Author Archives: Nigel Bankes

About Nigel Bankes

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

Cowper-Smith and the Law of Proprietary Estoppel: Implications for the Oil and Gas Lease?

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Cowper-Smith and the Law of Proprietary Estoppel: Implications for the Oil and Gas Lease?

Case Commented On: Cowper-Smith v Morgan, 2017 SCC 61 (CanLII)

The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in Cowper-Smith v Morgan in December 2017. The decision is an important decision on proprietary estoppel. While it arises in the context of a family dispute it deserves to be read by commercial lawyers including oil and gas lawyers. It is one of the curiosities of the Canadian law of estoppel that some of our leading cases have come out of fact patterns involving the “unless” form of the oil and gas lease from the 1960s and 1970s from Alberta and Saskatchewan. These cases include Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. v Paddon-Hughes Development Co., [1970] S.C.R. 932, 1970 CanLII 3 (SCC) and Sohio Petroleum Co. v Weyburn Security Co., [1971] S.C.R. 81, 1970 CanLII 137 (SCC). These cases continue to be influential in oil and gas lease matters and beyond. The typical fact pattern involves a missed or late payment during the primary term or a missed or late shut-in payment during the secondary term which automatically terminates the lease unbeknownst to either party. The parties continue to act as if the lease is in force and in some cases the lessee expends considerable monies on the leased lands including drilling a new well. But in the end, all is for naught. The lease is dead and to this point estoppel arguments aimed at reviving the lease have largely failed; in some cases on the basis that estoppel cannot be used as a sword (to create a new lease), and in other cases, and most commonly, on the basis that the lessee never acted to its detriment on the basis of a representation made by the lessor that the lease was still in effect; typically there was no such representation, the lessee was simply proceeding on the basis of its own understanding of the legal position. Continue reading →

The AESO Line Loss Marathon Inches Towards the Finish Line

By: Nigel Bankes

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Decision Commented On: Milner Power Inc. & ATCO Power Ltd. Complaints Regarding the ISO Transmission Loss Factor Rule and Loss Factor Methodology, Phase 2 Module C, AUC Decision 790-D06-2017, December 18, 2017

In a pre-Christmas post on the power purchase arrangements (PPAs) saga I hinted that, at least from the perspective of the energy regulatory lawyers in the city, the PPA saga must be the gift that keeps on giving; but this epithet must be even more so for the line loss dispute—for this truly is a marathon. And while the latest decision of the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) gets us a little closer to the finish line, I fully expect that we shall see further applications to the AUC for review and variance and perhaps several more trips to the Court of Appeal. Indeed I believe that there is still one outstanding application (Capital Power Corporation v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 197 (CanLII) and see also at paras 150-152 of this decision) for permission to appeal an earlier decision which application was adjourned sine die pending the outcome of the AUC’s decision on the merits (i.e. this decision). Continue reading →

Confidentiality Agreements and Brokerage Opportunities in the Context of the Sale of Oil and Gas Properties

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Confidentiality Agreements and Brokerage Opportunities in the Context of the Sale of Oil and Gas Properties

Case Commented On: Beaumont Resources Ltd. v Cardinal Energy Ltd., 2017 ABCA 416 (CanLII), aff’g unreported reasons for judgment of Justice Anderson, September 26, 2016, aff’g unreported reasons for judgment of Master Farrington, January 22, 2016

In 2012 Beaumont Resources made some preliminary inquiries of Felcom Resources about a possible acquisition of some oil and gas properties. In the course of those inquiries Beaumont and Felcom entered into a confidentiality agreement (the Felcom CA) with respect to information provided by Felcom to Beaumont. The agreement included the following terms: Continue reading →

An Unseverable Joint Tenancy: Intentions of the Donor or a Question of Law?

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: An Unseverable Joint Tenancy: Intentions of the Donor or a Question of Law?

Case Commented On: Pohl v Midtal, 2017 ABQB 711 (CanLII)

In this decision Justice Rita Khullar concludes that when a parent makes an inter vivos gift of interest as a joint tenant in real property to an adult child, that gift may include an irrevocable right of survivorship. While there is a presumption that the donor has retained the power to sever during the donor’s lifetime, this presumption may be rebutted based on the expressed intentions of the donor. In this case the presumption was rebutted. In reaching these conclusions Justice Khullar relies heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Pecore v Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 (CanLII), a case dealing with a joint bank account. Continue reading →

Court Confirms that Good Faith Fulfilment of Modern Treaties is Essential to the Project of Reconciliation

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Court Confirms that Good Faith Fulfilment of Modern Treaties is Essential to the Project of Reconciliation

Case Commented On: First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon, 2017 SCC 58 (CanLII)

In this unanimous decision authored by Justice Karakatsanis, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed what seems like an obvious proposition, namely that good faith fulfilment of modern treaties is a necessary condition for the project of reconciliation. The Court concluded that the land use planning process established by the Yukon Final Agreements permitted Yukon to modify a Recommended Final Plan (in this case the Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan), but that the power to modify did not include the power to change a Plan “so significantly as to effectively reject it” (at para 39). More specifically, Yukon’s power to modify was confined by the scope of the issues that it had raised during the planning process; it could not raise significant new issues although it could respond to changing circumstances. As a result, Yukon’s purported approval of the Plan was invalid (at para 35). Continue reading →