Author: Nigel Bankes Page 48 of 88

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

Methodological Pluralism: Canadian Utility Law Does Not Prescribe any Particular Prudent Expenditure or Prudent Investment Test that a Regulator Must Apply

By Nigel Bankes

On October 9, 2015

In Energy, Supreme Court of Canada, Utility Regulation

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Methodological Pluralism: Canadian Utility Law Does Not Prescribe any Particular Prudent Expenditure or Prudent Investment Test that a Regulator Must Apply

Case Commented On: Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2015 SCC 44, (OPG) and ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 SCC 45 (ATCO)

The last two weeks of September 2015 saw the release of three important court decisions dealing with utility regulation, two from the Supreme Court of Canada, the OPG case and the ATCO case, and one from Alberta’s Court of Appeal, the Utility Asset Disposition case (UAD): Fortis Alberta Inc v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 295. The two Supreme Court cases (which were heard together) deal with a utility’s opportunity to recover operating costs and the application of prudency tests to those costs. Justice Rothstein is the principal author of both judgments. The ATCO case is unanimous while Justice Abella offers a dissent in the OPG Case. The UAD case deals with what I have previously referred to as the continuing fall-out from the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Stores Block (ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140).

This post summarizes the holdings in the ATCO and OPG decisions and then offers some preliminary comments on their implications. The post begins with some general observations on utility regulation statutes. I will aim to do a separate post on the UAD case.

“Contract Depth” Does Not Mean Optimal Depth

By Nigel Bankes

On October 5, 2015

In Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: “Contract Depth” Does Not Mean Optimal Depth

Case Commented On: Shallow Gas Drilling Corp v Legacy Oil and Gas, 2015 ABQB 606

It would be nice to know a little more about the facts of this case; but what appears to have happened on the basis of the rather cryptic record provided by Justice Bensler’s judgement is as follows. 1346329 Alberta Ltd (134) drilled a series of wells to earn interests in the Pierson properties. Earning was contingent on drilling the wells to contract depth which was defined as “a subsurface depth sufficient to penetrate 15 metres into the Spearfish.” The wells were drilled between late 2007 and January 2008. It was admitted that all of the wells were drilled to depths between 28.3 and 30.65 metres into the Spearfish.

The Alberta Energy Regulator Announces that It will Publish a Broader Range of Decisions

By Nigel Bankes

On September 29, 2015

In Energy, Responsible Energy Development Act

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Alberta Energy Regulator Announces that It will Publish a Broader Range of Decisions

Matter Commented On: AER Bulletin 2015-28, Posting of Participation and Procedural Decisions, September 23, 2015

Over the past few years, ABlawg and this writer in particular, have criticized the practice of the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) in not publishing important procedural rulings. Examples of those posts are available here, here and here. It is therefore appropriate that we also acknowledge that the AER has recently announced an important and positive change in its practice. On September 23, 2015 the AER issued Bulletin 2015-28 in which it announced that “effective immediately” the AER will begin posting on its website participation or standing decisions and substantive procedural decisions made by both hearing panels and other AER decision-makers. These decisions will be available by following Applications & Notices > Decisions on the AER website.

ITLOS, The Enrica Lexie Incident and the Prescription of Provisional Measures: Saying That There is Urgency Does Not Make It So

By Nigel Bankes

On September 16, 2015

In International Law, Law of the Sea

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: ITLOS, The Enrica Lexie Incident and the Prescription of Provisional Measures: Saying That There is Urgency Does Not Make It So

Decision Commented On: ITLOS, The Enrica Lexie Incident: Order in respect of request for the prescription of provisional measures, Italy v India, 24 August 2015

Article 290 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (LOSC) accords the International Tribunal of the Law of Sea (ITLOS) the authority to prescribe provisional measures in two different circumstances. Paragraph one authorizes ITLOS (along with the International Court of Justice, and any relevant international tribunal properly seized with an application) “to prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision” provided that ITLOS, the Court or an arbitral tribunal (as the case may be) has prima facie jurisdiction, to consider the matter.

Provincial Environmental Appeal Boards: A Forum of Choice for Environmental (and First Nation) Plaintiffs?

By Nigel Bankes

On September 11, 2015

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Environmental, Oil & Gas, Water Law

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Provincial Environmental Appeal Boards: A Forum of Choice for Environmental (and First Nation) Plaintiffs?

Decision Commented On: Chief Gale and the Fort Nelson First Nation v Assistant Regional Water Manager & Nexen Inc et al, Decision No. 2012-WAT-013(c), BC Environmental Appeal Board, September 3, 2015

In this important (and lengthy) decision (115pp), British Columbia’s Environmental Appeal Board (EAB) revoked Nexen’s commercial water licence for two reasons: first, the terms and conditions of Nexen’s licence were not technically supportable, and second, the Crown was in breach of its constitutional obligation to consult the First Nation with respect to the decision to issue the water licence.

I think that the decision is important for at least four reasons (notwithstanding the fact that the days for the version of the Water Act, RSBC 1996, c 483 in force at the time of this licence decision are numbered since it is due to be replaced by the new BC Water Sustainability Act in early 2016 and for comment see here). First, and most generally, it is an excellent example of the important role that environmental appeal boards can play in shining a light on the administrative practices of line departments. In the same vein, it is also offers a dramatic illustration of the differences between the role of an EAB and the role of a court on a judicial review or statutory appeal application. An EAB can offer a searching, de novo, technical re-assessment of the merits of the department’s decision; a court is inevitably more deferential and precluded from engaging in an assessment of the merits. I have written at length on this important role that EABs serve, see “Shining a light on the management of water resources: the role of an environmental appeal board” (2006), 16 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 131 – 185.