Author: Martin Olszynski Page 2 of 18

B.Sc. in Biology (Saskatchewan), LL.B. (Saskatchewan), LL.M. Specialization in Environmental Law (University of California at Berkeley).
Assistant Professor.
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By: Martin Olszynski

Matter Commented On: Study on Emerging Issues Related to the Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources’ Mandate: Climate Change – Canadian Oil & Gas Industry

PDF Version: Inextricably Linked: Climate Policy and the Oil and Gas Sector’s Closure Liabilities

On February 15, 2024, I appeared before the Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources’ (ENEV) in the context of its study into emerging issues related to its mandate. As has been my practice in the past (see here and here), what follows are my prepared remarks, modified only for formatting purposes and to include hyperlinks to supporting resources where relevant. A recording of the hearing is available here; a hearing transcript should also be available upon translation.

Grading the AER Liability Management Performance Report

By Martin Olszynski

On February 8, 2024

In Energy, Oil & Gas

By: Shaun Fluker, Drew Yewchuk, and Martin Olszynski

Report Commented On: Liability Management Performance Report

PDF Version: Grading the AER Liability Management Performance Report

On January 17, 2024 the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) published a Liability Management Performance Report. This is the first published AER report to the public on progress being made by industry under the Liability Management Framework to reduce Alberta’s massive unfunded closure liability in the conventional (non-oil sands) oil and gas sector. The last comparable report from the AER on liability management was from September 2005. Somewhat predictably, in its news release, the AER reflected positively on industry’s performance and indicated that this will be an annual report with the objective of “. . . improving transparency of industry’s management of conventional oil and gas liabilities as well as to develop performance measure baselines and ongoing assessments of the industry as a whole and licensees specifically.” The response elsewhere was less enthusiastic. Some, like the Rural Municipalities of Alberta, reserved judgment pending further analysis; while others more critically noted that the Report curiously understates the overall liability amount, using a liability calculation method from 2015 that subsequent analysis by the AER revealed to be a vast under-estimation. The Report provides some aggregated data and licensee-specific information and accordingly gets partial marks for some transparency, but it absolutely fails to give the public adequate context to fully understand whether this should be read as good or poor performance by industry and says almost nothing at all about the AER’s performance. Secrecy and capture continue to govern liability management in Alberta.

What Does La Rose Tell Us About Climate Change Litigation in Canada?

By Martin Olszynski

On February 2, 2024

In Constitutional, Environmental, Equality

By: Nigel Bankes, Jennifer Koshan, Jonnette Watson Hamilton, and Martin Olszynski

Case Commented On: La Rose v Canada, 2023 FCA 241 (CanLII)

PDF Version: What Does La Rose Tell Us About Climate Change Litigation in Canada?

The last decade has seen an explosion of domestic climate change litigation around the world and an equally rich body of academic literature examining the case law from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law maintains an excellent data base covering these developments. Important cases in other jurisdictions include the Urgenda decision (Urgenda v Netherlands (2019)) and Shell decision (Milieudefensie et al v Shell (2021)) in the Netherlands, and the 2021 decision of the German constitutional court (Neubauer et al v Germany). Australian environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have been particularly active in bringing climate change issues before the courts, especially in the context of proposed natural gas and coal projects, most famously in the Sharma case (Sharma by her litigation representative Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v Minister for the Environment [2021] FCA 560, appeal allowed, [2022] FCAFC 35).

Locating the Constitutional Guardrails on Federal Environmental Decision Making after Reference re: Impact Assessment Act

By Martin Olszynski

On January 30, 2024

In Constitutional, Energy, Environmental, Oil & Gas

By: Nathan Murray and Martin Olszynski

Decision Commented On: Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Locating the Constitutional Guardrails on Federal Environmental Decision Making after Reference re: Impact Assessment Act

This post is the seventh ABlawg commentary on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Reference re: Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (CanLII) (IAA Reference) decision from October 2023. In the most recent of those posts, one of us briefly noted the majority’s preoccupation with the concept of “adverseness” when delineating the scope of federal environmental jurisdiction under the Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1 (IAA). The majority’s preoccupation with that concept actually pervades the IAA Reference decision. Here, we focus squarely on the majority’s treatment of the concept of “adverseness” and its role in the public interest decision-making stage of federal impact assessment.

Triviality and Significance of Federal Environmental Effects after Reference re: Impact Assessment Act

By Martin Olszynski

On January 15, 2024

In Energy, Environmental, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Martin Olszynski

Decision Commented On: Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Triviality and Significance of Federal Environmental Effects after Reference re: Impact Assessment Act

This is the sixth ABlawg post regarding the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent opinion in Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (CanLII) (IAA Reference) (see the first five posts here). In this post, I address the thorny issue of thresholds, i.e., the level or point at which an effect becomes material or relevant under the Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1 (IAA). Since the opinion’s release last fall, I have read and heard concerns that the majority has imposed some kind of minimum threshold regarding the magnitude of effects required to trigger federal jurisdiction, or that the federal government could only refuse to deem such effects to be in the public interest if they are significant (see here for a thoughtful commentary on the practical problems with such an approach). As noted by Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Mahmud Jamal in their dissent, however, it has actually long been an interpretive rule – since the Supreme Court of Canada’s environmental law decision in Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, 1995 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 1031 (Canadian Pacific) – that broadly worded environmental legislation is to be interpreted in a manner that does not capture trivial, or de minimis, impacts (IAA Reference at para 278). Importantly, however, and as I discussed almost a decade ago in “Ancient Maxim, Modern Problems: De Minimis, Cumulative Environmental Effects and Risk-Based Regulation” (2015) 40-2 Queen’s Law Journal 705, 2015 CanLIIDocs 5272, (“Ancient Maxim, Modern Problems”), non-triviality is a very low bar; between trivial and significant lies a wide spectrum of impacts, which at the very least includes low and moderate impacts. Trivial or de minimis impacts are essentially only those impacts that a regulatory regime could systematically ignore while still obtaining its objectives – they are treated the same as no impacts whatsoever.