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Author: Lisa Silver Page 2 of 9

Lisa Silver is a proud Calgarian, lawyer, educator, and avid blogger. She holds a B.A. in Economics (UWO, 1984), LL.B. (Osgoode, 1987), and LL.M. (Calgary, 2001). She is a member of the Bars of Ontario (1989) and Alberta (1998). As a criminal lawyer, Lisa has appeared before all levels of Court, including the Supreme Court of Canada. Presently, she is an Assistant Professor at the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law, where she teaches criminal law, evidence and advocacy. Lisa also maintains her own law blog at www.ideablawg.ca where she does a podcast series on the Criminal Code. Her blog was recognized with a 2017 Clawbie – Canadian Law Blog Award in the Law Professor/Law School category. Lisa also sits on various Boards and committees. She has presented at many conferences and workshops.

Who is Responsible for Extreme Intoxication?

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Who is Responsible for Extreme Intoxication? 

Case Commented On: R v Brown, 2021 ABCA 273 (CanLII) (Supreme Court of Canada Appeal Hearing Scheduled for November 9, 2021)

What you are about to read is not the usual case commentary. I will not summarize, analyze, or otherwise slice and dice the decision from the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Brown, 2021 ABCA 273 (CanLII), a case upholding the constitutionality of s 33.1 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Rather, I will provide context for the case, setting out the underlying principles at stake and the controversies underpinning the conflicting legal perspectives. Section 33.1 was a response by our lawmakers to the Supreme Court of Canada’s ultimate decision in R v Daviault, 1994 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 63, which found the rule against using intoxication as a defence for general intent offences unconstitutional under s 7 of the Charter (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11), where the accused was in a state of extreme intoxication. Section 33.1 promptly foreclosed this limited defence where the accused person used violence against or interfered with the bodily integrity of any person. Although the section was added to the Criminal Code in 1995, a mere one year after the release of Daviault, it is only recently that appellate courts have weighed in on the constitutionality of that section.

Taking the Police Act Seriously

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Taking the Police Act Seriously

Case Commented On: Conlin v Edmonton (City) Police Service, 2021 ABCA 287 (CanLII)

In Conlin v Edmonton (City) Police Service, 2021 ABCA 287 (CanLII) [Conlin], a 5-panel court of appeal refines the threshold standard by which public complaints against the police are assessed by the Chief under s 45(3) of the Police Act, RSA 2000, c P-17. In doing so, the court clarifies past appellate decisions but stops short of fully expressing the Chief’s authority to send an allegation to a disciplinary hearing under the Act. As part of this power, the Chief exercises a screening function under s 45(3). If the Chief is of the “opinion” that the complaint constitutes a contravention, the allegation is then subject to a disciplinary hearing. Even when an allegation passes this threshold bar, s 45(4) allows the Chief to dismiss an allegation of misconduct when it is “not of a serious nature.”

Harnessing the Power of AI Technology; A Commentary on the Law Commission of Ontario Report on AI and the Criminal Justice System

By: Lisa Silver and Gideon Christian

PDF Version: Harnessing the Power of AI Technology; A Commentary on the Law Commission of Ontario Report on AI and the Criminal Justice System

Report Commented On: Law Commission of Ontario, The Rise and Fall of AI and Algorithms In American Criminal Justice: Lessons for Canada, (Toronto: October 2020).

The Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) recently released its Report on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms in the Canadian criminal justice system. The Report, which is the first of three papers on the issue, is one of the most comprehensive discussions of the use of AI and algorithmic technologies in the criminal justice system to date. In Canada, AI use in the criminal justice system is limited and not easily subject to in-depth review. In the United States, however, AI and algorithms are used extensively throughout the justice system, particularly in pre-trial release decision-making. Not surprisingly, then, the Report draws from this American experience to arrive at a number of recommendations for application to the Canadian context. Based on those lessons learned, the LCO Report warns of “the risk of adopting unproven and under-evaluated technologies too quickly to address long-standing, complex and structural problems in the justice system” (at 7).  Yet, in the midst of this cautionary tone, the Report also recognizes that AI use in the criminal justice system will likely increase in the future. The Report proactively outlines a framework for such use by urging AI regulation, the application of legal protections to AI, and community involvement in developing AI best practices. All of these warnings and recommendations are extremely useful but the Report begs the basic question of whether the justice system should be using machine intelligence, with its embedded biases, in matters that can profoundly change people’s lives. Ultimately, the Report should stand as a timely reminder of the unharnessed power of technology and the realistic potential for injustice when it is used without restraint.

Freedom of Expression & Protecting the Visual Environment

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Freedom of Expression & Protecting the Visual Environment

Case Commented On: Top v Municipal District of Foothills No. 31, 2020 ABQB 521 (CanLII)

The legal environment is primarily constructed by written or spoken words. Lawyers write, submit, and file documents, and through their daily work, create a language of the law. Sometimes written laws impact the visual world. Such a law was at issue in the recent decision of Justice Nicholas Devlin in Top v Municipal District of Foothills No. 31, 2020 ABQB 521 (CanLII). In that case, the Municipal District (MD) Bylaw prohibited the use of signage on trailers, a continuing problem in the rural setting of the Foothills County. Other types of signage were permitted but it was the aesthetically unpleasing trailer signs, parked along the side of the roadways, which were a matter of contention. Justice Devlin agreed the law limited free expression under section 2(b) of the Charter but was a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter, considering the municipality’s pressing and substantial objective to protect the “visual environment” from “visual pollution” (at para 3). Although raised to justify the Charter violation, the idea that the visual environment is a value to be protected is intriguing. In Top, expression and the visual intersect, as the written law provides a platform for the perfect view. This post will explore this intersection and whether the legal landscape can or should protect the visual one.

Like A House of Cards: Sentencing McKnight

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Like A House of Cards: Sentencing McKnight

Case Commented On: R v McKnight, 2020 ABQB 443 (CanLII)

Law abhors a vacuum; to be meaningful, legal rules and principles must be tethered to reality. This means the law is animated by the factual circumstances of each particular case. Law garners gravitas or weight in the application of the law to the facts. In short, the law needs context. This basic proposition is particularly important in sentencing an offender after conviction by a jury. Once the jury trial ends, the trial judge is no longer the “judge of the law” (R v Pan; R v Sawyer, 2001 SCC 42 (CanLII) at para 43) but transforms into the sentencing judge, who must work with both fact and law. The recent Alberta Queen’s Bench sentencing decision by Justice Sulyma in R v McKnight, 2020 ABQB 443 (CanLII), highlights the difficulties inherent in this judicial transition and the need for clarification in this area. Not unlike the metaphorical “house of cards”, the decision also demonstrates the importance of the foundational facts to the integrity of the entire sentencing process.

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