow the legislature to re-consider PIPA as a whole. Acknowledging the comprehensive and integrated structure of PIPA, the Supreme Court declared it invalid but suspended the declaration of invalidity for a year to give the Alberta legislature ample time to make the necessary amendments (AIPC v UFCW at paras 40-41).

Judicial Economy, Judicial Extravagance and Pension Splitting under a Matrimonial Property Order

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Judicial Economy, Judicial Extravagance and Pension Splitting under a Matrimonial Property Order

Case Commented On: McMorran v Alberta Pension Services Corporation, 2014 ABCA 387

The Court of Appeal decision in McMorran v Alberta Pension Services Corporation determines an instrumentally important question in the pension and matrimonial property law areas. In addition, it is procedurally unusual for two reasons. First, although it is a matrimonial property action, the dispute is really between Justice Robert Graesser, the Court of Queen’s Bench judge who rendered the decision appealed from (McMorran v McMorran, 2013 ABQB 610) and the administrator of the Alberta public service pensions plans, the “appellant” by court order in the Court of Appeal — i.e., not between the former husband and wife who are both “respondents”. Second, the concurring judgment of Justice Thomas Wakeling disagrees with the majority judgment of Justices Ronald Berger and Frans Slatter on one statutory interpretation point, but no consequences appear to flow from that disagreement and the two judgments do not engage with each other on the point. The reasons for two separate judgments are not made explicit, but they appear to be a result of different perspectives on the value of judicial economy. And in these days of legal and public focus on access to justice issues and the need for a “culture shift” in the current legal system, I think it is important to consider whether we can afford judicial extravagance.

How much discretion does a regulator have to limit the recovery of a utility’s legal costs?

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: How much discretion does a regulator have to limit the recovery of a utility’s legal costs?

Case Commented On: ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2014 ABCA 397

In this case the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) has some level of discretion as to the extent to which it allows a regulated utility to recover its prudently incurred legal costs from its customers when that utility participates in hearings called by the AUC to consider generic issues of interest to all regulated utilities and their customers and shareholders. One member of the Court (Justice Peter Martin) thought that the Commission went too far in denying recovery in relation to one set of costs and would have sent that matter back to the Commission.

The decision is interesting because it involves the intersection between an adjudicator’s discretion to allow for the recovery of legal costs and the general principle that a utility ought to have the opportunity to recover all of its prudently incurred operating costs (including the legal costs associated with rate setting) through the tariff approved by the regulator. A decision that recognizes that a utility has prudently incurred certain costs but which then denies the utility even the opportunity to recover those costs will generally be unsupportable: BC Electric Railway Company v Public Utilities Commission, [1960] SCR 837. In this case however there were special considerations and thus while the majority found the Commission’s decision both reasonable and correct, the decision is not likely of broad application – a point that Chief Justice Fraser herself seems to acknowledge at paras 70 – 73. In particular, and notwithstanding other and rather more sweeping statements from the Chief Justice (see, for example para 106, quoted below, and paras 110 – 111), it is not likely that the decision can be applied in the more routine situation in which a utility incurs legal costs as part of preparing and presenting its general rate application (GRA) to the AUC for it to set just and reasonable rates. The AUC may still scrutinize those legal costs on prudence grounds (and see here in particular Justice Martin at para 171) to ensure that the utility is not gold-plating its costs (e.g. where it chooses to retain expensive outside counsel to undertake a task that could be more economically dealt with in-house) but it likely cannot say (even on a reasonableness standard of review) that the legal costs associated with preparing and presenting a GRA are not recoverable.

Bill 202 v Bill 10: A Battle of the Bills

By: Ronaliz Veron and Sarah Burton

PDF Version: Bill 202 v Bill 10: A Battle of the Bills

Bills Commented On: Bill 202: The Safe and Inclusive Schools Statutes Amendment Act, 2014, 3rd Sess, 28th Leg, Alberta, 2014; Bill 10: An Act to Amend the Alberta Bill of Rights To Protect Our Children, 3rd Sess, 28th Leg, 2014

The Alberta Legislature has been the subject of some controversy in recent weeks. On November 20, Liberal MLA Laurie Blakeman introduced Bill 202: The Safe and Inclusive Schools Statutes Amendment Act, 2014, 3rd Sess, 28th Leg, Alberta, 2014. A week later, in an abruptly called press conference, Premier Jim Prentice described Bill 202 as “unnecessarily divisive” and announced that his government would introduce its own bill dealing with the issues raised by Bill 202. On December 1, Bill 10: An Act to Amend the Alberta Bill of Rights To Protect Our Children, 3rd Sess, 28th Leg, 2014 was introduced by the Progressive Conservatives.  After being subjected to widespread public scrutiny, Bill 10 was amended on December 3, 2014. By the next day, it was clear that the amendment did not quell the rising tide of opposition and on December 4, Premier Prentice announced he was deferring Bill 10’s Third Reading until 2015.

This post will examine the salient parts of both Bill 202 and Bill 10 and their impact on the human rights regime in Alberta. It particularly focuses on the heart of the controversy: how the creation of gay-straight alliances is treated under both Bills.  Serious concerns that remain to be addressed by Bill 10 will also be identified. Given Premier Prentice’s apparent willingness to step back to examine his party’s Bill, we can only hope that these pressing concerns will be addressed in the new year.

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