Climate Change in Federal Impact Assessment: An Early Look at Two Energy Projects

By: Niall Fink and David V. Wright

PDF Version: Climate Change in Federal Impact Assessment: An Early Look at Two Energy Projects

Documents Commented On: Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28 s 1; Environment and Climate Change Canada, Final Strategic Assessment on Climate Change (Gatineau: ECCC, 2020)

One year ago, the new Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28 s 1 (IAA) came into force. With project reviews now proceeding under the IAA, this is an opportune time to reflect on implementation of the new regime so far. This post focuses on one specific dimension: climate change. For the first time since the inception of federal environmental assessment, Canada’s federal project-level assessment statute explicitly requires decision-makers to consider a project’s effects on Canada’s ability to meet its climate change commitments (ss 22(1)(i) and 63(e)). The year has seen this requirement fleshed out through guidance published in the form of the Strategic Assessment of Climate Change (SACC) (see commentary by Professor Wright). This post examines how the new regime’s climate change requirements and guidance have been implemented in two major project-level assessments currently underway: the Suncor Base Mine Extension Project (Suncor Project) and the Gazoduq Project.

We examine the proponents’ submissions and the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada’s (the Agency) process, and identify areas of uncertainty and concern. Overall, we find that the Agency has given proponents significant latitude to sidestep information requirements in preliminary stages of the assessment process. We also find early signals that the impact statement phase will not fully address concerns regarding downstream emissions nor ambiguity in determining a project’s impact on Canada’s ability to reduce emissions. While much remains to be seen in subsequent assessment stages, these weaknesses risk that implementation of the IAA becomes yet another instance of the “implementation gap” that has plagued environmental law for decades (see this article by law professor Dan Farber).

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The Cost of Justice for the Western Chorus Frog

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: The Cost of Justice for the Western Chorus Frog

Case Commented On: 9255-2504 Québec Inc. v Canada, 2020 FC 161 (CanLII)

This decision is a bit dated as it was issued back in January, but an English translation was only recently published and it caught my attention because I have been following the saga of the western chorus frog under the Species at Risk Act, SC 2002, c 29 (SARA) for several years (see Justice for the Western Chorus Frog? and More Justice for the Western Chorus Frog). In many ways, the case of the western chorus frog encapsulates the SARA story since it was enacted back in 2003: politics over science; missed statutory deadlines; and inadequate funding. SARA has certainly systematized efforts to develop recovery frameworks for threatened species and provided some additional transparency. However, the legislation has done very little to actually protect critical habitat beyond what would already be available under protected area or wildlife legislation. 9255-2504 Québec Inc. v Canada offers a glimpse into the question of who pays the cost of protecting critical habitat for a threatened species. The judgment also includes an unusual amount of detailed testimony from federal officials on how SARA has been applied in this case. Accordingly, this is an important decision not just for the western chorus frog but for all SARA-listed species and those interested in following the application of SARA generally.

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Like A House of Cards: Sentencing McKnight

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Like A House of Cards: Sentencing McKnight

Case Commented On: R v McKnight, 2020 ABQB 443 (CanLII)

Law abhors a vacuum; to be meaningful, legal rules and principles must be tethered to reality. This means the law is animated by the factual circumstances of each particular case. Law garners gravitas or weight in the application of the law to the facts. In short, the law needs context. This basic proposition is particularly important in sentencing an offender after conviction by a jury. Once the jury trial ends, the trial judge is no longer the “judge of the law” (R v Pan; R v Sawyer, 2001 SCC 42 (CanLII) at para 43) but transforms into the sentencing judge, who must work with both fact and law. The recent Alberta Queen’s Bench sentencing decision by Justice Sulyma in R v McKnight, 2020 ABQB 443 (CanLII), highlights the difficulties inherent in this judicial transition and the need for clarification in this area. Not unlike the metaphorical “house of cards”, the decision also demonstrates the importance of the foundational facts to the integrity of the entire sentencing process.

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The New Definition of a ‘Mental Disorder’ in the Mental Health Amendment Act: A Potential Gap in Care for ‘Persistent’ Mental Disorders?

By: Fraser Gordon

PDF Version: The New Definition of a ‘Mental Disorder’ in the Mental Health Amendment Act: A Potential Gap in Care for ‘Persistent’ Mental Disorders?

Bill Commented On: Bill 17, the Mental Health Amendment Act, 2020, 2nd Sess, 20th Leg, Alberta, 2020

Bill 17, the Mental Health Amendment Act (MHAA) was introduced to the legislature on June 4, 2020, with an anticipated proclamation date set for September, 2020. While presented by Tyler Shandro, the Minister of Health, as aimed at “strengthening the rights of these patients and assuring their rights are provided for and respected while they receive care” (Alberta Hansard, June 4, 2020 at 1125), this Bill also represents the province’s response to JH v Alberta Health Services, 2019 ABQB 540 (CanLII), which found several provisions of Alberta’s Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13 (MHA) an infringement on a person’s rights under sections 7, 8, 10(a) and (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms.

In particular, the legislature recognized the Court’s concern in JH as to the suitability of the MHA’s provisions for involuntary detention and treatment for persons suffering from mental disorders that are untreatable, and has sought, in the MHAA, to refocus, and perhaps narrow, these provisions upon persons who are suffering from severe mental illness that are capable of being resolved by treatment. This change finds expression in the MHAA’s change to the definition of a “mental disorder”, which now excludes “a disorder in which the resulting impairment is persistent and caused solely by an acquired or congenital irreversible injury.” In this post, I want to consider the potential effects of this change in caring for persons now excluded under the MHAA’s definition. My concern is that this new definition may create a gap in the current legislative scheme for the care of persons suffering from “persistent” mental health disorders, and place such persons – and others – at risk. This would certainly be an ironic – and I am sure unintended – outcome of legislation which has as its aim the strengthening of the rights of persons suffering from mental disorders.

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Offers to Settle and The Public Interest in Charter Litigation: Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460

By: Drew Yewchuk & Sarah Shibley

PDF Version: Offers To Settle and the Public Interest in Charter Litigation: Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460

Case Commented On:  Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460 (CanLII)

Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460 (CanLII) is a costs decision that concludes a ten-year legal battle about the power of police to stop and search protestors. Mr. Stewart was successful in obtaining a court decision that the Toronto Police Service (TPS) had violated the Charter by searching him without lawful justification and interfering with his freedom of speech. Despite his success, because of the Toronto Police Service’s $10,000 settlement offer to Mr. Stewart in 2017 and Ontario’s rules for litigation costs and offers to settle, it ultimately cost Mr. Stewart more than $60,000 to successfully enforce his constitutional rights. This post argues that the normal cost rules relating to offers to settle are ill suited to public interest litigation against government bodies.

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