Author Archives: Nigel Bankes

About Nigel Bankes

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

Some Things Have Changed but Much Remains the Same: the New Canadian Energy Regulator

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Some Things Have Changed but Much Remains the Same: the New Canadian Energy Regulator

Bill Commented On: Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

Given the discussions over the last year as to the future of the National Energy Board (see posts here and here) it is hardly surprising that Part 2 of Bill C-69 takes the form of an entirely new Act to be known as the Canadian Energy Regulator Act (CERA) rather than a set of amendments to the existing National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985, c N-7. This no doubt creates the impression that the new Bill represents a wholesale replacement of the NEB rather than mere tinkering. This post examines whether this is indeed the case by examining in some more detail what has changed and what remains the same. My focus is Part 2 of Bill C-69. My colleague Martin Olszynski has already provided a post on Part 1 of the Bill, the proposed new Impact Assessment Act (IIA) as well as the amendments to the Fisheries Act. Continue reading →

TMX v Burnaby: When Do Delays by a Municipal (or Provincial) Permitting Authority Trigger Paramountcy and Interjurisdictional Immunity?

By: Nigel Bankes and Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: TMX v Burnaby: When Do Delays by a Municipal (or Provincial) Permitting Authority Trigger Paramountcy and Interjurisdictional Immunity?

Decision Commented On: National Energy Board, Reasons for Decision (18 January 2018) in support of Order MO-057-2017 (6 December 2017) re Trans Mountain Expansion Project

The National Energy Board (NEB) has now issued its reasons for decision for an Order that it issued in December 2017 allowing Trans Mountain to proceed with certain activities associated with the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMX) without having first complied with bylaw requirements of the City of Burnaby. Continue reading →

Specific Performance of a Right of First Refusal in the Context of a Facilities Agreement

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Specific Performance of a Right of First Refusal in the Context of a Facilities Agreement

Decision Commented On: Canlin Resources Partnership v Husky Oil Operations Limited, 2018 ABQB 24 (CanLII)

Canlin and Husky are successors in interest to a Construction, Ownership and Operation (CO & O) Agreement for the Erith Dehydration and Flow Splitter Facility (Facility Agreement). The agreement was based on the standard form CO & O Agreement (1999) developed by the Petroleum Joint Venture Association (PJVA). The Facility Agreement provides both parties with mutual rights of first refusal (ROFR) in the event that either decides to sell the facility but also provides a number of exceptions. In particular, the Agreement provided that the ROFR would not be triggered in the event of (at para 3) “(a) disposition made by an Owner of all or substantially all … of its petroleum and natural gas rights in wells producing to the Facility …”. Husky was disposing of its interests in the area (the Ikkuma transaction) but the challenge was that there had been no wells producing into the facility since 2016 when Husky installed a “jumper” pipeline. This pipeline served to by-pass the Erith Facility with the result that gas previously processed at Erith was now processed at the Blackstone Facility. The question therefore was whether Husky could rely on the exception, there being no wells producing into the facility. Husky took the view that the exception was triggered since the wells in question were still associated with the Erith Facility in the sense of being tied-in to the Facility. Justice Romaine concluded that the exception was not triggered and accordingly declared that Canlin could exercise the ROFR; furthermore she concluded that Canlin was entitled to an order of specific performance. Continue reading →

The Complaint Jurisdiction of the AUC with Respect to the AESO

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Complaint Jurisdiction of the AUC with Respect to the AESO

Decisions Commented On: (1) AUC Decision, 22367-D01-2017, Enel Alberta Wind Inc. General Partner of the Castle Rock Ridge Limited Partnership Complaint Pursuant to Section 26 of the Electric Utilities Act Regarding Conduct of the Alberta Electric System Operator December 23, 2017; (2) AUC Decision 21867-D01-2017, ENMAX Corporation Written Complaint About the Conduct of the Independent System Operator October 23, 2017; (3) AUC Decision 2010-104, Lavesta Area Group Written Complaint about the Conduct of the Independent System Operator March 10, 2010

The Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) (aka the ISO, the Independent System Operator) established by the Electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c E-5.1 (EUA) has two principal functions. It is responsible for the operation of the power pool and for the procurement of ancillary services, and it is responsible for engaging in transmission system planning and for providing system access to the transmission system. In furtherance of the latter it must prepare and submit to the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) for approval a tariff (EUA, s 30) setting out the rates to be charged by the AESO for system access service and the terms and conditions that apply. Continue reading →

Cowper-Smith and the Law of Proprietary Estoppel: Implications for the Oil and Gas Lease?

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Cowper-Smith and the Law of Proprietary Estoppel: Implications for the Oil and Gas Lease?

Case Commented On: Cowper-Smith v Morgan, 2017 SCC 61 (CanLII)

The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in Cowper-Smith v Morgan in December 2017. The decision is an important decision on proprietary estoppel. While it arises in the context of a family dispute it deserves to be read by commercial lawyers including oil and gas lawyers. It is one of the curiosities of the Canadian law of estoppel that some of our leading cases have come out of fact patterns involving the “unless” form of the oil and gas lease from the 1960s and 1970s from Alberta and Saskatchewan. These cases include Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. v Paddon-Hughes Development Co., [1970] S.C.R. 932, 1970 CanLII 3 (SCC) and Sohio Petroleum Co. v Weyburn Security Co., [1971] S.C.R. 81, 1970 CanLII 137 (SCC). These cases continue to be influential in oil and gas lease matters and beyond. The typical fact pattern involves a missed or late payment during the primary term or a missed or late shut-in payment during the secondary term which automatically terminates the lease unbeknownst to either party. The parties continue to act as if the lease is in force and in some cases the lessee expends considerable monies on the leased lands including drilling a new well. But in the end, all is for naught. The lease is dead and to this point estoppel arguments aimed at reviving the lease have largely failed; in some cases on the basis that estoppel cannot be used as a sword (to create a new lease), and in other cases, and most commonly, on the basis that the lessee never acted to its detriment on the basis of a representation made by the lessor that the lease was still in effect; typically there was no such representation, the lessee was simply proceeding on the basis of its own understanding of the legal position. Continue reading →